State v. Tabory, 19768

• Citation: 262 S.C. 136,202 S.E.2d 852
• Decision Date: 11 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 19768,19768
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Leon TABORY, Appellant.

Page 852

202 S.E.2d 852

262 S.C. 136

The STATE, Respondent, v. Leon TABORY, Appellant.

No. 19768.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 11, 1974.

J. Lewis Cromer and John L. Sweeny, Columbia, for appellant.

Asst. Sol. George C. Kosko, Columbia, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

The grand jury of Richland County indicted the defendant-appellant, Leon Tabory charging in the first count that on October 12, 1972, he 'did knowingly and intentionally possess a quantity (1 tablet) of Amphaplex 20, a controlled substance, such substance not having been obtained as authorized by Act No. 445, Acts of 1971, General Assembly of South Carolina, while being an inmate in the South Carolina Department of Corrections.'

In the second and third counts of the indictment, in language identical to that of the first count, Tabory was charged with possessing a quantity (39.2 micrograms) of LSD and a quantity (0.4151 grams) of hashish, respectively.

Upon the trial of the case, the trial judge instructed the jury that 'this case was brought under two Code Sections of our Code of Laws.' He proceeded to charge, first, § 32-- 1510.49(b) (Cum.Supp.1971) of the laws regulating controlled substances and dangerous drugs and, secondly, (over objection of counsel) § 55--383 (Supp.1972), which is entitled 'Contraband.'

Tabory was found guilty and sentenced to serve eight years consecutive to the term of imprisonment he was then serving.

Tabory contends that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury relative to § 55--383 because the indictment did not charge a violation of that section. We agree.

In 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1311 (1961), the applicable general rule is stated to be as follows:

'As a general rule the instructions should be confined to the issues made by the pleadings, and should not be broader or narrower than the indictment or information, and an instruction which is not based on, and in conformity with, the issue properly raised by the pleadings is generally erroneous, . . . It has been held that the instructions should not . . . submit to the jury an offense not included in the indictment or information.'

The logical reason for this rule is that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to be tried only upon the charges in the indictment against him. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960).

Section 17--402 of the Code (1962) sets forth the guidelines under which an indictment is to judged in determining whether the allegations thereof are sufficient to charge a particular crime. In State v. McIntire,221 S.C. 504, 71 S.E.2d 410 (1952), we held that the true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is whether it contains the necessary elements of the offense intended to be charged and sufficiently appraises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet. The offense intended to be charged must be described with sufficient particularity that conviction or acquittal thereupon may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution. We held in State v. Soloman, 245 S.C. 550, 141 S.E.2d 818 (1965), that an indictment phrased substantially in the language of the statute which creates and defines the offense is ordinarily sufficient.

Section 55--383 provides as follows:

'Contraband.--It shall be unlawful for any person to furnish or attempt to furnish any prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections with any matter declared by the Director to be contraband. It shall also be unlawful for any prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections to possess any matter declared to be contraband. Matters considered contraband...