State v. Sturdivant

• Decision Date: 23 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. SC10–1791.,SC10–1791.
• Citation: 94 So.3d 434
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Robert N. STURDIVANT, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

94 So.3d 434

STATE of Florida, Petitioner,

v.Robert N. STURDIVANT, Respondent.

No. SC10–1791.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Feb. 23, 2012.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

The issue in this case is whether the merger doctrine precludes a first-degree felony-murder conviction predicated on a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the child's death. In Sturdivant v. State, 84 So.3d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the First District Court of Appeal certified to this Court a question as one of great public importance, asking whether this Court's decision in Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181 (Fla.2005), precludes a felony-murder conviction in such a situation, notwithstanding the language of the felony-murder statute.¹

We rephrase the certified question as follows:

DOES THE MERGER DOCTRINE PRECLUDE A FELONY–MURDER CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 782.04(1)(a) 2., FLORIDA STATUTES (2007), THAT IS PREDICATED UPON A SINGLE ACT OF AGGRAVATED CHILD ABUSE THAT CAUSED THE CHILD'S DEATH?

Based upon legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the felony-murder statute, we hold that the merger doctrine does not preclude a felony-murder conviction predicated upon a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the child's death. Accordingly, we answer the rephrased certified question in the negative, recede from Brooks to the extent that it holds to the contrary, and quash the First District's decision below.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

The felony-murder statute in Florida provides that first-degree murder includes: “The unlawful killing of a human being ... [w]hen committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any ... [a]ggravated child abuse....” § 782.04(1)(a) 2.h., Fla. Stat. (2007). In this case, Sturdivant “was indicted by a grand jury for first-degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. As to the felony-murder charge, the indictment alleged that [Sturdivant] killed the victim while committing aggravated child abuse by slapping the [two-year-old] victim into a wall. The allegation was the same for the aggravated child abuse charge.” Sturdivant, 84 So.3d at 1044. In light of the Brooks decision, the State out of an abundance of caution also filed an information charging second-degree murder on the same allegation as had been made in the indictment. The first-degree and second-degree murder cases were consolidated. Id.

At trial, the State “played for the jury a portion of a statement made by [Sturdivant] in which [he] said that he had slapped the two-year-old victim, who was standing on a coffee table, on the back of the head with such force that the victim fell, hitting his head on the concrete wall.” Id. The medical examiner testified that Sturdivant's “version of what had happened was consistent with the findings on autopsy, and that the force of the slap to the back of the victim's head would have been sufficient to cause death.” Id.

Following the trial, the jury returned verdicts finding Sturdivant guilty of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and aggravated child abuse. ² At sentencing, Sturdivant was adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse. Id. at 1045. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction and to thirty years' imprisonment for the aggravated child abuse conviction. Because of double jeopardy concerns, Sturdivant was not adjudicated guilty of, or sentenced for, second-degree murder. Id.

On appeal, Sturdivant argued that he could not be convicted of both the first-degree felony murder and the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse because of the merger doctrine. After examining this Court's decision in Brooks, in which a majority of the Court held that it was error to convict Brooks of felony murder based on the predicate felony of a single act of aggravated child abuse, the First District held that in this case, “[b]ecause it is clear that the child victim died as the result of a single blow from [Sturdivant], we are constrained to reverse [Sturdivant's] convictions.” Id. at 1048. The First District then certified to this Court the question of whether Brooks precludes a conviction for felony murder based on the predicate offense of aggravated child abuse when the abuse consists of a single act, despite the language of section 782.04(1)(a) 2., the felony-murder statute. Id.

ANALYSIS

In Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181, 198 (Fla.2005), a majority of this Court concluded that when a felony-murder conviction is predicated upon a single act of aggravated child abuse that causes the child's death, the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse based on that single act merges with the homicide. We begin our analysis by examining the merger doctrine, which is a doctrine of statutory construction designed to effectuate legislative intent. Then, we examine the relevant portions of the felony-murder statute to discern the legislative intent. We conclude that where the underlying felony has been explicitly enumerated by the Legislature as one upon which a felony-murder conviction can be based, the underlying felony and the homicide do not merge. To hold otherwise would do violence to legislative intent as evidenced by the plain language of the felony-murder statute. Accordingly, we recede from Brooks to the extent that it holds to the contrary.

The Merger Doctrine

The merger doctrine is a principle of statutory construction rather than a principle of constitutional law.³ The origins of the merger doctrine have been explained as follows:

Conceived in the nineteenth century, the merger doctrine was developed ... as a shorthand explanation for the conclusion that the felony-murder rule should not be applied in circumstances where the only underlying (or “predicate”) felony committed by the defendant was assault. The name of the doctrine derived from the characterization of the assault as an offense that “merged” with the resulting homicide.

State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759, 774 (Tenn.2001) (quoting People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022, 1028 (1994), overruled on other grounds by People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal.4th 1172, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 203 P.3d 425 (2009)). With respect to the merger doctrine being one of preserving legislative intent, the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

Courts have generally declined to hold that the merger doctrine implicates any principles of constitutional law. Instead, courts have viewed the merger doctrine as a principle for preserving legislative intent and, more specifically, as a principle that preserves “some meaningful domainin which the Legislature's careful graduation of homicide offenses can be implemented.”

Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Hansen, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d at 1028). The court observed that “[t]he doctrine has been applied largely in those states where the felony murder statute fails to specifically list the felonies capable of supporting a felony murder conviction.” Id. at 774–75.

In a prior decision, this Court also recognized this distinction. In Robles v. State, 188 So.2d 789, 792 (Fla.1966), this Court distinguished between a felony-murder statute that provided that “any” felony could serve as a basis for felony murder and an enumerated felony-murder statute, such as Florida's. In that case, the defendant asserted that the facts of the case—where the victim was killed during the course of a burglary—were not appropriate for the application of the felony-murder rule. Id. at 791. The defendant directed the Court's attention to a line of New York cases holding that the felony-murder rule does not apply unless the felony is separate and independent from the homicide and where the underlying felony is not separate and independent, the underlying felony and the homicide merge. Id. at 792. This Court disagreed, noting the difference between the general catch-all felony-murder statute in New York and the enumerated felony-murder statute in Florida, which listed burglary as an offense on which felony-murder can be predicated:

As appellant acknowledges, the concern of the New York court, which was to preserve the integrity of the statutory degrees of homicide, resulted from the fact that the statute of that state makes a homicide committed in the perpetration of any felony first degree murder. Since the phrase “any felony” is broad enough to include even the aggravated assault that is usually involved in any homicide, the result would be that substantially every homicide would constitute first degree murder.

It was to avoid this result that the New York court adopted the doctrine that the supporting felony had to be independent of the homicide....

It is obvious that the problem that motivated the New York court to adopt the above rule cannot exist under a statute like Florida's, which limits the felony-murder rule to homicides committed in the perpetration of specified felonies, not including assault in any of its forms.

Id. (second emphasis added) (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court concluded that the concern motivating the New York courts—preserving the integrity of statutory degrees of homicide—did not compel the same result in Florida.⁴

Florida's Felony–Murder Statute

Because the merger doctrine is a principle of statutory construction, our analysis focuses on legislative intent. This is because “[a] court's purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction.” Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008). “As with any case of statutory construction, [the Court must] begin with the ‘actual language used in the...