State v. Taylor
| Docket Number | C. A. 29443 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO Appellee v. WILLIAM TAYLOR Appellant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court Trial Court Case No 2019 CR 02787/2.
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee.
ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant, William Taylor, appeals from his convictions on numerous charges, including aggravated robbery, kidnapping, felonious assault, aggravated burglary, and felonious assault on a police officer. According to Taylor, his convictions on some counts were not supported by sufficient evidence because the State failed to prove that he used deadly force and that two victims suffered serious physical harm. Taylor further contends that some convictions must be reversed because the jury verdict forms only specified that he had caused "serious harm" rather than "serious physical harm." In addition, Taylor asserts that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and in imposing financial sanctions and court costs.
{¶ 2} After reviewing the record, we conclude that Taylor's felonious assault convictions were supported by sufficient evidence because the State established that he had used deadly force and that his victims had suffered serious physical harm. The trial court did not err in captioning the jury verdict forms with the words "serious harm" rather than "serious physical harm." Using captions to identify offenses is a rational way to identify the verdict for each offense, particularly where, as here, many offenses were involved.
{¶ 3} The State concedes that the trial court erred in calculating the proper sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law, and we agree. However, the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences, which originally resulted in a 94.5-year maximum prison term. Under State v. Gwynne, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607, N.E.3d _, a trial court must consider each sentence on individual counts that it intends to impose consecutively on the defendant and the aggregate prison term that will result. Nonetheless, we are unable to reach a firm conviction or belief that "the record does not support the trial court's necessity or proportionality findings in light of the actual number of consecutive terms that it imposed and the resulting aggregate sentence." Gwynne at ¶ 17.
{¶ 4} We further conclude that the court did not err in ordering Taylor to pay restitution. Taylor failed to object to the amount or to ask for a hearing in the trial court, the trial court did consider Taylor's ability to pay, and the amount of restitution was minimal. Finally, no error occurred in imposing court costs, because Taylor failed to file a motion in the trial court seeking waiver of court costs based on his alleged indigent status. Taylor has also not lost his ability to make such a request, since R.C. 2947.23(C) allows defendants to make such requests at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.
{¶ 5} Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part as to the error in calculating the sentence under the Reagan Tokes Law. This matter will be remanded so that the trial court may correct the sentence.
{¶ 6} The charges against Taylor arose from a series of events that began in the late evening hours of August 20, 2019, and continued into August 21, 2019. Essentially, Taylor and another individual, Aaron Paddock, assaulted and robbed a pedestrian, attempted to break into one house, assaulted the resident of that house when he came outside, and then broke into a second home. Taylor damaged property in that house before fleeing. In the process of attempting to flee, Taylor also assaulted and injured several police officers.
{¶ 7} On August 30, 2019, an indictment was filed charging Taylor with 12 counts, including: (1) aggravated robbery (serious harm), a first-degree felony; (2) kidnapping (terrorize/physical harm); a first-degree felony; (3) felonious assault (serious harm), a second-degree felony; (4) felonious assault (serious harm), a second-degree felony; (5) felonious assault (deadly weapon), a second-degree felony; (6) criminal damaging, a second-degree misdemeanor; (7) aggravated burglary (physical harm), a first-degree felony; (8) felonious assault (police officer) (deadly weapon), a first-degree felony; (9) felonious assault (police officer) (deadly weapon), a first-degree felony; (10) assault (police officer), a fourth-degree felony; (11) assault (police officer), a fourth-degree felony; and (12) assault (police officer), a fourth-degree felony. Eight charges had repeat violent offender specifications. The offense supporting the specifications was that Taylor had previously been convicted of or had pled guilty to burglary in Greene County C.P. No. 2014 CR 226.
{¶ 8} On September 5, 2019, Taylor pled not guilty to the charges, and counsel was appointed to represent him. Trial was initially set for November 18, 2019, but Taylor filed a written waiver of his speedy trial rights on November 14, 2019. Subsequently, on March 10, 2020, Taylor entered a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and asked the court to order a competency evaluation. On March 12, 2020, the court issued an order for an evaluation. The report was submitted on April 3, 2020, and the court then, on May 12, 2020, ordered a second competency evaluation at Taylor's request. The docket does not include a decision finding Taylor competent, but the presentence investigation report ("PSI") indicates that both psychiatrists found Taylor competent. PSI, p. 8.
{¶ 9} After a number of continuances, the case was ultimately tried to a jury beginning on February 28, 2022. At the end of the trial, the jury found Taylor guilty of all counts and specifications as charged. On March 7, 2022, Taylor filed a motion for acquittal on all charges, alleging that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of evidence. However, the trial court overruled the motion on March 23, 2022.
{¶ 10} During the sentencing hearing, the court merged the following counts: I and III; IV and V; VIII and X; and IX and XI. For these merged counts, the State elected for the court to impose sentencing on Counts I, IV, VIII, and IX. Except as to Count II, on which Taylor was found to be a repeat violent offender, the State asked to dismiss the repeat violent offender specifications, and the court dismissed them. Some sentences were imposed consecutively and two were imposed concurrently, for a total prison term of a minimum of 63 years to a maximum of 94.5 years. The court also imposed restitution of $135 and ordered Taylor to pay court costs. Taylor timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.
{¶ 11} Taylor's first assignment of error states that:
There was Insufficient Evidence Presented to Support the Convictions in Counts V, VIII, IX, I, III, IV, and II.
{¶ 12} Under this assignment of error, Taylor makes two arguments. First, he contends that his convictions on Counts V, VIII, and IX were based on insufficient evidence because the State failed to prove that he used a deadly weapon. Second, Taylor argues that Counts I, III, and IV were based on insufficient evidence because the State failed to prove that the victims suffered serious physical harm.[1] We will discuss these issues separately after outlining applicable standards for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶ 13} "A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law." State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In such situations, we apply the test from State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), which states that:
An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 14} Furthermore, "[b]ecause the factfinder * * * has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses, * * * [t]he decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness." State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16288, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (Aug. 22, 1997).
{¶ 15} Contrastingly, deciding "which of several competing inferences, suggested by the evidence in the record, should be preferred, is a matter in which an appellate judge is at least equally qualified, by reason and experience, to venture an opinion." Id. "Consequently, we defer more to decisions on what testimony should be credited, than we do to decisions on the logical force to be assigned to inferences suggested by evidence, no matter how persuasive the evidence may be." State v. Brooks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21531, 2007-Ohio-1029, ¶ 28, citing Lawson at *4.
{¶ 16} As noted, Taylor maintains that the State failed to prove, for purposes of Counts V, VIII, and IX, that he possessed a deadly weapon, and for purposes of Courts I, III and...
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