State v. Stubbs

• Decision Date: 10 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 568A03–2.,568A03–2.
• Citation: 368 N.C. 40,770 S.E.2d 74
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Larry STUBBS.

368 N.C. 40

770 S.E.2d 74

STATE of North Carolina

v.Larry STUBBS.

No. 568A03–2.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 10, 2015.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Sarah Jessica Farber for defendant-appellant.

HUDSON, Justice.

In this case we are tasked with determining if the Court of Appeals has subject matter jurisdiction to review the State's appeal from a trial court's ruling on a motion for appropriate relief ("MAR") when the defendant has been granted relief in the trial court. We hold that it does.

In 1973 defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary and assault with sentenced defendant to imprisonment for "his natural life." In 2011 defendant filed a pro se MAR in the Superior Court in Cumberland County asking the trial court to set aside his sentence on the burglary charge as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant argued that because of "significant changes" in the sentencing laws, his sentence should now be considered grossly disproportionate.¹ The trial court ordered a hearing and appointed counsel for defendant. After the hearing, the trial court entered an order granting defendant's motion for appropriate relief, vacating the 1973 judgment in the second-degree burglary case, and resentencing defendant to a term of thirty years. Giving credit for time served, the trial court ordered that defendant be immediately released. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the trial court's order, and by an order dated 13 December 2012, the Court of Appeals allowed the petition, thereby agreeing to hear the case.

After hearing the matter, a panel of the Court of Appeals agreed with the State, ultimately reversing the trial court's order and remanding to the trial court for reinstatement of the original 1973 judgment and commitment. ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 754 S.E.2d 174, 182 (2014). Procedurally, the Court of Appeals tackled two challenging questions, resulting in a lead opinion, a concurring opinion, and a dissenting opinion. First, the panel hearing the case considered whether it was bound by the decision of a prior petition panel (which allowed certiorari) that the Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at ––––, 754 S.E.2d at 177 n. 2. The lead opinion concluded that the panel was bound by that prior determination, citing to N.C.N.B. v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 567, 299 S.E.2d 629, 631–32 (1983) ("[O]nce a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question in a given case that decision becomes the law of the case and governs other panels which may thereafter consider the case. Further, since the power of one panel of the Court of Appeals is equal to and coordinate with that of another, a succeeding panel of that court has no power to review the decision of another panel on the same question in the same case. Thus the second panel in the instant case had no authority to exercise its discretion [against] reviewing the trial court's order when a preceding panel had earlier decided to the contrary." (first alteration in original)). Id. at ––––, 754 S.E.2d at 177 n. 2. The concurring and dissenting opinions disagreed with the lead opinion on that point, believing that each panel of the Court of Appeals has the authority and ability to address subject matter jurisdiction anew. Id. at ––––, 754 S.E.2d at 182–88. Second, the Court of Appeals addressed whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to review the State's appeal from a trial court's decision on a defendant's MAR when the defendant prevailed in the trial court. The lead opinion was silent on the matter (believing the panel bound by the prior petition panel's determination), id. at ––––, 754 S.E.2d at 177 n. 2 ; the concurring opinion believed that the court did have jurisdiction, id. at ––––, 754 S.E.2d at 183 ; and the dissent would have held that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over such an appeal, id. at ––––, 754 S.E.2d at 185. Defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the dissenting opinion, which addressed only the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established in the North Carolina Constitution: "The Court of Appeals shall have such appellate jurisdiction as the General Assembly may prescribe."

N.C. Const. art. IV, § 12 (2). Following such direction, the General Assembly has stated that the Court of Appeals "has jurisdiction ... to issue the prerogative writs, including mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, and supersedeas, in aid of its own jurisdiction, or to supervise and control the proceedings of any of the trial courts of the General Court of Justice." N.C.G.S. § 7A–32(c) (2014). More specifically, and also relevant here, the General Assembly has specified when appeals relating to MARs may be taken:

(c) The court's ruling on a motion for appropriate relief pursuant to G.S. 15A–1415 is subject to review:

(1) If the time for appeal from the conviction has not expired, by appeal.

(2) If an appeal is pending when the ruling is entered, in that appeal.

(3) If the time for appeal has expired and no appeal is pending, by writ of certiorari.

Id. § 15A–1422(c) (2014). Here, given the timing, appeal of the MAR would fall under subdivision (c)(3): by writ of certiorari. Notably, subsection 15A–1422(c) does not distinguish between an MAR when the State prevails below and an MAR under which the defendant prevails. Accordingly, given that our state consti...