State v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1916
• Docket Number: 13049.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. SEATTLE TAXICAB & TRANSFER CO.

156 P. 837

90 Wash. 416

STATE v. SEATTLE TAXICAB & TRANSFER CO.

No. 13049.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 29, 1916

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; King Dykeman Judge.

The Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Company was convicted of violation of taxicab law and fined. From the judgment and sentence, it appeals. Affirmed.

William Hickman Moore, Hugh Todd, Bogle, Graves Merritt & Bogle, and Brightman, Halverstadt & Tennant, all of Seattle, for appellant.

Alfred H. Lundin, W. F. Meier, and Joseph A. Barto, all of Seattle for the State.

C. J France, Shorett, McLaren & Shorett, Jas. E. Bradford, and William B. Allison, all of Seattle, amici curiae.

FULLERTON J.

The Legislature of the state of Washington, at its biennial session of 1915, passed an act relating to common carriers of passengers, the title and body of which reads as follows:

'An act relating to and regulating common carriers of passengers upon public streets, roads and highways, providing for the issuance of permits; prescribing penalties for violations, and providing when this act shall take effect.

'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Washington:

'Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, other than a steam, street or interurban railway company to engage in or to carry on the business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle along any public street, road or highway, within the corporate limits of any city of the first class, without having first obtained a permit so to do as hereinafter provided: Provided, that any street or interurban railway or other transportation company engaging in the business of transporting passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle except street cars along any public street, road or highway in this state, shall come under the provisions of this act: Provided, further, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to carriers of the United States mail.

'Sec. 2. Every person, firm or corporation other than a steam, street or interurban railway company, desiring to engage in the business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle over or along any public street, road or highway in any city of the first class and every street or interurban railway or other transportation company desiring to engage in the business of transporting passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle except street cars, shall apply to the secretary of state for a permit so to do, and such applicant for each motor vehicle intended to be so operated shall deposit and keep on file with the secretary of state a bond running to the state of Washington in the penal sum of twenty-five hundred dollars, with good and sufficient surety company licensed to do business in this state as surety to be approved by the secretary of state, conditioned for the faithful compliance by the principal of said bond with the provisions of this act and to pay all damages which may be sustained by any person injured by reason of any careless, negligent or unlawful act on the part of said principal, his agents or employés in the conduct of said business or in the operation of any motor propelled vehicle used in transporting passengers for hire over or along any public street, road or highway, and shall pay to the secretary of state a fee of five dollars and thereupon such license shall be issued to the applicant.

'Sec. 3. Every person injured by any careless, negligent or unlawful act of any person, firm or corporation receiving a permit under the provisions of this act, or his, their, or its agents, or employés in conducting or carrying on said business or in operating any motor propelled vehicle used for the carrying and transporting of passengers over and along any public street, road or highway, and his heirs, executors and administrators shall have a cause of action against the principal and surety upon the bond provided for in the preceding section for all damages sustained and in any such action the full amount of damages sustained may be recovered against the principal, but the recovery against the surety shall be limited to the amount of the bond and a surviving husband and child or children or if no husband, then the child or children shall have action for the death of the wife or mother caused by any such negligence.

'Sec. 4. Every person, firm or corporation, other than a steam, street or interurban railway company, engaging in the business of carrying or transporting any passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle along or over any public street, road or highway or carrying or transporting any passengers for hire along or over any public street, road or highway in any city of the first class, and every street or interurban railway or transportation company engaging in the business of transporting passengers for hire in any motor propelled vehicle except street cars, without having first obtained and having a permit so to do as in this act provided shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

'Sec. 5. If any part of this act be held invalid by any court, the remainder of this act shall nevertheless be valid.

'Sec. 6. This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public safety, and shall take effect April 10, 1915.' Laws 1915, p. 227.

On April 27, 1915, the prosecuting attorney of King county filed an information in the superior court of that county charging the Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Company, a corporation, with a violation of the act. The company, on appearing in answer to process served upon it, did not contest the charge that it had operated its taxicabs without a compliance with the provisions of the act, but rested its defense on the ground that the act itself was void and of no effect, because in contravention of the Constitution of the United States as well as the Constitution of the state of Washington. At the conclusion of the trial, the company was adjudged guilty by the trial court, and sentenced to pay a fine as for a gross misdemeanor. From the judgment and sentence this appeal is prosecuted.

In this court, likewise, constitutional questions only are presented. The act is assailed by counsel specially representing the appellant as violative of section 19 of article 2, and sections 1 and 12 of article 1, of the state Constitution, and section 1 of article 14 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We have been favored, also, with briefs of counsel representing other interests, and these in addition assail the act as violative of sections 7, 9, and 17 of article 1 of the state Constitution, and fourth and fifth amendments to the federal Constitution. These objections we shall notice in order, taking up first those founded upon the state Constitution.

Section 19 of article 2 of the state Constitution provides that 'no bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.' The claim of unconstitutionality on this branch of the question is founded on the concluding clause of this provision, the particular contention being that the title of the act does not express its subject-matter. The appellant points out that the only operative words of the title of the act which can be said to denote its contents are found in the first clause thereof that is, in the words, 'An act relating to and regulating common carriers of passengers upon public streets, roads and highways,' and these, it argues, give no hint that a bond is to be required from a certain class of common carriers before they will be permitted to engage in the business of carrying passengers. But it is our opinion that the title is sufficient. How full the title of an act must be in order to express its subject has frequently been a question for the consideration of this court. We have frequently held that the title to an act to be sufficient need not be an index to the body of the act; that it is sufficient if it is suggestive of the general subject treated; that the generality of a title is no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself; and that under a general subject may be included innumerable minor subjects, if these minor subjects relate to the general subject expressed and form a comprehensive whole. More specifically, we have held that the title, 'An act relating to pleadings in civil actions' (Laws 1891, p. 106), was sufficiently definite not only to permit the enactment of specific provisions relating to the subject of pleadings, but also to permit the repeal of certain existing sections of the statute on the same subject. Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 P. 520. In State v. Fraternal Knights and Ladies, 35 Wash. 338, 77 P. 500, we held that under the title, 'An act regulating fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations' (Laws 1901, p. 356), certain enumerated beneficiary insurance societies could be prohibited from doing business in this state unless their mortuary assessment rates equaled or exceeded a certain minimum named in the statute. In Seattle v. Barto, 31 Wash. 141, 71 P. 735, an ordinance requiring one desiring to engage in the business of a pawnbroker to procure a license was held valid although enacted under the title, 'An ordinance to license and regulate certain trades and occupations in the city of Seattle.' In Ewing v. Seattle, 55 Wash. 241, 104 P. 263, the title of the act was, 'An act relating to electric railroads, street and other electric railways, * * *' (Laws 1903, p. 364), and was held sufficiently broad to embrace a provision providing for the granting of franchises for such railways by the legislative authority of a city. And see, also, State ex rel. Puget Mill Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Wash. 425, 123...