State v. Taggart

• Decision Date: 19 May 1919
• Docket Number: 32570
• Citation: 172 N.W. 299,186 Iowa 247
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, v. HUGH TAGGART, Appellee
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

172 N.W. 299

186 Iowa 247

STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, v. HUGH TAGGART, Appellee

No. 32570

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 19, 1919

Appeal from Black Hawk District Court.--CHAS. W. MULLAN, Judge.

CERTAIN intoxicating liquors were seized by a constable, under a search warrant issued by a justice of the peace, and removed from the premises of the Hugh Taggart Drug Store, in Waterloo, Iowa. At the time fixed by the notice required to be given of the hearing by Section 2415 of the Supplemental Supplement to the Code, 1915, Taggart appeared, and claimed to be the owner of the liquor seized, and that same was not kept by him for illegal sale. A trial was had to a jury resulting in a verdict that the liquors were not kept for sale in violation of law; whereupon, judgment was entered by the justice, ordering the liquors returned to Taggart. The State appeals.--Reversed and remanded.

Reversed.

H. M Havner, Attorney General, F. C. Davidson, Assistant Attorney General, C. G. Watkins, and E. J. Wenner, County Attorney for appellant.

Mears & Lovejoy, for appellee.

STEVENS, J. LADD, C. J., WEAVER and GAYNOR, JJ., concur.

OPINION

STEVENS, J.

I.

No irregularities in the proceedings before the justice are charged. The State bases its right to appeal upon the following provision of Section 2, Chapter 322, Acts of the Thirty-seventh General Assembly, to wit:

"In any such proceeding where the judgment is against the state, it shall have the same right of appeal to the district court, except that no bond shall be required, and if an appeal be taken by the state, the same shall operate as a stay of proceedings and the liquors seized under the warrant shall not be returned to any claimant thereof until, upon the final determination of said appeal, he is found entitled thereto."

The defendant appeared in the district court, and moved that the appeal be dismissed, upon the following grounds: (a) That the above act of the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly violates Section 12, Article 1 of the Constitution of the state of Iowa, which provides that "no person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense;" and that it subjects the defendant, who had been tried and acquitted before the justice of the peace, to a second trial for the same offense; (b) that Chapter 322 of the Acts of the Thirty-Seventh General Assembly went into effect after the alleged offense of keeping the liquor for illegal sale was committed and the condemnation proceedings instituted, and, therefore, if applied to this case, must be given retroactive effect; (c) that the notice of appeal was filed by the justice before the entry of judgment. The argument of counsel for appellee is based upon the above propositions. The trial court filed a carefully prepared opinion, sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal upon the first two grounds stated above.

The affidavit for a search warrant was in the usual form, and designated as defendants John Doe, Hugh W. Taggart Drug Store, and certain intoxicating liquors. No information charging the defendant with keeping the liquor in question for illegal sale was filed. His appearance before the justice was voluntary, and for the purpose of recovering the liquors seized. Section 2415 of the Supplemental Supplement, 1915. provides that:

"* * * If any person shall so appear, he shall become a party defendant in said case, and said justice or judge shall make a record thereof. * * * The proceeding in the trial of such case may be the same, substantially, as in cases of misdemeanor triable before justices of the peace, and if any person shall appear and be made a party defendant as herein provided, and shall make written plea that said liquor, or a part thereof claimed by him, was not owned or kept with intent to be sold in violation of this chapter, such party defendant may, at his option, demand a jury to try the issue, and if, upon the evidence presented, the said justice or judge or jury, as the case may be, shall, by verdict, find that said liquor was, when seized, owned or kept by any person, whether said party defendant or not, for the purpose of being sold in violation of this chapter, the said justice or judge shall render judgment that said liquor, or said part thereof, with the vessels in which it is contained, is forfeited. If no person be made defendant in manner aforesaid, or if judgment be in favor of all the defendants who appear and are made such, then the costs of the proceeding shall be paid as in ordinary criminal prosecutions where the prosecution fails. If the judgment shall be against only one party defendant appearing as aforesaid, he shall be adjudged to pay all the costs of proceedings in the seizure and detention of the liquor claimed by him, and trial, up to the time of judgment. * * *"

