State v. Superior Court of Spokane County

• Decision Date: 05 April 1894
• Citation: 36 P. 443,8 Wash. 591
• Parties: STATE EX REL. WOLFERMAN v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SPOKANE COUNTY ET AL.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

36 P. 443

8 Wash. 591

STATE EX REL. WOLFERMAN v. SUPERIOR COURT OF SPOKANE COUNTY ET AL.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 5, 1894

Application by the state at the relation of Laura Wolferman against the superior court of Spokane county, and the judges thereof, for a writ of prohibition. Writ granted.

H. M Herman, for petitioner.

Jno. R McBride, J. R. Boarman, and J. B. Metcalfe, for respondents.

SCOTT J.

The relator petitions for a writ of prohibition against the superior court of Spokane county to prevent further proceedings in an action brought by Harry C. Bell and his wife, Belle Bell, who are the real parties in interest herein, against the relator. The matters in controversy in said action have been before this court several times on various questions. 6 Wash. 84, 32 P. 1017; 7 Wash. 234, 34 P 930; 8 Wash. ---, 35 P. 603. Since the last proceeding above mentioned, the present action was commenced in the superior court to review and so modify the decree as to except from its operation the lands claimed to have been released. The facts set up therein are substantially the same as those disclosed in the last two prior proceedings, which were brought to obtain the same relief, but as to which no hearing was reached on the merits. While fraud is claimed, its only basis is the fact that the plaintiff sought for and obtained a decree covering the whole land as described in the mortgage. Upon objection being made, the superior court determined that it had jurisdiction to entertain the action whereupon this application is made to us to prohibit said court from proceeding therein.

The investigation of the various questions connected herewith some of which are only indirectly pertinent, has involved an examination into a long line of authorities, many of which are cited or are referred to in such citations as are given. Under these we are well satisfied that the plaintiffs in said action have not stated a cause of action entitling them to any relief. The fraud alleged is not of that character which a court of equity would recognize as sufficient to warrant a vacation or modification of the judgment. Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 17 How. 443; Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 2 S.Ct. 25; Gray v. Barton, 62 Mich. 186, 28 N.W. 813; Haynes, New Trials & App. § 340; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665, 6 S.Ct. 901; Brooks v. O'Hara, 8 Fed. 529; Knox Co. v. Harshman, 133 U.S. 152, 10 S.Ct. 257. The proposition that, where a cause has been appealed and a judgment rendered by the appellate court, no interference therewith will be tolerated on the part of the lower court by any proceeding in the cause other than such as is directed by the higher court, is well sustained by the authorities. Ex parte Dubuque & P. R. Co., 1 Wall. 69; Abrams v. Lee, 14 Ill. 167; Armstrong v. Poole (W. Va.) 5 S. E. 257. And see Gelston v. Codwise, 1 Johns. Ch. 189; Greene v. Greene, 2 Gray, 361; Elliott, App. Proc. §§ 562-585. Some of the cases hold that a proceeding like this in the nature of a bill of review can only be brought after obtaining permission of the appellate court. Stafford v. Bryan, 2 Paige, 45; Lyon v. Merritt, 6 Paige, 473; Southard v. Russell, 16 How. 547-570; Ryerson v. Eldred, 18 Mich. 491; Kimberly v. Arms, 40 F. 549. If we were to follow these authorities, it seems as though it would follow that, where a case is presented sufficient in our judgment to warrant it, we should grant permission to a party to institute such a proceeding in the lower court, even after the lapse of the time for filing a petition for rehearing, or, perhaps, after the lapse of the statutory time of one year, unless such time is to govern in all cases, and upon this point the authorities are conflicting. See Freem. Judgm. §§ 105, 489, 497; Murchison v. White, 54 Tex. 78; Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325, 19 N.E. 842; Yerkes v. McHenry, 6 Dak. 5, 50 N.W. 485. Otherwise, the effect would be to deprive a party from proceeding after that time. There would be no other mode provided for the investigation, for this, not being a court of original jurisdiction, or constituted to try such questions, could not entertain such an action itself. But we do not find it necessary to pass upon or consider that question further at this time. The provisions of the Code (sections 221 and 1393, vol. 2) have a very broad scope, if they do not cover all possible grounds for obtaining relief from judgments, where the proceedings are instituted in the manner and time specified, and it is very questionable, at least, whether the plaintiffs have stated enough to have entitled them to any relief under any...