State v. Sutton
Decision Date | 18 April 1974 |
Docket Number | CA-CR,No. 1,1 |
Citation | 521 P.2d 1008,21 Ariz.App. 550 |
Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Charles SUTTON, Appellant. 583. 1 |
Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
On February 5, 1974, we issued our opinion in State v. Sutton, 21 Ariz.App. 271, 518 P.2d 590 (1974), holding that a probationer whose probation was subsequently revoked must be given credit for time served in pre-probation incarceration where the sentence received was the maximum allowable by law.
The rationale of this holding was based upon an interpretation of the sentencing statutes involved and an infringement upon the legislative prerogatives by the executive or judicial branches of government if jail time actually served exceeded the maximum set by the legislature. We stated:
* * *
* * *
'Thus, to allow the executive or judicial branch of government to punish the defendant in excess of that which the legislature has allowed infringes upon the separation of powers of government and is prohibited.'
The state, by its motion for rehearing, has called the court's attention to the case of State v. Witt, 19 Ariz.App. 440, 508 P.2d 105 (1973), which may cast doubt on the basis for our previous holding.
The statutes cited in Witt provide that a sentence actually commences at the time of 'actual delivery of defendant at the place of imprisonment, or from the time fixed by the court as the time when the term of imprisonment begins,' (A.R.S. § 13--1652) and that on revocation of probation the trial court may 'pronounce sentence . . . within the longest period for which the defendant might have been sentenced . . ..' (A.R.S. § 13--1657). Giving these statutes the interpretation placed on them by Witt, we are still of the opinion that the results reached in our previous opinion must stand.
We reach this conclusion based upon the application of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution to the states. In making this application, we are persuaded that where the statutory scheme of sentencing places a greater burden on those who are unable to make bond, in bailable offenses, than on those who are financially able is to deny the equal protection mandated by the 14th Amendment. The added burden being, of course, presentence incarceration. This issue was met in the case of In re Young, 32 Cal.App.3d 68, 107 Cal.Rptr. 915 (1973) 2. California, like Arizona, has a statute which provides that the commencement of sentence begins upon actual delivery of the defendant to the place of imprisonment (Cal.Penal Code § 2900). In discussing this legislative enactment, the California Court of Appeals noted:
The Young court went on to hold that when an indigent is unable to afford bail, is given the maximum possible sentence, and is not given credit for presentence incarceration, his pre-trial confinement
'operates to create an unconstitutional discrimination . . . in an overall confinement of persons who are convicted of the same crime who are able to afford bail and so secure liberty and those who cannot do so and are confined.' Id. at 920
The same result has been reached on constitutional grounds in the following ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Fuentes
...been imposed upon defendant was ten years, and after revocation he was sentenced to that maximum term in prison. In State v. Sutton, 21 Ariz.App. 550, 521 P.2d 1008 (1974), we held that where the defendant was given the maximum statutory sentence and was not given credit for presentence tim......
-
Banks, In re
...conclusions were reached by state courts. (E. g., Klimas v. State (1977) 75 Wis.2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285, 287; State v. Sutton (1974) 21 Ariz.App. 550, 521 P.2d 1008, 1009.) Reviewing this line of authority, a federal court recently stated: "It seems recognized that the right to credit for ja......
-
Durkin v. Davis
...(1974) 83 Wash.2d 342, 517 P.2d 949; Drew v. State (Mo.1970) 458 S.W.2d 263; Smith v. State (Ark.1974) 508 S.W.2d 54; State v. Sutton (1974) 21 Ariz.App. 550, 521 P.2d 1008.7 See Stapf v. United States, supra.One commentator has acidly remarked in connection with this presumption:"Those pre......
-
State v. Cruz-Mata
...in 1973, require the trial judge to consider the amount of the defendant's presentence custody. Rule 26.10(b)(2). In State v. Sutton, 21 Ariz.App. 550, 521 P.2d 1008 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that credit for presentence custody was mandatory for prisoners who could not make bail on ......