State v. Taylor, 51485

Decision Date08 January 1968
Docket NumberNo. 51485,No. 1,51485,1
Citation422 S.W.2d 633
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Bill Frank TAYLOR, Appellant
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Charles C. Hatley Asst. Atty. Gen., New Madrid, for respondent.

Richard E. Graulich, Kansas City, for appellant.

SEILER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment and sentence of three years, following conviction by a jury on an indictment charging the defendant with knowingly receiving stolen property, specifically, an eight cylinder Chevrolet motor, serial number S--185501, belonging to a car dealer, Van Auto Sales, Inc.

The issue is whether the state proved the required guilty knowledge on the part of defendant. The statute, Sec. 560.270 RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., makes punishable the buying or receiving of stolen property by the defendant, 'knowing the same to have been stolen'.

The state's evidence was along these lines: On March 5, or 6, 1964, Van Auto Sales, Inc., discovered one of its new cars, a 1964 Chevrolet Impala two door sedan, serial number 41847S185501, had been stolen from its lot. 1 The shell of the car, stripped of its engine, transmission, drive shaft, differential gears, tires, wheels, radiator, axles, radio and wheel hubs was located by the Kansas City, Kansas police on March 6, 1964, near the state line, under the Intercity viaduct. The insurance company paid the theft loss, took title from the car dealer, and sold the shell to the highest salvage bidder, one Bill Edwards, who operated a filling station and salvage business. April 17, 1964, defendant bought the shell from Edwards for $1575 and a front end on a used car, worth about $75. The evening of the day of the purchase, Edwards and a friend, Dan Strong, went to defendant's place of business, known as Carl's Hollywood Muffler Shop, 2743 McGee, Kansas City, Missouri, to get the money and pick up the front end. In the course of showing them around the premises, defendant showed them a 1956 Chevrolet convertible, and said that the engine and transmission in the 1956 convertible came out of the 1964 Chevrolet; that he had purchased the convertible 'from a colored fellow in Kansas City, Kansas', for $450. There was no mention in the conversation, however, of the 1964 Chevrolet as having 'previously been stolen'. Edwards testified the engine in the 1956 Chevrolet was a Chevrolet V--8, either a 283 cubic inch or a 327 cubic inch and could have been anything from a 1955 to a 1964 engine. The engine looked new, not dirty.

An F.B.I. agent, O. T. Handwerk, testified he investigated the theft of the 1964 Chevrolet both in Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas. March 26, 1964, he conducted an investigation in regard to the motor number on a 1956 Chevrolet convertible registered in Kansas to Edward Dodds, Kansas City, Kansas. There was no identification number on the motor. 'There was markings where the identification number normally is placed on the motor, which indicated that it had been altered to the extent that some numbers had been removed.' He did not know what became of this car. He questioned two men, Edward Paul Dodds and Leonard Wade Scaife, about the theft of the 1964 Chevrolet.

Defendant rebuilt the 1964 Chevrolet and sold it, June 23, 1964, to the aforesaid Van Auto Sales, Inc., for $2300. Shortly after the purchase, the office girl at Van Auto Sales discovered the serial number was the same as on the car stolen from their lot. On June 27, 1964, Van Auto Sales sold the car to Arthur J. Dunham, who was still driving it at time of trial. On July 2, 1964, the Kansas City police made a physical inspection of the car and took photographs. The car had an identification plate on the left front door post, No. 41847S185501, and the number on the engine block was S185501.

An officer, Donald Wienberg, from the Auto Theft Bureau of the Kansas City, Missouri, police department, inspected the 1964 Chevrolet a few days after Dunham purchased it. The officer said the engine was a 327 cubic inch and that he saw nothing 'on this serial number that indicated to me that this was not a factory job', referring to the way the members were stamped on the engine block. The transmission in the car was not original equipment; it had a 1962 case, but someone had placed a 1963 Corvette serial number on it. This witness also testified that the transmission from the 1964 Chevrolet was in Kansas, but he did not know exactly where.

Defendant's evidence was as follows: In addition to Carl's Hollywood Muffler Shop at 2743 McGee, defendant also operated Jackson County Motors, a used car business, at 7500 Prospect, both in Kansas City, Missouri. Defendant testified he bought the 1956 Chevrolet convertible from Edward Dodds on April 8, 1964, for $500, paid by a Carl's Hollywood Muffler Shop check, exhibit 12, on which defendant had noted 'Mtr. number backwards,--CV 14375--56 Chev. Conv. Idn. no. VC56S014375'. He said Dodds came to his place approximately four days earlier, asking if he were interested in buying the car, at which time defendant offered $300. Dodds was back a couple of times before the deal was closed. Before he bought, defendant looked at the engine and noticed the 'number seemed to be stamped on there backwards, plus the fact that it was white silvery looking like they might have had acid on the motor', and this, he said, together with the fact he had noticed in the paper about a week before where Dodds 'had been picked up in Kansas for investigation', prompted defendant to go 'into the office and called the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department and it was clear. They had the car and they had released it'. Defendant talked to Lt. Hall. At the time of purchase defendant received a Kansas motor vehicle title for the 1956 Chevrolet made out to Edward Dodds, exhibit 13. The application on the Kansas title is dated February 26, 1964. The certificate of title was issued and dated March 6, 1964.

