State v. Sullivan
| Decision Date | 14 December 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27650. |
| Citation | 96 P.2d 1117,2 Wn.2d 1 |
| Parties | STATE v. SULLIVAN et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Jack Sullivan and Richard Palmer were charged by information with committing the crime of grafting, and from a judgment dismissing the action, the State appeals.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, judge.
B. Gray Warner, John M. Schermer, and James W Mifflin, all of Seattle, for appellant.
Colvin & Rhodes, of Seattle, for respondents.
March 13, 1939, the prosecuting attorney of King county filed an information in the superior court of that county accusing the defendants of the commission of the crime of grafting. The charging portion of the information reads as follows 'They, said Jack Sullivan and Richard Palmer, and each of them, in the County of King, State of Washington, on or about the 8th day of March, 1939, then and there wilfully and unlawfully did ask and receive from one Bob Hewitt a gratuity, compensation and reward in the sum and of the value of $300 in lawful money of the United States, upon the agreement and understanding that they, the said Jack Sullivan and Richard Palmer, and each of them, would directly and indirectly influence certain public officials, to-wit: the mayor of Seattle, Arthur B. Langlie, the duly elected qualified and acting mayor of the City of Seattle; the chief of Police of Seattle, William Sears, the duly appointed, qualified and acting chief of police of the City of Seattle; and the Prosecuting Attorney of King County, B. Gray Warner, the duly elected, qualified and acting prosecuting attorney of King County, and their duly appointed deputies to refuse, Neglect and Defer the Performance of his and their official duly of arresting and prosecuting one said John Doe, a Chinese whose true name and identity is at this time unknown to the Prosecuting Attorney, for violating the laws of the State of Washington, relating to the conducting and maintaining of a Chinese lottery.'
The case proceeded to trial, and the court at the conclusion of the state's case denied defendants' motion to dismiss and overruled their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. After evidence had been taken on their behalf, defendants renewed their motion to dismiss the action. This motion was granted by the trial court. Shortly afterwards a formal judgment was entered dismissing the action. The state has appealed.
The record is presented by a bill of exceptions in which it is shown that the court dismissed the action on the sole ground that the evidence disclosed that the Chinese mentioned in the information had never existed. Respondents had notice of the signing of the bill of exceptions but made no objection to its contents. Neither did they offer or suggest any amendments thereto.
We must assume that the trial court was of the opinion that sufficient evidence had been introduced to take the case to the jury, save and except that relating to the existence of the Chinaman mentioned in the information.
The sole question presented is, whether, in order to find the respondents guilty of the crime of grafting, it was necessary for the evidence to show that 'John Doe, a Chinese' actually existed.
The charge against respondents was based upon the first provision of Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2333, which reads: 'Every person who shall ask or receive any compensation, gratuity or reward, or any promise thereof, upon the representation that he can, directly or indirectly, or in consideration that he shall, or shall attempt to, directly or indirectly, influence any public officer, whether executive, administrative, judicial or legislative, to refuse, neglect, or defer the performance of any official duty * * * shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, * * *.'
What is the gravamen of the offense as defined by the statute?
On five previous occasions we have been called upon to construe § 2333; State v. Marion, 68 Wash. 675, 124 P. 125; State v. Shea, 78 Wash. 342, 139 P. 203; State v. Roberts, 100 Wash. 493, 171 P. 225; State v. Worsham, 154 Wash. 575, 283 P. 167; and State v. Shay, 186 Wash. 154, 57 P.2d 401; but the precise question presented by this appeal has not Before been raised. It is further disclosed through exhaustive research that this problem has not been adjudicated by a court of any other jurisdiction. Indeed, it appears that § 2333 is, in itself, unique.
We turn, then, to the language of the statute itself. Our purpose is to discover the effect and meaning which the legislature intended to ascribe to the...
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State v. Ferro
...as well as actual brokers of corruption along with officials and others implicated in corrupt arrangements. State v. Sullivan, 2 Wash.2d 1, 96 P.2d 1117 (Sup.Ct.1939). See also, People v. Woodward, 136 Cal.App. 149, 28 P.2d 36 (D.Ct.App.1934), which held that a statute which is analogous to......