State v. Superior Court of Washington for King County

• Decision Date: 30 October 1920
• Docket Number: 16157.
• Citation: 193 P. 226,113 Wash. 54
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CARROLL, City Comptroller, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY et al.

193 P. 226

113 Wash. 54

STATE ex rel. CARROLL, City Comptroller, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY et al.

No. 16157.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 30, 1920

Department 1.

Application by the State of Washington, on relation of H. W. Carroll, as Comptroller of the City of Seattle, against the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County and Walter M. French, Judge, to review a judgment of the superior court issuing a writ of mandamus in an action by W. J. Brown to compel the relator, as Comptroller of the City of Seattle, to register him as a voter in that city. Judgment of the superior court reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the proceeding.

Walter F. Meier and Chas. T. Donworth, both of Seattle, for plaintiff.

R. B Brown, of Seattle, for defendants.

MAIN J.

One W J. Brown brought an action in mandamus in the superior court for the purpose of compelling the relator, H. W. Carroll, as comptroller of the city of Seattle, to register him as a voter in that city. The trial resulted in a judgment, directing a writ to issue as prayed for; from this judgment the cause is brought here for review.

W. J Brown is a man 61 years of age. He was born in Scotland, and came to the United States with his mother in the year 1863. His father had preceded them to this country the year before, and had settled in the state of Pennsylvania. Since attaining his majority Brown in good faith has continuously exercised the rights and performed the duties of a citizen of the United States. He claims that he has a right to vote because he believes the fact to be that his father had become a naturalized citizen. When he applied to be registered as a voter in the city of Seattle, the city comptroller declined to register him, because, being of foreign birth, he did not produce the evidence of his citizenship, which is required by section 4767, Rem. & Bal. Code, as amended in chapter 163, § 7, Laws of 1919. This statute requires that when a person of foreign birth desires to register he must exhibit to the registration officer the original or the duly certified copy of his naturalization papers, or, 'if naturalized by virtue of the naturalization of his ancestor, then the original, or a duly certified copy, of the naturalization papers of such ancestor.' On the hearing in the court below Brown insisted that he had a right to register notwithstanding the provision of this statute, and that the statute is unconstitutional and void.

The question here for determination is whether the Legislature, in making the requirements referred to, exceeded its powers. It is the settled law that courts will presume that an act regularly passed by the legislative body of the government is a valid law, and will entertain no presumptions against such validity, and when the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature is brought in question, it is only when the act is clearly in violation of the Constitution that the courts will so declare it. Section 1 of article 6 of the Constitution, as amended, provides, among other things, that----

'All male persons of the age of twenty-one years or over, possessing the following qualifications, shall be entitled to vote at all elections: They shall be citizens of the United States. * * *'

Section 7 of the same article provides that----

'The Legislature shall enact a registration law, and shall require a compliance with such law before any elector shall be allowed to vote.'

In 1919, in pursuance of the power conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Legislature, in the act above referred to, provided, as already stated, that a naturalized citizen of the United States, relying upon the fact of such citizenship by reason of the naturalization of an ancestor, must, before he is entitled to register, produce either the original or a duly certified copy of the naturalization papers of such ancestor. Mr. Brown, when he applied to be registered, did not comply with this provision of the statute. The law further provides in section 8 that no person shall be entitled to vote at any election who is not registered according to the provisions of the act. The Constitution, in section 1 of article 6 as amended, specifies who are entitled to vote. In section 7 of the same chapter the Legislature is directed to enact a registration law. Such a law is not for the purpose of adding to or modifying the qualifications of a voter as fixed by the Constitution, but is for the purpose of making regulations and determining the proof which one shall present to establish the fact that he is a citizen and entitled to register and vote. The right to vote is a constitutional right, but the manner in which the franchise shall be exercised is purely statutory. In State ex. rel. Shepard v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370, 111 P. 233, 140 Am. St. Rep. 925, it was said:

'The right to vote is a constitutional right, given by the people to certain citizens and withheld from others. But the manner in which the franchise shall be exercised is purely statutory. It is not within the power of the Legislature to destroy the franchise, but it may control and regulate the ballot, so long as the right is not destroyed or made so inconvenient that it is impossible to exercise it. It follows, then, that that which does not destroy or unnecessarily impair the right must be held to be within the constitutional power of the Legislature.'

The law requiring a foreign-born citizen to produce naturalization papers or a certified copy thereof as a condition precedent to his right to register and vote deals with the question of proof, and not with a question of the right to vote. Capen v. Foster, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 485; State v. Butts, 31 Kan. 537, 2 P. 618.

It is contended that the law is unconstitutional because it requires a different kind of evidence or proof of a naturalized citizen of his right to register and vote than that which is required of a natural-born citizen. In other words, that by this discrimination the law is void as class legislation. It is only arbitrary and unreasonable classifications, as to which there is no just difference or distinction, as between the class affected and others, that will render a law unconstitutional. Allen v. Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 163 P. 18.

When the law is assailed as class legislation the assailant must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160.

According to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States there are two methods by which a person may become a citizen: (a) By birth in the United States; and (b) by naturalization therein. A natural-born citizen's right to vote depends upon his place of birth, and this is the fact to be established. A naturalized citizen's right to vote depends, not upon his place of birth, but on a judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, declaring either him or his ancestor a naturalized citizen. Evidence which would be reasonable and satisfactory in determining a natural-born citizen's right to vote would not necessarily be such evidence when applied to a naturalized citizen. The Legislature has a discretion in determining the character of proof that may be required to establish the fact of citizenship in each case. There is no reason why a law passed by the Legislature which does not require the same character of proof as applied to each class should be held to be unconstitutional. There is a reasonable basis for the...