State v. Taylor
| Citation | 965 N.W.2d 747 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | A20-0425 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Larry Dale TAYLOR, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Jacob P. Fauchald, Assistant Clay County Attorney, Moorhead, Minnesota, for respondent.
Luke T. Heck and Drew J. Hushka, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota, for appellant.
The issue in this case is whether a deputy sheriff had reasonable, articulable suspicion during a traffic stop to believe that appellant Larry Dale Taylor may have been driving while impaired when the deputy learned that Taylor's license had been canceled as inimical to public safety and the deputy saw an open case of beer with missing cans in the backseat of Taylor's truck. Taylor challenges his convictions for first-degree driving while impaired (DWI) and possessing an opened bottle or receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage. He argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence because the deputy impermissibly expanded the scope of the underlying traffic stop by asking Taylor if he had consumed any beer from the open case in his truck. A divided panel of the court of appeals held that the officer lawfully expanded the scope of the stop, and therefore concluded that the district court properly denied the motion to suppress. Because we conclude that the circumstances known to the deputy, and the legitimate inferences to be drawn from them, raised a reasonable, articulable suspicion of other criminal activity sufficient to expand the scope of the traffic stop, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Taylor with (1) first-degree DWI for driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(5) (2020) ; (2) first-degree DWI for driving while under the influence of alcohol, Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1 (1); (3) driving after cancellation-inimical to public safety, Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2020) ; and (4) driving with an open bottle containing an alcoholic beverage, Minn. Stat. § 169A.35, subd. 3 (2020). Taylor was charged with first-degree DWI because he committed the current offense within 10 years of the first of three prior DWI convictions. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(1) (2020). Taylor filed a motion to suppress, arguing, in part, that the arresting deputy sheriff improperly expanded the scope of the traffic stop by asking him if he had recently consumed alcohol. A contested omnibus hearing was held, at which the deputy sheriff was the sole witness.
The deputy sheriff testified that on February 17, 2019, at about 7:15 p.m., he noticed a truck driving in Clay County without a front license plate and a back license plate covered in snow even though it had not snowed for some time. The deputy pulled the truck over and dusted off the back license plate. He noticed that the registration sticker read "2017"; when he ran the license plate number through the database, he learned that the vehicle had not been registered since then.
The deputy then approached Taylor, who was the driver of the truck and sole occupant. He asked Taylor for identification, which Taylor claimed not to have. The deputy noticed a case of beer in the backseat of the truck, with the flap open, that was missing some cans. It was, as the deputy testified, an "extremely cold" and "unbearable" night; so cold, in fact, that even in his brief interaction with Taylor, he was losing dexterity in his fingers. The deputy escorted Taylor to his squad car and ran the truck's registration through the database. In so doing, he learned that Taylor's license had been canceled as inimical to public safety, which, in his experience, often means that a driver is a "repeat offender" for driving while impaired. The deputy asked Taylor if he knew his driver's license was canceled as inimical to public safety; Taylor confirmed that he was aware of this status. Based on the license status and the open case of beer, the deputy asked Taylor if he had consumed any of the beer, to which Taylor replied that he had drunk two cans. Later, Taylor admitted to having drunk six cans. After the truck was eventually impounded, the deputy found two empty cans of beer near the passenger seat.
Driving with a license canceled as inimical to public safety, the deputy testified, is a gross misdemeanor, for which he decided to arrest Taylor. Because of the extreme cold, he explained that it would have been irresponsible to have Taylor complete field sobriety tests on the road, both because it would be quite uncomfortable and because the test results might be skewed. He brought Taylor to jail, where Taylor agreed to complete the field sobriety testing. Based on his performance, the deputy concluded that Taylor was impaired. A preliminary breath test revealed that Taylor had an alcohol concentration of 0.09, and a later DataMaster breath test revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.12. Both tests were administered within 2 hours of the stop.
After the omnibus hearing, the district court denied Taylor's motion to suppress the statements and the results of the field sobriety and breath tests. The court concluded that the deputy expanded the scope of the traffic stop to investigate a possible driving while impaired violation when he asked Taylor if he had been drinking. The court further concluded that "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances," the deputy "had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to expand the scope of the stop based on the open case of beer and [Taylor's] license status."
Taylor then waived his right to a jury trial and other trial rights and stipulated to the prosecution's evidence in a court trial, under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of the district court's order denying his motion to suppress. The district court found Taylor not guilty of first-degree DWI based on driving while under the influence, but convicted him of the other three counts: (1) first-degree DWI based on driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as measured within 2 hours of the time of driving; (2) driving after his license was cancelled as inimical to public safety; and (3) having an open bottle in his vehicle. The district court sentenced Taylor to a stayed, 42-month sentence for first-degree DWI and placed him on probation.
In an unpublished decision, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed Taylor's convictions. The court of appeals reasoned that the combination of both the open case of beer within reach of the driver and the canceled license amounted to reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. Taylor , No. A20-0425, 2020 WL 7491283, at *3 (Minn. App. Dec. 21, 2020). The court emphasized that the deputy's training and experience as an officer caused him to believe that drivers whose licenses have been canceled as inimical to public safety are often repeat offenders for driving while impaired. Id. It concluded that this knowledge, in combination with the open case of beer within Taylor's reach, gave the officer more than a "mere hunch" that Taylor may have been driving while impaired. Id. The court of appeals rejected Taylor's argument that the deputy could not have had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of driving while impaired when he did not observe any physical indicia of intoxication. Id. at *4.
The dissent concluded that "[w]ithout the presence of any indicia of intoxication, the license status together with the observation of a legally-located open case of beer did not provide a reasonable basis to believe the driver was intoxicated." Id. at *6 (Slieter, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge recognized that an officer may have a reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated even without observing the tell-tale signs of intoxication but concluded that the totality of the circumstances here allowed the deputy to form only a "hunch." Id.
We granted Taylor's petition for review.
The question before us today is whether the deputy lawfully expanded the scope of the traffic stop to investigate whether Taylor was driving while impaired. Taylor does not contest the facts, but merely whether the expansion of the scope of the stop was lawful. Accordingly, the issue is "purely a legal determination on given facts," which we review de novo. Berge v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety , 374 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Minn. 1985).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV ; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 10. Warrantless searches and seizures are generally unreasonable. State v. Lugo , 887 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn. 2016). A law enforcement officer may, however, "consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop" of a motor vehicle when "the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
Reasonable suspicion must be "particularized" and based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In determining whether the reasonable suspicion standard is met, we consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Davis , 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007). We have emphasized that an analysis of reasonable suspicion is a " ‘common-sense’ " and " ‘nontechnical’ " approach that considers "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life"; this standard is " ‘not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ " State v. Lee , 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 695–96, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) ). Under this standard, trained police officers may ...
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