The issue to be tried, therefore, so far as the person appearing is concerned, is that tendered by his written plea: that is, whether he owns some part or all of the liquor seized, and kept same for illegal sale. Much of the argument of counsel for appellee is based upon the thought that proceedings under the statute for the seizure and forfeiture of intoxicating liquors are in character criminal; that, by his voluntary appearance, he became a defendant in a criminal case, and the following decisions of this court are cited to sustain this contention: Funk & Hardman v. Israel, 5 Iowa 438; State v. Certain Intoxicating Liquors and Harris, 40 Iowa 95; Weir v. Allen, 47 Iowa 482; Fries & Co. v. Porch, 49 Iowa 351; State v. Arlen, 71 Iowa 216, 32 N.W. 267.

In each of the above cases, search warrant proceedings are referred to as in their nature criminal; but in State v. Knapp, 178 Iowa 25, 158 N.W. 515, the court classifies them as quasi criminal. Numerous decisions are cited by the State from other jurisdictions, holding that such proceedings are governed by the rules of civil procedure. In the sense that they are instituted in aid of the police regulations of the state, are enacted for the enforcement of the prohibitory liquor laws, concern the public at large, and are conducted in the name of the state, such proceedings may be said to be, in their nature, quasi criminal; but they are, however, primarily against the liquor, and not against a person voluntarily appearing therein for the purpose of claiming the liquor seized, and that same was not kept by him for illegal sale. Drake v. Jordan, 73 Iowa 707, 36 N.W. 653; Campbell v. Manderscheid, 74 Iowa 708, 39 N.W. 92; Farley v. Geisheker, 78 Iowa 453, 43 N.W. 279; State v. Dougherty, 147 Iowa 570, 126 N.W. 696; Jones v. Mould, 151 Iowa 599, 132 N.W. 45; United States v. Olsen, 57 F. 579; United States v. Three Copper Stills, 47 F. 495; Steward v. State, 180 Ind. 397 (103 N.E. 316); Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 744 (130 P. 553).

The affidavit filed before the justice for a search warrant did not charge the defendant with an offense against the statute prohibiting the keeping for sale or selling of intoxicating liquors; and, as above stated, the proceeding is against the property, and not the owner; and while, under the statute, anyone claiming the same has a right to appear and file a written plea so alleging, and that same was not kept for an illegal purpose, and, by doing so, becomes a defendant in the case, yet this is for the purpose only, however, of trying the issues tendered by his written plea.

The verdict of the jury that the liquor was not kept for illegal sale did not operate as an acquittal of the defendant of an offense for which he had been put upon trial. He was not under arrest, and no charge against him was included in the information, and his liberty was not involved. The verdict of the jury fixed the status of the liquor only, and amounted to an adjudication that same was not kept, at the place and time of seizure, for an unlawful purpose. Such, in substance, is our holding in State v. Cobb, 123 Iowa 626, 99 N.W. 299, and State v. Dougherty, 147 Iowa 570, 126 N.W. 696, cited and relied upon by appellee. The defendant in State v. Cobb, supra, had been acquitted of the offense of keeping the particular liquors seized, and, upon the trial for the forfeiture of the liquor, pleaded an acquittal of the charge made against him personally. The court, in the course of its opinion, said:

"It is at once apparent that the fact that liquor is kept with intent that it be sold in violation of law is the ground for its forfeiture, as it is one of the grounds for a personal charge under Section 2382. As we have seen, the information against the defendant, Cobb, charged him with keeping the liquor for unlawful sale, and here it is charged again that it was kept and intended by him to be sold in violation of law. The precise issue was therefore presented in both cases, and, indeed, the district court so found. If, as found by his acquittal on that trial, the liquor was neither kept to be sold by himself nor others in violation of law, it was lawfully kept by him, and an adjudication that such was the case was a bar herein and fixed the status of the liquor."

In State v. Dougherty, supra, the defendant pleaded an adjudication, based upon a finding, in a proceeding to condemn the liquor, that it was not kept by him for illegal sale. The court held that this finding exonerated the defendant from the charge of illegally keeping the liquors in controversy, but said:

"The vice in appellant's reasoning lies in the...