State ex rel. N.Y. Cas. Co. v. Superior Court for King County

• Decision Date: 12 November 1948
• Docket Number: 30691.
• Citation: 199 P.2d 581,31 Wn.2d 834
• Parties: STATE ex rel. NEW YORK CASUALTY CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

199 P.2d 581

31 Wn.2d 834

STATE ex rel. NEW YORK CASUALTY CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY.

No. 30691.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 12, 1948

Department 1

Original prohibition proceeding by the State of Washington on the relation of the New York Casualty Company, a corporation relator, against the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, the Honorable Hugh C. Todd Judge, respondent, to prevent the respondent from entering an order granting a voluntary nonsuit in an action then pending in that court.

Lewis L. Stedman, of Seattle, for relator.

Murray & Hedgcock and McClure & McClure, all of Seattle, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

This proceeding had its inception in an original application filed in this court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court in and for King county, through one of its judges, from entering an order granting a voluntary nonsuit in an action then pending in that court.

The facts as set forth in the application for the writ are as follows: One K. T. Henderson, as plaintiff brought suit in the superior court for King county against New York Casualty Company, a corporation, defendant, to recover from the defendant the sum of $3,640.41. Upon the issues presented by the pleadings, the cause proceeded to trial Before the Honorable Hugh C. Todd, judge of the superior court for King county, and evidence was produced by and on behalf of the plaintiff. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in chief, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and moved for a dismissal of the action. After hearing argument on the challenge and motion, Judge Todd stated that he would entertain, instead, a motion by the plaintiff for a voluntary nonsuit. Counsel for the plaintiff thereupon announced that he did not desire a voluntary nonsuit, and counsel for the defendant followed with a statement to the court that, in his opinion, a motion for a voluntary nonsuit at that time came too late, inasmuch as the plaintiff had rested his case. After further argument, however, the plaintiff did make a motion for voluntary nonsuit, which the judge stated would be granted upon payment by the plaintiff of $100 as attorney's fee for the defendant. Pursuant to the announced ruling of the court, there was presented to Judge Todd an order proposed by the plaintiff, granting the plaintiff's motion for voluntary nonsuit, and also an order proposed by the defendant, dismissing the action. The judge thereupon stated that he would sign the order presented by the plaintiff, but would delay such signing until application could be made to the supreme court for a writ of prohibition; that if, however, such writ should be issued by the supreme court, he would then sign the order presented by the defendant. In due time the defendant, as relator, made application to this court for a writ of prohibition, alleging the above facts by affidavit, and attaching thereto copies of the pleadings in the superior court cause, copies of certain letters which were attached to the complaint and by reference made a part thereof, and copies of the proposed orders described above. Upon the showing made by the application, the chief justice issued an order directing the superior court, through Judge Todd, to show cause why the writ should not issue.

The respondent judge has made no return to the order to show cause, but has demurred to relator's application, on the grounds that in its decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for a voluntary nonsuit in the cause pending Before it, the superior court was acting within its jurisdiction, and not in excess thereof; that relator has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; and that the matter of granting or refusing to grant a voluntary nonsuit at the particular stage of the proceeding rested in the sound discretion of the trial court.

In the briefs submitted to this court, both parties cite Rule 4, Rules of Pleading, Procedure and Practice Rem.Supp.1945, § 308-4, 18 Wash.2d 33-a, which has to do with the right to take voluntary nonsuit after trial has commenced, and each of the parties now contends that, upon the authority of that rule, it is entitled to a decision of this case in its favor. However, in view of the grounds upon which our decision herein will rest, we shall not quote the provisions of that rule nor discuss its general applicability.

