Woods v. Rhay

• Decision Date: 12 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 38323,38323
• Citation: 414 P.2d 601,68 Wn.2d 601
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of James Francis WOODS, Petitioner, v. B. J. RHAY, Superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary, Walla Walla, Washington, Respondent.

Page 601

68 Wn.2d 601

414 P.2d 601

In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

of James Francis WOODS, Petitioner, v. B. J. RHAY, Superintendent of the Washington State

Penitentiary, Walla Walla, Washington, Respondent.

No. 38323.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

May 12, 1966.

Francis Conklin, Spokane, for petitioner.

John J. O'Connell, Atty. Gen., Paul J. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.

HAMILTON, Justice.

This is an original application for a writ of habeas corpus. The gravamen of petitioner's claim is that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated and that his plea of guilty to the crime of forgery in the first degree was involuntary.

It is conceded by counsel for respondent that an inordinate and unexcused delay occurred between petitioner's arrest and his arraignment. A detailed recitation of the unfortunate circumstances would serve no useful purpose. Suffice it to say that the occurrence was such as to amount to a violation of petitioner's constitutional rights (Const. art. 1, § 22 (amendment 10)) to be advised of the nature of the charges against him and to a speedy trial. The dispositive questions presented, however, are whether (a) petitioner's plea of guilty to the offense charged was voluntary, and (b) such plea, if voluntary, waived the constitutional rights involved.

We answer both questions in the affirmative and dismiss petitioner's application.

Briefly, the operative facts are as follows: Petitioner, following his arrest and incarceration, first appeared in a court of law on April 20, 1964. His appearance was predicated upon a complaint filed in Seattle District Justice Court charging him with the crime of forgery in the first degree. He was represented by retained counsel and the justice court judge sat as a committing magistrate. Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and his counsel moved that the complaint be dismissed because of the delay between the arrest and the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied, evidence was presented by the state, and petitioner was, on April 28, 1964, bound over to the Superior Court for King County for prosecution. On April 29, 1964, an information was filed in the superior court and shortly thereafter petitioner was brought before the court and counsel appointed to represent him, he being without funds to continue with retained counsel. His court appointed counsel, a competent attorney and one experienced in the trial of criminal cases, promptly filed a motion to dismiss the information asserting a prejudicial violation of petitioner's right to a speedy trial. Hearing on the motion and arraignment was continued until June 3, 1964. On the appointed day, petitioner with his counsel appeared, presented testimony concerning the unavailability of certain defense witnesses, and argued the motion for dismissal. The trial judge denied the motion, proffered the services of the state in locating and returning the missing witnesses, and tendered a trial setting at the convenience of petitioner. Counsel for the state offered to stipulate as to what the witnesses would state if present. Thereafter, the trial judge and counsel conferred in chambers. Following this conference, the petitioner indicated a desire to enter a plea of guilty to the charge, his counsel stating:

I have discussed the matter with Mr. Woods and in view of the court's ruling on the motion we have sat down and reconsidered our basic position in the matter and Mr. Woods advises me he wishes to enter a plea of guilty because he did in fact cash the check.

After ascertaining that petitioner had fully discussed the matter with his attorney, the trial judge accepted his plea of guilty and indicated he would enter an order deferring sentence for a period of 3 years, the effect of which would be to place petitioner on probation and immediately release him from jail. The trial judge then stated:

That will be the sentence of the court and I now pronounce it. I will now give you an opportunity to withdraw your plea of guilty.

MR. WOODS: No sir.

THE COURT: One reason I am doing this this way is the testimony you have given and I want to be sure you know what you are doing. It may very well be in light of your record, that you are not a one hundred percent parole risk and there might be a very strong possibility that I will see you in front there again. I hope not.

MR. WOODS: So do I.

THE COURT: But in light of your previous record you may have some difficulty and if you are in here again on an offense of any seriousness I will have to sentence you for this and I do not want you then to maintain all of a sudden you have now decided you are not guilty.

MR. WOODS: No, your honor.

THE COURT: So I have given you one chance to withdraw your plea of guilty and I am going to give you another chance tomorrow morning. I want you to be very sure you know what you are doing. I want you to be sure you want to plead guilty and you want to receive that sentence and that you will not all of a sudden discover later some day you are not guilty of the offense, because the time to discover that is now and we will give you a very, very speedy trial.

MR. WOODS: I am perfectly satisfied, your honor.

The next morning, June 4, 1964, the following colloquy relative to the plea and order deferring sentence took place:

THE COURT: Have you thought the matter over over the evening and you still wish to rely on your plea of guilty?

MR. WOODS: Yes, your honor.

THE COURT: You don't want to change it. I will let you withdraw it if you wish.

MR. WOODS: No, I will let it stand.

THE COURT: You understand, do you, you can have a trial on this matter and you still want to plead guilty?

MR. WOODS: Yes.

THE COURT: You had better straighten up a little and be careful. Either straighten up or be very careful, because if you come back here it will be just too had.

MR. WOODS: I will try to.

Petitioner was thereupon released on probation. On August 14, 1964, he was charged in justice court with the crime of petit larceny occurring on or about August 13, 1964. He was tried and convicted. A motion to revoke the order of deferred sentence, based upon petitioner's continued criminal activity, was interposed and, on October 8, 1964, the trial judge revoked the order and sentenced petitioner to the penitentiary. It is from this confinement that petitioner now seeks relief.

A plea of guilty to a criminal offense, if voluntarily made in open court, is a confession of guilt and the result equivalent to a conviction. Unless withdrawn before sentence is pronounced, such a plea has the same effect in law as a verdict of guilty, for nothing remains to be done save the imposition of sentence. In re Mohr v. Smith, 26 Wash.2d 188, 173 P.2d 141 (1946); In re Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wash.2d 155, 160 P.2d 529 (1945); State ex rel. Lundin v. Superior Court, 102 Wash. 600, 174 P. 473 (1918).

To be voluntary, a plea of guilty must be freely, unequivocally, intelligently and understandingly made in open court by the accused person with full knowledge of his legal and constitutional rights and of the consequences of his act. It cannot be the product of or induced by coercive threat, fear, persuasion,...