State v. Superior Court of Washington In and For King County

• Decision Date: 04 November 1916
• Docket Number: 13798.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PORT OF SEATTLE et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

160 P. 755

93 Wash. 267

STATE ex rel. PORT OF SEATTLE et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON IN AND FOR KING COUNTY et al.

No. 13798.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

November 4, 1916

Proceeding by the State of Washington, on the relation of the Port of Seattle, a municipal corporation, Robert Bridges, and others as Commissioners thereof, against the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and for King County, and Edward H Wright, Judge of the Superior Court acting in and for such county, to review an order granting an injunction in the case of C. O. Qualheim against the Port of Seattle and the Port Commissioners. Order affirmed.

C. J France, of Seattle, for plaintiffs.

Halverstadt & Clarke and W. M. Whitney, all of Seattle for defendants.

MOUNT J.

This is a proceeding to review an order of the lower court granting an injunction in the case of C. O. Qualheim, Plaintiff, v The Port of Seattle, and Robert Bridges, C. E. Remsberg and Carl A. Ewald, as Port Commissioners of the Port of Seattle Defendants.

The plaintiff in that case alleged that the Legislature, in 1915, enacted a law amending the Port District Act of this state, being chapter 46 of the laws of that year. This amendment increased the number of port commissioners, and limited the bonded indebtedness of port districts of the first class. It is alleged that the port commissioners, for the purpose of defeating that enactment, are attempting to secure a nullification thereof by means of a referendum, and, for that purpose, the port commissioners have wrongfully, unlawfully, and without authority, expended large sums of the funds of said port district for the purpose of advertising, lobbying, and printing circulars, which have been scattered over King county and a considerable portion of the state; that the port commissioners, unless restrained from so doing, will expend other large sums of port funds for the purpose of carrying on a political campaign against said chapter 46; and that, by reason of said unlawful expenditures, the rate of taxation in King county will be increased, and the taxpayers of King county will be compelled to repay the money so unlawfully expended. It is also alleged that the plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of King county. An application was made to the court below for a restraining order. After a hearing upon that application, the superior court of King county, on the 18th day of October, entered an order enjoining the defendant port of Seattle, and the port commissioners, their agents and servants, from expending, or causing to be expended, any of the funds of the port of Seattle, for the purpose of defeating the operation and effect of chapter 46 of the Laws of 1915. This writ is to review that order.

The amendment to the Port District Act, being chapter 46 of the Laws of 1915, was made the subject of a referendum under the Constitution. It is now designated as referendum measure No. 8, to be printed on the official ballot, to be approved or rejected at the general election on November 7th of this year. By reason of the reference, this chapter has not yet become a law. This amendment is intended to increase the board of port commissioners from three to seven members, and provides that the total bonded indebtedness of any port of the first class shall be limited to 2 1/4 per cent. of the assessed valuation of taxable property in said district, but in no event shall the total bonded indebtedness ever exceed the sum of $5,750,000.

The question presented is whether the board of port commissioners is authorized to expend public funds, raised by taxation, to defeat proposed legislation affecting that corporation. It is contended by the relators that, while the port of Seattle is a municipal corporation, it is also a business corporation, and has the power to expend the money of the corporation to the best interest thereof.

It is not contended, as we understand the brief of the relators, that there is any express provision in the law authorizing the port commission to expend money belonging to the corporation for political purposes, but it is argued, in substance, that, because this corporation is in the nature of a business corporation, engaged in commercial enterprises in competition with private individuals engaged in similar enterprises, and is conducting such business as an agency of the state, it has a right to expend its moneys in such way as the port commissioners deem for the best interest of the corporation; that, inasmuch as the powers of the corporation are general in their character, the power is implied to the trustees to apply the money of the corporation as, in their opinion, will best promote the affairs of the corporation. There can be no doubt that a corporation, exercising powers of the state, possesses only those powers expressly granted, or such as are necessarily implied. The general rule is stated by Dillon on Municipal Corporations, at section 89, as follows:

'It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. * * *'

In the case of Tacoma Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Tacoma, 14 Wash. 288, 44 P. 655, this court said:

'It is a well-settled rule of construction that a delegation of powers will not be presumed in favor of a municipal corporation unless they be such as are necessary to its corporate existence, but that the same must be clearly conferred by express statutory enactment. * * *'

And in Young v. State, 19 Wash. 634, 54 P. 36, this court said:

'* * * It is well settled that public officers have, and can exercise, only such power as is conferred upon them by law, either statutory or constitutional, and that the government is not bound by the unauthorized acts of its officers or agents. * * *'

See, also, Smith v. Lamping, 27 Wash. 624, 68 P. 195; Farwell v. Seattle, 43 Wash. 141, 86 P. 217, 10 Ann. Cas. 130. In this latter case, it is said:

'A municipal corporation is limited in its powers to those granted in express words, or to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and also to those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4th Ed.) § 89. * * * It is a general

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