As indicated above, this is a proceeding in which the relator seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the superior court and the judge thereof from entering an order which it is alleged and conceded the court is about to enter, in the progress of a cause pending Before it. Under that situation, the primary and controlling question in this case is whether the superior court was acting within its jurisdiction, and not in excess thereof, when it invited the plaintiff in the cause pending Before it to interpose a motion for a voluntary nonsuit, and indicated that it would grant such a motion, at a time when the plaintiff had rested his case and the defendant had challenged the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence and moved for a dismissal of the action. We emphasize the fact, which should ever be kept in mind, that the question here to be considered is not whether the superior court committed, or was about to commit, error of law, but whether the court had jurisdictional power to invite, entertain, or grant a motion for voluntary nonsuit at the particular stage of the proceeding.

The writ of prohibition is commonly defined, substantially, as a writ to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or quasijudicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance, or from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 1030; 42 Am.Jur. 139, Prohibition, § 2. The statutes of this state defining prohibition and prescribing when and by whom the writ may be issued read as follows:

'The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board or person.' (Italics ours.) Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1027.

'It may be issued by any court, except police or justices' courts, to an inferior tribunal, or to a corporation, board or person, in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is issued upon affidavit, on the application of the person beneficially interested.' Rem.Rev.Stat. § 1028.

In numerous cases this court has not only described the function of the writ of prohibition, but has also specifically prescribed the factors necessary to the issuance thereof. We have repeatedly stated that the writ of prohibition is available only where the court which is sought to be prohibited from further proceedings is acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction, and then only in cases where there is no adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Meyer v. Clifford, 78 Wash. 555, 139 P. 650; State ex rel. Potter v. Superior Court, 135 Wash. 344, 237 P. 717; State ex rel. Ernst v. Superior Court, 198 Wash. 133, 87 P.2d 294; State ex rel. Heyes v. Superior Court, 12 Wash.2d 430, 121 P.2d 960; State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd., v. Superior Court, 26 Wash.2d 740, 175 P.2d 640.

We have also frequently declared that the writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent the commission of mere error, nor to take the place of an appeal, nor to perform the office of a writ of review for the correction of error. State ex rel. Lewis v. Hogg, 22 Wash. 646, 62 P. 143; State ex. rel. Griffith v. Superior Court, 71 Wash. 386, 128 P. 644; State ex rel. Prentice v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 90, 149 P. 321; State ex rel. Bellingham v. Abrahamson, 98 Wash. 370, 168 P. 3; State ex rel. McGlothern v. Superior Court, 112 Wash. 501, 192 P. 937; State ex rel. Walker v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 610, 270 P. 126; State ex rel. Nelms v. Superior Court, 149 Wash. 50, 270 P. 128; State ex rel. O'Brien v. Police Court, 14 Wash.2d 340, 128 P.2d 332, 141 A.L.R. 1257; State ex rel. Cheson v. Superior Court, 22 Wash.2d 947, 157 P.2d 991.

In view of the declared function of the writ of prohibition and the factors essential to its issuance, as above explained, the inquiry here resolves itself into the question whether the superior court, in this instance, had jurisdiction to invite, consider, and pass upon the motion for voluntary nonsuit.

By 'Jurisdiction,' in the broad sense, is meant the power to hear and determine a controversy, regardless of whether the ruling made in the particular case is correct or incorrect. State ex rel. Griffith v. Superior Court, supra; State ex rel. McGlothern v. Superior Court, supra; Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397; In re Rabie's Estate, 199 Wash. 207, 90 P.2d 1011; In re Brown's Estate, 7 Wash.2d 717, 110 P.2d 867; State v. Hampson, 9 Wash.2d 278, 114 P.2d 992.

In order to acquire complete jurisdiction, so as to be authorized to hear and determine a cause or proceeding, the court necessarily must have jurisdiction of the parties thereto and of the subject matter involved. For a list of cases supporting this statement, see Vol. 23, Words and Phrases, Perm.Ed., page 396 et seq., as supplemented by Cumulative Annual Pocket Part.

In Tucker v. Brown, 20 Wash.2d 740, 150 P.2d 604, 636, we summarized the matter thus:

'Jurisdiction of a court is said to depend upon various things--for instance, upon proper service of process as provided by statute, and that the subject matter be one upon which the court is given authority by the constitution or has implied power to exercise judicial...