State v. Teeters, 90-1118
| Decision Date | 22 July 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1118,90-1118 |
| Citation | 487 N.W.2d 346 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Bryan Patrick TEETERS, Appellant. STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Larry LARSEN, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shari Barron, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for appellants.
Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Julie Ann Halligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Richard Crowl, County Atty., for appellee.
Considered en banc.
Defendants' appeals from convictions of attempted murder and willful injury present three assignments of error. One challenges the trial court's refusal to continue trial in order to procure the presence of a subpoenaed witness. A second challenges a refusal to reopen evidence for testimony of that witness. The third challenges the appropriateness of judgment because of the jury's failure to answer an interrogatory. We find no merit in the assignments and affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Because of the thrust and nature of the assignments, it is unnecessary to detail the facts. It is sufficient to explain that defendants Bryan Teeters and Larry Larsen entered a house occupied by the three acquaintances who became the victims in the case. Defendants entered on the pretext of needing help to start a car. The attacks which followed were unprovoked. Defendant Teeters asked Jerry Peeler for a cigarette and, after telling him he was a dead man, began indiscriminately shooting. Jerry Peeler was shot at least four times and received treatment for wounds to the jaw, back, and left thigh. Lisa Peeler was treated for two gunshot wounds, one in her right hip and one in the calf of her right leg. Rex Livingston, the third victim, was treated for wounds in the stomach, groin, leg, and nose.
After a joint trial, a jury found both Teeters and Larsen guilty of three charges: two counts of attempted murder and one count of willful injury in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.11 and 708.4 (1989). On appeal the cases were transferred to the court of appeals which affirmed Larsen's conviction. That court however vacated the enhanced sentence entered against Teeters because the jury failed to answer a special interrogatory asking if he was armed with a firearm. We granted further review in both cases.
I. Before resting their case, defendants sought a continuance of the trial to secure the testimony of Josh Herman, who failed to appear despite a subpoena directing him to do so. Herman's testimony might have been helpful to both defendants because it contradicted prosecution evidence placing them at the scene, as well as describing their other activities, on the night in question. Herman's testimony was especially important to support Larsen's alibi defense, according to which Larsen, Larsen's brother Chris, and the missing witness were together at a recreation area during the time of the shootings.
The ruling denying defendants' motion for continuance was discretionary and therefore calls for reversal only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Slayton, 417 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1987).
Many trial continuances are sought on legitimate grounds. In spite of careful plans and diligent preparations, an unanticipated event will on occasion necessarily precipitate a continuance motion. It is far from unknown, on the other hand, for continuance motions to serve as a mere delaying tactic. We call upon our trial judges to do justice to those needing and deserving a continuance, while at the same time resolutely moving the trial assignment toward the speedy resolution of cases. The trial judge must sense whether a given continuance motion stems from a legitimate need, or from a wish to delay. From its closer vantage point, the trial court can better sort through these matters than an appellate court can.
The circumstances here are especially appropriate for allowing trial court discretion. No attempt was made to estimate how long it would take to find Herman. His address and whereabouts, notwithstanding efforts to locate him, were at that time unknown. We find no basis to interfere here with the trial court's exercise of its broad discretion.
II. A decidedly closer question is presented on defendants' challenge to the trial court's refusal to reopen evidence to receive Herman's testimony. The motion to reopen was made before final arguments to the jury, and thus also before instructions were read to the jury. Herman was present at the time and ready to testify. The ruling denying the motion was also discretionary. Stanford v. Iowa State Reformatory, 279 N.W.2d 28, 35 (Iowa 1979); State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 461 (Iowa 1976); see generally 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1223, at 103 (1989); 89 C.J.S. Trial § 591, at 375 (1955); 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 379, at 576 (1991).
The following factors weigh in determining whether a case should be reopened for additional evidence: (1) the reason for the failure to introduce the evidence; (2) the surprise or unfair prejudice inuring to the opponent that might be caused by introducing the evidence; (3) the diligence used by the proponent to secure the evidence in a timely fashion; (4) the admissibility and materiality of the evidence; (5) the stage of the trial when the motion is made; (6) the time and effort expended upon the trial; and (7) the inconvenience reopening the case would cause to the proceeding. See 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 382, at 579 (1991).
At least some of these factors militate in favor of reopening. The trial court believed its refusal to reopen the case was justified at least in part because it considered Herman's proffered testimony to be cumulative. The value of the testimony to Larsen, though, cannot be so easily written off. Larsen's alibi was supported only by his own out-of-court statement and by the testimony of his brother. Larsen would have preferred to have the alibi defense bolstered by less interested witnesses.
On the other hand the discretion accorded here must necessarily be especially broad. Judicial...
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