State v. Superior Court of King County

• Decision Date: 04 September 1913
• Citation: 75 Wash. 239,134 P. 916
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. GORELICK v. SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY.

134 P. 916

75 Wash. 239

STATE ex rel. GORELICK v. SUPERIOR COURT OF KING COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 4, 1913

Department 1. Original application in the Supreme Court for mandamus to compel the settlement of a statement of facts by the judge of the superior court. Writ denied.

R. B Brown and Thos. R. Horner, both of Seattle, for plaintiff.

John F Murphy, Robt. H. Evans, and C. F. Riddell, all of Seattle for defendant.

PARKER J.

This is an original proceeding in this court wherein the relator, an alien, seeks a writ of mandate to compel the settlement and certification of a statement of facts by Judge Frater, of the superior court for King county, in aid of an appeal which the relator is attempting to prosecute from the decision of that court denying his application to become a citizen of the United States. The argument of counsel upon both sides proceeds upon the theory that the relator's right to the relief he here seeks depends upon whether there is any right of appeal to this court from the decisions of the superior courts, rendered in naturalization proceedings had in those courts in pursuance of the laws of the United States. We therefore give no attention to the right of the relator to have settled and certified a statement of facts aside from his claimed right of appeal.

It is provided by section 8, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, that 'the Congress shall have power * * * to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.' Laws enacted by Congress in pursuance of this power have been in existence since near the beginning of our national life, conferring power of naturalization upon state courts as well as upon federal courts. The last enacted general law upon this subject is that of 1906 (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 529]). It gives this power to state courts in the following language: 'Sec. 3. That exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens as citizens of the United States is hereby conferred upon the following specified courts: * * * Also all courts of record in any state or territory now existing, or which may hereafter be created, having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which the amount in controversy is unlimited.' This is followed by provisions prescribing in considerable detail the conditions under which aliens may become citizens, and also the procedure to be followed by the courts in citizenship proceedings. The force of federal naturalization statutes enacted in pursuance of this uniform rule of the federal Constitution, it has been held by this court, extends even to the amount of fees chargeable by the clerks of the superior court for services rendered by them in naturalization proceedings, to the exclusion of state legislation upon the subject of fees. State ex rel. Newman v. Libby, 47 Wash. 481, 92 P. 350. The capacity in which state courts act in naturalization proceedings is well stated by Justice Frick in Eldredge v. Salt Lake County, 37 Utah, 188, 106 P. 939, as follows: 'It seems to us too obvious to require either argument or the citation of authorities that in naturalization proceedings the United States government exercises sovereign functions which exclusively belong to that government, and further that, in authorizing the state courts to act in such proceedings, the national government selects such courts and the clerks thereof as government agencies through whom said government is discharging one of its peculiar functions of national sovereignty. Whatever may have been the theory of some courts regarding the power of Congress to confer such authority upon the state courts in the past, the question is now settled that Congress has such power, and that state courts may constitutionally exercise the same when authorized by Congress to do so. Among other cases, we refer to the following: Levin v. United States, 128 F. 826, 63 C. C. A. 476; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326, 41 L.Ed. 715; State v. Libby, 47 Wash. 481, 92 P. 350. The question as to whether the state courts continue or cease to be state courts while acting in naturalization cases, while interesting, is not material. It is enough for the present to know that in so doing such courts are merely agencies of the national government.'

It is true that our state Constitution in section 6, art. 4, provides that superior courts 'shall have the power of naturalization.' This, however, was regarded by this court in State ex rel. Newman v. Libby, supra, as simply an expression of consent on the part of the state that its superior courts might exercise that power in conformity to federal law rather than as an attempt to confer jurisdiction on the superior courts independent of federal law. This power, being one to be exercised as a function of the national government, and governed by rules required by the federal constitutional provision above quoted to be uniform, it seems to us to follow that the state courts must of necessity be controlled in their methods of procedure, as well as in their determination of the rights of applicants for citizenship, by laws enacted by Congress. Indeed, upon no other theory could the rule of uniformity be maintained.

It also seems plain to us that the question of what courts have jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings, whether original or appellate, must be determined by the laws enacted by Congress. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the requirements of the 'uniform rule' found in the federal Constitution. The judgments of United States courts in citizenship proceedings have, on a few occasions since the passage of the act of 1906, been reviewed in the appellate courts, but not until the decision in the case of United States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 100 C. C. A. 521, 21 Ann Cas. 665, has such review in an appellate court by error or appeal been challenged. In that case, after a review of the provisions of the act of 1906 and noting, among other things, the fact that it makes no provision for appeal, and also noting the provisions of the general statute allowing review of case...