State v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 04 April 2000
• Citation: 18 S.W.3d 366
• Parties: (Mo.banc 2000) . State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Leon Taylor, Appellant. Case Number: SC81748 Supreme Court of Missouri Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

18 S.W.3d 366 (Mo.banc 2000)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Leon Taylor, Appellant.

Case Number: SC81748

Supreme Court of Missouri

Handdown Date: 04/04/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Charles E. Atwell

Counsel for Appellant: Melinda K. Pendgraph, Robert Wolfrum and Teoffice Cooper

Counsel for Respondent: Krista D. Boston

Opinion Summary:

In 1994, Leon Taylor shot and killed the manager during an Independence gas station robbery, with the manager's eight-year-old daughter watching. Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder and other crimes. The jury deadlocked on his sentence, and the judge sentenced Taylor to death. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but granted a new penalty phase. In the new penalty phase, the jury recommended, and the court imposed, the death penalty. Taylor appeals his sentence.

AFFIRMED.

Court en banc holds:

1) The state's explanations for striking certain prospective jurors did not violate Batson. When Taylor objected to the strikes, the state provided race-neutral reasons for the strikes. Taylor failed to show that the reasons were pretext for discrimination. Despite the all-white jury, Batson requires evaluating each stricken African-American venireperson on an individual basis as to whether the stated reason was race-neutral and not pretext for discrimination. The judge also took an active role, by taking notes and rereading transcript answers. His comments demonstrate he was looking at relevant factors, the evidence, and the totality of the circumstances. He was aware the defendant was black and the jury was white, and his comments indicated he was concerned with this, and mindful of the whole picture. He gave the defense counsel ample time and discretion to supplement the record and prove pretext, but Taylor failed to show that the state treated similarly situate venirepersons differently based on race.

A) While evidence of a pattern of strikes against African-Americans can indicate racially motivated peremptory challenges, that is not the case here. Taylor fails to demonstrate a pretextual motive for the prosecutor's peremptory strikes. The record indicates no statements or questions by the prosecutor or other relevant circumstance to support an inference of discrimination. Taylor failed to show purposeful discrimination.

B) The judge did not use the wrong standard in denying the Batson challenges. Instead, the judge cited McClesky for its statistical studies and other data suggesting the death penalty creates a disparate impact on people of color, demonstrating again that the judge was aware of surrounding circumstances and sensitive to Taylor's claims.

2) To establish an equal protection violation, a defendant must show an intent to discriminate. Taylor presented insufficient evidence for an equal protection violation.

3) Testimony of the victim's wife and stepdaughter was relevant and admissible to inform the court of the impact that the victim's death had on his family. 4) The trial judge properly listed Taylor's prior convictions in the jury instruction as possible statutory aggravating circumstances, thus finding that the convictions were serious and assaultive. The jury decided as a matter of fact whether Taylor indeed had such convictions. In any event, the jury found an additional aggravating circumstance, which would support the death penalty.

5) The court did not subject Taylor to double jeopardy by submitting an aggravating circumstance that the previous court did not submit to the jury. The previous judge had not submitted it because he ruled a different instruction paragraph should have been used.

6) Taylor's sentence passes this Court's independent, statutory proportionality review.

Opinion Author: Michael A. Wolff, Judge

Opinion Vote: AFFIRMED. All concur.

Opinion:

Opinion modified by Court's own motion on May 9, 2000. This substitution does not constitute a new opinion.

Leon Taylor was convicted in his first trial of first degree murder, first degree robbery, first degree assault, and three counts of armed criminal action. After the jury deadlocked, the trial judge sentenced Taylor to death on the murder conviction. This Court affirmed the convictions but granted a new penalty phase trial on the murder conviction. State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925 (Mo. banc 1997). In the second penalty phase trial, the jury recommended, and the court imposed, the death penalty for the first-degree murder conviction. We have jurisdiction. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.

Taylor's main contentions on appeal are that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race in two respects:

(1) That the prosecutor's peremptory strikes, which resulted in an all white jury, violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and

(2) That the Jackson County prosecutor's office discriminates against African-American defendants, and specifically Taylor, in the process that it uses to decide when to seek the death penalty.

Both of Taylor's major contentions are based on statistical disparities. In racial discrimination cases, it has been commonplace for courts to observe that "statistics tell much, and courts listen."¹ However, statistical analysis is only the beginning, not the end of the inquiry. The ultimate issue is whether racial discrimination has occurred, and racial discrimination is an intentional act. Courts consider statistical evidence of racial disparities and in some cases shift the burden of producing evidence or explanation to the state, as in Batson.

In this case, the trial judge gave careful consideration to Taylor's allegations and made appropriate findings based upon the evidence in accordance with the totality of circumstances. Although racial disparities exist, as Taylor points out, the burden of persuasion as to intentional racial discrimination remains with Taylor. The trial court found after careful review of the circumstances that Taylor failed to meet this burden. For reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Facts²

On April 14, 1994, Taylor, his half-brother, Willie Owens, and his half-sister, Tina Owens, were driving in Tina's car, discussing various robbery possibilities. Taylor suggested a gas station in Independence where only one person would be working. The trio went to the station and purchased some gasoline. Taylor asked whether they were going to rob it. Tina Owens said "no" because a little girl was inside. Sarah Yates, an eight-year-old, was keeping company with Robert Newton, her stepfather and the gas station manager.

The three left the station, only to return a few moments later after the oil light came on. Willie Owens went into the station and asked for some oil. Taylor next entered the store and stated they needed a different weight of oil. Taylor then drew a pistol and stated that he would shoot Newton unless he gave them money. Newton complied, handing Owens approximately $400 in a bank moneybag. Owens took the money and returned to the car.

Taylor directed Newton and the child to the station's back room. Taylor shot Newton once in the head, killing him. Taylor then pointed the gun at the child. Taylor pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed and did not discharge. Frustrated, Taylor locked the child in the back room and returned to the car. Taylor told Willie and Tina Owens that he had shot the man and that he had to go back inside to get the little girl. However, because the Owens couple wanted to leave, they then drove away.

II. Did the Prosecutor's Explanations for Striking Venirepersons Violate Batson?

Taylor claims the trial court erred in overruling his motion based on Batson to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes of six African-American venirepersons. He contends that the trial court judge did not look at the "totality of the circumstances" in denying his Batson challenges as required in Batson and our cases. We disagree.

After Taylor's case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial as to the penalty, the new jury was all white.³The trial court conducted the jury selection in three phases.⁴ In the first phase approximately 145 venirepersons were summoned for jury service in the Jackson County courthouse. Each venireperson filled out a questionnaire, which was drafted by the trial court with suggestions from counsel. The second phase included two panels, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, consisting of examination by counsel. The examination covered topics that were either not the subject of the questionnaire or had nothing to do with the issues of publicity or death qualification. The trial court ruled on strikes for cause in this second phase. In the third phase of jury selection, members of the venire were questioned individually, out of the presence of all other members, regarding their views touching upon the death penalty, whether they had read or heard anything about the case, and other related sensitive issues. In this third phase, both the trial court judge and counsel questioned the venirepersons. The trial court judge allowed each side eleven peremptory strikes, including two peremptory strikes for alternate venirepersons. See sections 494.480 and 494.485.⁵

To establish a claim under Batson, the defendant must object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges as violating Batson and identify the cognizable racial group to which the stricken veniremember belongs. State v. Parker, 836 S.W.2d 930, 939 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992). The state then must provide race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Id. This step of the process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995). If the prosecutor articulates a reason, the defendant must prove that the state's proffered reason was merely pretextual and that the strike was in fact racially motivated. Id. An...