State v. Tempesta
| Decision Date | 24 December 1992 |
| Citation | 617 A.2d 566 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Gerald TEMPESTA. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Janet T. Mills, Dist. Atty., Patricia Reynolds Regan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Auburn, for the State.
Arthur J. Greif, Isaacson & Raymond, Lewiston, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.
Gerald Tempesta appeals from judgment entered in Superior Court (Androscoggin County, Alexander, J.) affirming the judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, Beliveau, J.) convicting him of driving to endanger in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314 (Pamph.1991) for splashing snow slush onto a police cruiser and two other vehicles. 1 Because we agree with Tempesta's assertion that the State failed to prove that his splashing snow slush was criminally negligent, we vacate the conviction.
The court heard the following evidence: At about 8:45 AM on Sunday, March 24, 1991, Tempesta was driving north in the left-hand, north-bound lane of Minot Avenue in Auburn. Snow from the previous night's storm covered the road in varying depths. Tempesta was driving within the speed limit when his vehicle entered an area of "heavier" slush. Tempesta testified that he did not move to the right-hand lane in which two tracks had been cleared by previous traffic because he feared that a car was traveling next to the right rear of his vehicle outside his range of vision, in the area typically referred to as his "blind spot." 2 His vision in the side-view mirror was obscured by moisture and in the rear-view mirror was blocked by the load in the bed of the pickup he was driving. Because Tempesta was traveling in the slush-covered left-hand lane, his vehicle splashed slush onto the windshields of three oncoming vehicles, one of which was a police cruiser. This splashing caused the drivers of those vehicles to momentarily lose control of their vehicles.
The State charged that Tempesta was criminally negligent for causing "snow to be splattered on oncoming vehicles obstructing views and almost causing an accident." After hearing the testimony of Tempesta and Officer Page, the District Court convicted Tempesta and sentenced him to a 30-day loss of license and a $100 fine. The Superior Court affirmed the conviction.
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to decide whether a fact-finder rationally could find every element of the criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Philbrick, 551 A.2d 847, 852 (Me.1988). Because the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review directly the action of the District Court. See City of Portland v. Gemini Concerts, Inc., 481 A.2d 180, 181 (Me.1984).
To be convicted of driving to endanger, the operator of a motor vehicle must drive "with criminal negligence." 29 M.R.S.A. § 1314 (Pamph.1991); see also State v. Davis, 398 A.2d 1218 (Me.1979) (). Criminal negligence is defined in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 35(4) (1983) which reads:
A. A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result of his conduct when he fails to be aware of a risk that his conduct will cause such a result.
. . . . .
C. For purposes of this subsection, the failure to be aware of the risk, when viewed in light of the nature and purpose of the person's conduct and the circumstances known to him, must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation.
17-A M.R.S.A. § 35(4) (1983) (emphasis added). Like civil negligence, criminal negligence is defined in terms of unreasonable...
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...to decide whether a factfinder rationally could find every element of the criminal charges beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Tempesta, 617 A.2d 566, 567 (Me.1992); State v. Priest, 617 A.2d 537, 539 (Me.1992). We will overturn a jury verdict only when no trier of fact rationally could hav......
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