Larimore v. State

• Decision Date: 11 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. SC06-139.,SC06-139.
• Citation: 2 So.3d 101
• Parties: William Todd LARIMORE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

2 So.3d 101 William Todd LARIMORE, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent. No. SC06-139. Supreme Court of Florida. December 11, 2008. As Revised on Denial of Rehearing January 29, 2009.

[2 So.3d 103]

Bill White, Public Defender, and Ward L. Metzger, Assistant Public Defender, Jacksonville, FL, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief Criminal Appeals, and Charles Richey McCoy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Larimore v. State, 917 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). The district court certified that its decision was in direct conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Gordon v. Regier, 839 So.2d 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

In this case, we interpret the Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, sections 394.910-.931, Florida Statutes (2004), commonly known as the "Jimmy Ryce Act" (the Act), and conclude that the Act requires that an individual be in lawful custody when the State takes steps to initiate civil commitment proceedings in order for the circuit court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition. For the reasons expressed below,

2 So.3d 104

we quash the district court's decision in Larimore and approve of the Second District's decision in Gordon.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises from the First District's decision denying Larimore's petition for writ of prohibition, in which Larimore sought to prevent civil commitment proceedings against him by the State pursuant to the Act. Larimore, 917 So.2d at 355. The facts are summarized in the First District's opinion:

On August 29, 1991, after pleading guilty to lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 16 years of age in two separate cases, Larimore was sentenced pursuant to the guidelines to 15 years in prison in one case followed by five years of probation in the second case. On October 10, 1998, Larimore was released from prison due to the award of gaintime, and began serving probation. On February 29, 2000, Larimore's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. On August 12, 2002, [the First District] held that Larimore was entitled to credit pursuant to Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941 (Fla.1993), for the 15 years served on his prison sentence (which included both actual prison time served and gaintime) which had the effect of erasing his five-year sentence for violating probation. Larimore v. State, 823 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Shortly thereafter, based on the revocation of probation, the Department of Corrections forfeited the gaintime (2,830 days) earned on Larimore's 15-year prison sentence, relying on section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes.

On November 23, 2004, the state filed a petition to have Larimore declared a sexually violent predator and involuntarily committed pursuant to the Jimmy Ryce Act. However, on December 10, 2004, [the First District] held that Larimore was entitled to immediate release from custody because forfeiture of Larimore's gaintime was not authorized pursuant to section 944.28(1) where Larimore's offense occurred before the effective date of the amendment to section 944.28 authorizing the forfeiture of gaintime upon revocation of probation. Larimore v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 910 So.2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), review denied, 905 So.2d 125 (Fla.2005). Larimore then filed a motion to dismiss the state's commitment petition under the Jimmy Ryce Act, arguing that he was not in lawful custody on the effective date of the Act. After the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, this petition for writ of prohibition followed [in the First District].

Larimore, 917 So.2d at 355. The district court correctly concluded that even though Larimore was not in custody when the Jimmy Ryce Act was enacted, his subsequent incarceration in 2000 generally subjected him to application of the Act. Id. at 356-57. However, the district court also concluded that the fact that Larimore was not in lawful custody when the commitment petition was filed in 2004 was not grounds upon which to grant the writ of prohibition. See id. at 356. It is this latter point upon which our decision turns.

Relying on provisions of the Act that provide that compliance with certain requirements and time limitations are not jurisdictional, the district court held that "jurisdiction under the amended Act is not conditioned on a person being `in custody' on the date the petition is filed." Id. at 357. The First District therefore concluded that although Larimore was not in lawful custody when the State filed its petition on November 23, 2004, id. at 356, the trial court nevertheless had jurisdiction to adjudicate

2 So.3d 105

the commitment petition. Id. at 358. The First District explained:

While the Act as amended clearly contemplates that a commitment petition should be filed before a person is released from total confinement, there is nothing in the Act that provides that the petition must be filed before the person's release. Rather, the Act clearly states that its time limitations are not jurisdictional and do not prevent the state from proceeding pursuant to the Act even if the person is released from custody.

Id. at 357. The First District also certified conflict on this issue with the Second District's decision in Gordon, in which the Second District concluded that proceedings under the Act could not be initiated against a person who was no longer held in lawful custody by the State. Larimore, 917 So.2d at 357-58.

The court in Gordon had before it a case in which the individual had been released from the custody of the Department of Corrections and was in the civilian population when, two days after his release, the State obtained a warrant for his arrest in order that commitment proceedings could be filed against him. Gordon, 839 So.2d at 717. Only after he was placed back into custody did the multidisciplinary team make its evaluation and recommendation, after which an order of probable cause under the Act was entered. Id. Gordon filed a motion to dismiss alleging that he "was not in custody for purposes of the Act at the time the petition for involuntary commitment was filed." Id. The Second District agreed and held that "for the Act to apply, the person must be in custody or in `total confinement,'" id., which the court interpreted to mean "that the person in question is being held at a secure facility." Id. at 718. The Second District also concluded that the seizure of Gordon in order to commence commitment proceedings was unlawful and could not qualify as custody for purposes of the Act. See id. & n. 4.

The Gordon court reasoned that "the Act contemplates that the circuit court make a determination prior to the expiration of the incarcerative sentence as to whether probable cause exists to hold the person as a sexually violent predator. This is consistent with our legal historical precedents requiring a probable cause determination prior to a person's seizure." Id. at 719. The Gordon court also found that section 394.9135 provides a "safety valve for a situation where `the anticipated release from total confinement of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense becomes immediate.'" Id. As to the jurisdictional disclaimer provisions, the Gordon court stated: "We do not interpret subsection (4) to mean that the state attorney or the DCF [Department of Children and Family Services] may start proceedings against a person who is not in custody, since, as stated, that person would not be subject to the provisions of the Act." Id. at 720. The Second District concluded that "[t]here is no provision in the Act for commencing proceedings against a person under the Act where he or she is not in custody and is, in fact, living in society." Id. at 719.

The First District in Larimore chose not to follow Gordon because, in its view, Gordon did not follow the plain statutory language of the Act and could not be reconciled with this Court's decision in Tanguay v. State, 880 So.2d 533 (Fla.2004). Larimore, 917 So.2d at 358. We conclude, however, that Tanguay does not control the analysis in this case and, as explained below, that lawful custody is required to initiate Jimmy Ryce proceedings; and further that the provisions of the Act relied on by the First District, which state that certain provisions and time limitations are

2 So.3d 106

not jurisdictional, do not constitute a statutory waiver of the lawful custody requirement contained within the overall legislative scheme.

ANALYSIS

Larimore asserts that under the terms of the Act a person must be in lawful custody for the State to initiate commitment proceedings against that individual. Because this issue is a matter of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Kephart v. Hadi, 932 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Fla.2006). Because Larimore's claim is predicated solely upon a construction of the provisions of the Act, we must give great deference to the actual language used by the Legislature.

A court's purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction. Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003). To discern legislative intent, a court must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the statute. Id. (citing Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000)). Moreover, a "statute should be interpreted to give effect to every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts." Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc., 793 So.2d 912, 914-15 (Fla.2001) (quoting Acosta v. Richter, 671 So.2d 149, 153-54 (Fla.1996)). "The doctrine of in pari materia is a principle of statutory construction that...