State v. Summers, No. 195PA99.

• Decision Date: 05 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 195PA99.
• Citation: 528 S.E.2d 17
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Allen T. SUMMERS, Jr.

528 S.E.2d 17

STATE of North Carolina v. Allen T. SUMMERS, Jr.

No. 195PA99.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 5, 2000.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Isaac T. Avery, III, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

The Law Offices of James D. Williams, Jr., P.A., by James D. Williams, Jr., Durham, for defendant-appellee.

LAKE, Justice.

Defendant was stopped on 23 March 1996 for passing another vehicle in a no-passing zone and was subsequently arrested for driving while impaired (DWI) in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. He was taken to the magistrate's office, where the charging officer recorded that defendant willfully refused to submit to an Intoxilyzer breath-alcohol test. Defendant's refusal was reported to the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), which notified defendant that his driver's license was being revoked for one year, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 16.2(d). Defendant appealed for a hearing before DMV, at which time the revocation was upheld. He then appealed to civil superior court, and on 17 April 1996, Superior Court Judge David Q. LaBarre overturned the revocation upon finding that defendant did not willfully refuse to submit to the Intoxilyzer test.

Defendant was found guilty of DWI in criminal district court on 7 October 1996 and appealed to superior court for a trial de novo. The trial court denied his motion in limine to exclude evidence relating to his alleged refusal to submit to the breath-alcohol test. Defendant was tried before a jury at the 7 October 1997 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Durham County. The jury found defendant guilty of DWI, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals issued a unanimous decision granting defendant a new trial. The court held the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented relitigation of the question of whether defendant willfully refused to submit to an Intoxilyzer test because that issue had been conclusively decided on appeal to civil superior court from defendant's driver's license revocation by DMV. State v. Summers, 132 N.C.App. 636, 645, 513 S.E.2d 575, 581 (1999). On appeal to this Court, the State contends the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel. We disagree.

The question of whether defendant did, in fact, willfully refuse to submit to an Intoxilyzer test is irrelevant to the determination of this appeal. The only issue before this Court is whether a civil superior court determination, on appeal from an administrative hearing, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(e), regarding an allegation of willful refusal, estops the relitigation of that same issue in a defendant's criminal prosecution for DWI.

Under North Carolina law, "[a]ny person who drives a vehicle on a highway or public vehicular area thereby gives consent to a chemical analysis if charged with an implied-consent offense," which includes an offense involving impaired driving. N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(a) (1999). If an individual charged with an implied-consent offense willfully refuses to submit to chemical analysis, after being informed of the consequences of willful refusal, in accord with N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2, the charging officer must execute an affidavit to that effect, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(c). Upon receipt of the affidavit, DMV must expeditiously notify the person charged that his or her license to drive is revoked for twelve months. N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d). The person charged may request a hearing by a DMV hearing officer, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(d), and, if the revocation is sustained, he or she has the right to a hearing de novo in superior court. N.C.G.S. § 20-16.2(e). In the case sub judice, DMV revoked defendant's license on the basis of an alleged willful refusal to submit to an Intoxilyzer test. Defendant's revocation was sustained through all stages of administrative review, and defendant filed a petition for a hearing de novo in superior court. At the civil court hearing, with the State Attorney General's office representing DMV, Judge LaBarre made findings of fact supporting the conclusion of law that defendant "did not willfully refuse to submit to a chemical analysis upon the request of the charging officer" and, on that basis, dismissed the revocation order. The State did not appeal the trial court's ruling, which accordingly became the law of the case. This Court must now determine whether the trial court's ruling became conclusive in defendant's criminal trial for DWI.

The companion doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel have been developed by the courts of our legal system during their march down the corridors of time to serve the present-day dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.

Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 427, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986). The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also referred to as "issue preclusion" or "estoppel by judgment," precludes relitigation of a fact, question or right in issue

"when there has been a final judgment or decree, necessarily determining [the] fact, question or right in issue, rendered by a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, and there is a later suit involving an issue as to the identical fact, question or right theretofore determined, and involving identical parties or parties in privity with a party or parties to the prior suit."

King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 355, 200 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1973) (quoting Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 524, 124 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1962)). The doctrine of collateral estoppel "`is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally.'" Id. at 356, 200 S.E.2d at 805 (quoting Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599, 68 S.Ct. 715, 720, 92 L.Ed. 898, 907 (1948)). "`[W]hen a fact has been agreed upon or decided in a court of record, neither of the parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as the judgment or decree stands unreversed.'" Id. at 355, 200 S.E.2d at 804 (quoting Dunstan, 256 N.C. at 523-24, 124 S.E.2d at 576).

The requirements for the identity of issues to which collateral estoppel may be applied have been established by this Court as follows: (1) the issues must be the same as those involved in the prior action, (2) the issues must have been raised and actually litigated in the prior action, (3) the issues must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and (4) the determination of the issues in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. Id. at 358, 200 S.E.2d at 806. Here, there is no dispute as to "the issue" element of collateral estoppel. The State does not contest that "the issue" is whether there was willful refusal, that it was raised and litigated and that it was material and necessary to the resulting judgment in defendant's appeal of his license revocation. Therefore, it is unnecessary to further analyze the collateral estoppel element of issue identity.

Unlike issue identity, the rules for determining whether the parties in question are or were in privity with parties in the prior action are not as well defined. Except in cases where the parties in each claim are identical, the meaning of "privity" for the purpose of collateral estoppel is "somewhat elusive ... [and] `[t]here is no definition of the word "privity" which can be applied in all cases.'" Hales v. N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 337 N.C. 329, 333-34, 445 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1994) (quoting Dunstan, 256 N.C. at 524,124 S.E.2d at 577). "In general, `privity involves a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right'" previously represented at trial. State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411, 417, 474 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1996) (quoting 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 663 (1995)). "Whether or not a person was a party to a prior suit `must be determined as a matter of substance and not of mere form.'" Grindstaff, 284 N.C. at 357,200 S.E.2d at 806 (quoting Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611, 618, 46 S.Ct. 420, 423, 70 L.Ed. 757, 763 (1926)). "`The courts will look beyond the nominal party whose name appears on the record as plaintiff and consider the legal questions raised as they may affect the real party or parties in interest.'" Id. (quoting Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 688, 44 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1947)).

This Court previously determined the question of privity between an attorney general in a civil action and a district attorney in a criminal action in State ex rel. Lewis v. Lewis, 311 N.C. 727, 319 S.E.2d 145 (1984). In Lewis, there was privity and commonality of interest between the State in its criminal prosecution for nonsupport and the State in its civil action for indemnification of its payments of support to defendant's children. This Court concluded that the State was not a nominal party in either action, and that the defendant was collaterally estopped from litigating the underlying issue of paternity in a civil action after the issue had been fully litigated in the criminal action. Id. at 734, 319 S.E.2d at 150.

In the instant case, the State contends the district attorney, representing the State in defendant's criminal prosecution for DWI, was not in privity with the Attorney General, representing the State in defendant's appeal to civil superior court from his license revocation. However, there can be no question that the district attorney and the Attorney General both represent the interests of the people of North Carolina, regardless of whether it be the district attorney in a criminal trial court or the Attorney General in a civil or criminal appeal. See N.C.G.S. § 114-2(1), (2), (4) (1999); N.C.G.S. § 7A-61 (1999); Simeon v. Hardin, 339...