State v. Taylor
Decision Date | 27 June 1893 |
Citation | 22 S.W. 1103,117 Mo. 181 |
Parties | The State, Appellant, v. Taylor et al |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn Circuit Court.
The trial court held upon demurrer thereto the following count to an indictment insufficient, to-wit:
(With intent to defraud the said First National Bank of Kirksville, in the state of Missouri, out of the sum of two thousand dollars); and the said George E. Taylor, alias J. T. Gash, and Wm. P. Taylor, at the time when they so sold, exchanged and delivered the said last mentioned, forged and falsely made draft as aforesaid, then and there on the seventh day of February, 1890, well knowing the same to be falsely made and forged with intent to have the same passed contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state." Thereupon the state appealed. The grounds of the demurrer were:
First. Because said count in said indictment does not state facts which constitute any offense under the law. Second. Because said second count does not charge that the act of selling or uttering the alleged forged instrument was with a felonious intent.
Reversed and remanded.
R. F. Walker, Attorney General, for the state.
The court erred in sustaining defendant's motion to quash the second count in the indictment. It charges the act of selling, exchanging and delivering the forged draft to have been done falsely, fraudulently and feloniously. It follows the language of the statute under which it is drawn. This is sufficient. Sections 3633, 3634, R. S. 1889; State v. Watson, 65 Mo. 115; State v. Yerger, 86 Mo. 33; State v. Flora, 109 Mo. 293; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 104. The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.
Huston & Parrish for respondents.
The indictment was doubtless drawn on sec. 3646, R. S. 1889, under which the material ingredients in the crime are first, uttering as genuine an instrument, the false making of which is by some section of the statute declared forgery, knowing it to be forged; and, second, that it was uttered with an intent to defraud. Each of these ingredients is constitutive and descriptive of the offense and if either of them is omitted no offense is charged. State v. Jackson, 89 Mo. 561. Where an offense is a felony under the statute it must be charged to have been feloniously done. State v. Murdock, 9 Mo. 739; State v. Feaster, 25 Mo. 324; State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 391; State v. Diffenbacher, 51 Mo. 26; State v. Emerick, 87 Mo. 115; State v. Breeden, 58 Mo. 507. Without a felonious intent there can be no felony. State v. Clayton, 100 Mo. 516.
-- The count in question is bottomed on sections 3633, 3634, R. S. 1889, which are as follows:
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