State v. Teague
| Decision Date | 29 August 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 65638,65638 |
| Citation | 475 So.2d 213,10 Fla. L. Weekly 423 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 423 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lewis Abayomi TEAGUE, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Kaden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Harold C. Arnold, Jacksonville, for respondent.
Paul A. Rowell, Gen. Counsel, and Michael J. Alderman, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, amicus curiae.
We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in State v. Teague, 452 So.2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), which certified the following question to be of great public importance:
Does the carrying of a firearm by the occupant of a motor vehicle having tinted window glass which prevents the firearm from being visible within the ordinary sight of persons outside the vehicle, although the firearm is otherwise in clear view and unconcealed, constitute the offense of carrying a concealed firearm under Section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes?
We answer the certified question in the negative and hold that the weapon in the present case was not a "concealed firearm" within the meaning of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1983). *
The facts relevant to this decision are as follows. On June 18, 1983, at approximately 9:35 p.m., an officer of the Duval County Sheriff's Office stopped Teague for driving without headlights. Teague exited his vehicle. When the officer requested to see his driver's license, Teague unhesitatingly opened the left rear door of his car to retrieve the license from the pocket of some clothing. When he opened the door, the officer saw the muzzle portion of a rifle lying uncovered on the front seat of the car. He thereupon arrested Teague for carrying a concealed firearm, in violation of section 790.01(2). The sole alleged probable cause for arresting Teague was that the car had tinted windows through which the firearm could not be seen in the "ordinary sight of another person."
The trial court granted Teague's motion to dismiss on the basis that the facts did not establish a prima facie case of guilt under section 790.01(2).
The district court affirmed and reasoned that the tinted windows did not convert the carrying of a firearm openly on the front seat of a motor vehicle and in an otherwise lawful manner into the crime of carrying a concealed firearm. It, however, certified the question to this Court.
The state contends that the certified question is a factual question which can be answered only by the jury and not this Court. We disagree. This case presents the legal question of whether tinted motor vehicle windows by themselves make a firearm that is otherwise legally carried within a motor vehicle a concealed firearm under section 790.01(2).
The term "concealed" as used in the statutory definitions, sections 790.001(2) and 3(a), must be construed in accordance with its usual and ordinary meaning. We agree with Judge Smith's statement in his special concurrence wherein he reasoned:
We would...
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Cope v. State, 87-798
...as was required by the officer in Ensor. The Florida Supreme Court's most recent analysis of the concealment issue is in State v. Teague, 475 So.2d 213 (Fla.1985). In that case, the supreme court said the term "concealed" must be construed in accordance with its usual and ordinary meaning, ......
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Dorelus v. State
...focusing on the "manner" in which the weapon is carried on or about the person. See § 790.001(2)-(3)(a). Our decision in State v. Teague, 475 So.2d 213, 214 (Fla.1985), recognized this focus by making clear that the crux of concealment is the location of the weapon in the In Teague, after t......
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Wilson v. State, 88-212
...v. State, 523 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), this court recently recited the standards for concealment of firearms. Citing State v. Teague, 475 So.2d 213 (Fla.1985), the court held that the term "concealed" must be construed in accordance with its usual and ordinary meaning. 523 So.2d at 1......
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State v. Gale, 90-1521
...the gun was concealed as contemplated by the statute. The term "concealed" must be given its usual and ordinary meaning. State v. Teague, 475 So.2d 213 (Fla.1985). Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349 (Fla.1981), is the seminal case interpreting the statute, and the traverse quoted language from E......