State v. Superior Court, King County

• Decision Date: 13 May 1912
• Citation: 68 Wash. 425,123 P. 791
• Parties: STATE ex rel. PUGET MILL CO. et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT, KING COUNTY, et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

123 P. 791

68 Wash. 425

STATE ex rel. PUGET MILL CO. et al. v. SUPERIOR COURT, KING COUNTY, et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 13, 1912

Department 2. Certiorari by the State, on the relation of the Puget Mill Company and others, to review an order of the Superior Court of King county, adjudging the use of lands for the construction of a waterway a public use. Judgment affirmed.

Hughes McMicken, Dovell & Ramsey, Edward Von Tobel, Robert A Devers, and Richard Saxe Jones, all of Seattle, for plaintiff.

Shorett McLaren & Shorett, of Seattle, for respondents.

MOUNT J.

This action is brought by writ of certiorari to review an order of the superior court of King county, adjudging the use of certain lands for the construction of the Duwamish waterway in King county a public use. Several errors are assigned; but they are all argued under points as follows: (1) That a corporation may maintain suit only in its proper name; (2) that the action relating to commercial waterway districts (Laws of 1911, p. 11), under which the original proceedings were brought, is unconstitutional for several reasons; (3) that the waterway sought to be constructed is not the same as the one proposed by the petition under which the district was organized; and (4) that all the interested parties in the district were not legally served with process in the condemnation action. We shall notice these points in the order stated.

The petition in the condemnation action states the caption of the case as follows, 'Fred W. Newell, D. Hamm, and Frank H. Paul, as commissioners of Commercial Waterway District No. 1 of King county, state of Washington, v. Philip Abey,' and about 13,000 other defendants, naming them. The first paragraph of the petition avers 'that commercial waterway district No. 1 of King county, state of Washington, is a duly organized and existing commercial waterway district in King county, under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Washington, relating to commercial waterway districts, and that your petitioners are duly elected, qualified, and acting commissioners thereof.' It is argued that the action was brought by the commissioners in their own names, that it should have been brought by the 'commercial waterway district No. 1 of King county, state of Washington,' which the statute designates as the name of the district. This would, no doubt, be correct, if the statute so provided; but the statute provides, at section 1, Laws 1911, p. 11, as follows: 'Any county or portion of a county requiring commercial waterways may be organized into a commercial waterway district, and when so organized such district, and the board of commissioners hereinafter provided for, shall have and possess the power herein conferred, * * * and said district shall be known and designated as commercial waterway district No. ... of the county of ..... in the state of Washington, and shall have the right to sue and be sued by and in the name of its board of commissioners hereinafter provided for. * * *' This statute expressly gives the district the right to sue 'in the name of its board of commissioners,' which was done. Hence, if the general rule is that a corporation must sue in its proper name, where the statute provides that suits may be brought in the name of its board of commissioners, suits may be so brought.

It is next contended that the act of February 9, 1911, under which the proceedings were originally brought, is unconstitutional because it is a special and private law and grants special privileges to a class of citizens, and because the act embraces more than one subject. We do not regard the act as subject to any of these objections. The act is a general act, applicable alike to all citizens upon the same terms. It is true that one part of the act provides for the organization of the district, another part provides for the powers and duties of the commissioners, and another provides for the procedure of the court. These things, however, are all germane and necessary to the one subject, namely, the establishment of commercial waterway districts. Because ...