Defendant and his mechanics testified about rebuilding the 1964 Chevrolet, using the engine from the 1956 Chevrolet convertible (which they said had around 15,000 to 20,000 miles wear) and obtaining other parts from various sources. He said he had approximately $2700 in the rebuilt car. Defendant admitted that he ground off the engine number CV 14375 and in its place stamped the number S185501, which he said he took from the serial number plate on the door post on the 1964 Chevrolet. He said he wanted a number 'that had to do something (sic) with the car' and also to make it more difficult for a prospective purchaser to prove that it was not a 1964 engine.

Defendant denied telling Reynolds and Strong that he had the engine or transmission from the 1964 Chevrolet. He testified he did not believe the engine in the 1956 Chevrolet was stolen. When questioned as to whether he knew Dodds had been picked up for theft of the 1964 Chevrolet, defendant answered, 'I still don't know that he has been.'

Defendant's mechanic testified that defendant had customers interested in high performance engines, but that the motor in the 1956 Chevrolet did not have a head, camshaft, carburetor or pistons of the high performance type.

As stated earlier, the issue is whether the evidence shows the required guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant. In deciding this, there are several well established rules to keep in mind as follows: Many cases have held guilty knowledge requires knowledge on the part of the accused of the stolen character of the goods at the time he received them. 2 This means actual knowledge must be proved and found, not mere negligence in failing to know, not what a reasonably prudent man might know or believe, not facts which would put a reasonably prudent man on guard, although of course the knowledge which defendant possessed may be shown by circumstances. 3 And the mere fact of possession of the goods by the defendant raises no presumption defendant knew the property had been stolen by another. 4

At first glance, defendant's statement to Reynolds and Strong that the engine and transmission from the 1964 Chevrolet were on the 1956 Chevrolet convertible seems incriminating. But the element of receipt of the engine knowing that it was stolen is not supplied by this statement of defendant, because there is no evidence that defendant knew the 1964 Chevrolet was stolen. There were no suspicious circumstances proved surrounding the acquisition of the 1964 shell by defendant. There is no evidence that Edwards informed defendant, or that defendant was otherwise apprised of the fact, that the 1964 Chevrolet Impala had been stolen from Van Auto Sales. There is no circumstantial evidence from which this could be reasonably inferred.

Somehow, by means not shown, the engine taken out of 1964 Chevrolet apparently shows up in the 1956 Chevrolet convertible which defendant buys from Dodds. There was no evidence to show defendant was aware the F.B.I. agent had questioned Dodds about the theft of the 1964 Chevrolet. There is no proof that defendant dealt with Dodds in the dark of the night or in a furtive manner or that defendant attempted to hide the 1956 Chevrolet after he got it. He paid what would appear to be a reasonable price, $500, in 1964 for a 1956 Chevrolet convertible. Certainly there was no evidence he bought it at a suspiciously low price.

We have looked at exhibit 13, the Kansas title in the name of Edward Dodds, Jr., on the 1956 Chevrolet and exhibit 12, the $500 check, made out to Dodds in payment for the car. Dodds' signature appears in two places on the title and once in the endorsement on the check. While we do not pretend to be handwriting experts (and there was no expert testimony on the subject at the trial), the signatures appear to be substantially alike. The check is stamped 'Paid' by the bank April 8, 1964. As noted above, the application for the Kansas title on the 1956 Chevrolet is dated February 26, 1964, which was before the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Russell v. State, 4735
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 19 de julho de 1978
    ...of possession of stolen property for the necessary Substantive 3 Evidence of guilty knowledge. As succinctly stated in State v. Taylor, Mo., 422 S.W.2d 633, 637-639: " . . . The jury evidently disbelieved his explanation. But in a criminal case, where defendant is presumed to be innocent an......
  • Merriman v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 11 de junho de 1973
    ...substitute for, affirmative proof of those contrary facts essential to plaintiff's recovery on his two-dog theory. State v. Taylor, 422 S.W.2d 633, 637--638 (Mo. 1968); Nevinger v. Haun, 197 Mo.App. 416, 426, 196 S.W. 39, 41 (1917); Fausette v. Grim, 193 Mo.App. 585, 594, 186 S.W. 1177, 118......
  • Carter v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 21 de julho de 1970
    ...the limitations of this opinion, the finding of scienter from its denial, at least one state does not allow the finding, State v. Taylor, 422 S.W.2d 633 (Mo.1968). In the instant case to justify the finding of scienter from the disbelief of defendant's denial, the trial judge relied on defe......
  • State v. Roy
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 27 de janeiro de 2020
    ...or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action[.]").30 Roy relies on State v. Taylor , 422 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1968), for the proposition that the jury’s disbelief of a defendant’s testimony "is not probative and does not constitute substantive proof......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT