State v. Terry, s. 65515

Decision Date13 August 1996
Docket NumberNos. 65515,68173,s. 65515
Citation928 S.W.2d 879
PartiesSTATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Marcus TERRY, Appellant. Marcus TERRY, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Raymund J. Capelovitch, Asst. Public Defender, St. Louis, for appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, David R. Truman, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, for respondent.

HOFF, Judge.

Defendant, Marcus Terry, was convicted by a jury of two counts of murder in the first degree, § 565.020.1 RSMo 1986. He was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without possibility of probation or parole. On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in: (1) overruling his motion for a mistrial following the State's cross-examination of one of defendant's witnesses; (2) overruling his Batson motion to disallow the State's strikes of two venirepersons from the petit jury; (3) overruling his motion for severance of Counts I and II; and (4) admitting evidence of uncharged crimes. 1 We affirm.

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is as follows. On the evening of November 2, 1992, defendant, Kaven Sipes, David "Wookey" Williams, Mark Johnson, and Clarence Temple were involved in a dice game. During the game, defendant confronted Sipes about "the dope he had took from Tawana." Defendant then left the area and, approximately five minutes later, a man wearing a black ski mask appeared and fatally shot Sipes. Temple testified that although he could not see defendant's face, he identified defendant "from his body."

Johnny Jackson, a friend of defendant's, finished his shift at a Rally's restaurant and was walking to his girlfriend's home when he was approached by defendant. Defendant was wearing a black ski mask. Defendant removed the mask and said, "I got that mother fucker."

Four days later, defendant and Temple talked about the shooting. Defendant asked Temple if he knew Williams. Temple said he did not and defendant said he "was going to have to get" Williams because Williams had identified defendant to the police. Defendant asked Temple to "take care of" Williams and gave him $1,000. Two days later, Temple returned the money to defendant and told him he could not do it.

Hyshol "Highshoe" Eastling testified that on November 8, 1992, he, defendant, and Williams were driving around and drinking from the late afternoon until the early morning of November 9, 1992. Ultimately, the three entered Forest Park and Eastling got out of the car to urinate. While he was doing so, defendant shot Williams in the head with a .32 caliber firearm. Eastling got back into the car and defendant told Eastling he would kill him if he said anything. Defendant also said he shot Williams because Williams had been "snitching, talking too much."

Several days later, defendant and Temple were in jail together. Temple asked defendant why he was there. Defendant said "somebody had told the police he had killed the little dude in the park and Kaven Sipes." Defendant speculated Eastling was the informant. When defendant discovered Temple was expected to be released that day, defendant offered him $2,000 to kill Eastling. Defendant also admitted to Temple that he killed Williams.

Defendant did not testify at trial, but presented the testimony of two witnesses in his defense. At the close of all of the evidence, and following the instructions and arguments of counsel, the jury found defendant guilty as charged.

On August 25, 1994, defendant filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15. Appointed counsel filed an amended motion on December 5, 1994. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied defendant's motion for postconviction relief. This appeal followed.

In his first point on appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial following a question asked of Mark Johnson, a witness testifying on defendant's behalf, during the State's cross-examination. During direct examination, Johnson testified defendant was not present at the dice game which preceded Sipes' murder. During cross-examination the following exchange took place:

Q: Okay. Now you say [defendant] was not there?

A: I didn't see him.

Q: But are you saying he wasn't there?

A: I didn't see him. He wasn't there in my eyes.

Q: Could he have been there and you didn't see him?

A: People could have been all around but I didn't see him. He wasn't out there. If he was out there I would have talked to him or whatever.

Q: So if he was there you would have seen him?

A: Yeah, I would have seen him.

Q: So if he said he was there how could you miss him?

A: If he said he was there he was lying, because I was there.

Q: If he said he was there he was lying?

A: Yep.

At this point, defense counsel objected. Out of the hearing of the jury, the following exchange occurred:

[Defense Counsel]: [Prosecutor] has made a reference to a statement made allegedly by the defendant, asking if the defendant said he was there if he was lying. No such statement has ever been disclosed to me.

[Prosecutor]: Come again? You've got the police report. It's in the police report. You know the statement's been disclosed to you.

[Defense Counsel]: And my understanding of the police report is that there is no reference whatsoever to the first homicide.

[Prosecutor]: Excuse me? "He was present when Sipes was murdered." (Showing defense counsel the report)

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I take this to mean the reference to "he" being David Williams was present when he was murdered. That's how I read this police report.

[Prosecutor]: It specifically says Sipes.

[Defense Counsel]: That he, meaning David Williams, he said it was probably--in reference to the decedent, he was present.

[Prosecutor]: I can see your interpretation. I can have the officer come in.

[Defense Counsel]: My interpretation when they interviewed the defendant they talk about the decedent, the very next word, "he was present," is a reference to the victim, David Williams having been present when Sipes was murdered.

...

The Court: Then I yield with the report since it is not clear from reading the report, then what we'll do is direct the State not to make any further reference.

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I have to move for a mistrial at this time, because I think the implication clearly now is the defendant has admitted being present. There has been no such evidence offered to me that the State has a statement to that effect. The reliance on the police report, in good faith I believed the reference was directly to David Williams being present at the time of the homicide, and I think now to suggest otherwise denies [defendant] of a fair trial and I move for a mistrial based on the question put to this witness.

The Court: What's your response?

[Prosecutor]: Judge, all along I've read this the defendant was present at that time. I have not inquired as to the police officer. I've relied upon my interpretation as she's relied on hers.

The Court: I haven't read the entire report, so it's hard for me to say. It appears there could be some question, but suffice to say that I didn't interpret your question as calling for a comment as to whether or not the defendant would be lying or not. Basically, whether or not this witness would have seen him there. But I think he chose to answer. The motion for mistrial is denied.

Defense counsel then read the relevant portion of the police report into the record. The police report states, in part, as follows:

[Defendant] later learned of the decedent's [Williams'] demise in the evening on Monday, 11-8-92, from an acquaintance (Barry, black male, no further).

He stated it was probably Kevin [sic] Sipes' people who murdered the decedent. He was present when Sipes was murdered and the word on the street "had it that" Sipes' people were going to kill all persons who were present when Sipes was murdered.

(emphasis added). Following the defense counsel's reading of the police report, the trial judge stated, "Begins to sound more like the defendant stated he was there at the crime scene. But if there's any question to it I'm going to--I will direct the State not to inquire further. Motion is denied, though."

On January 28, 1994 the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion for new trial. During the hearing, Detective Gary Stidum, the author of the police report, presented testimony as to the correct interpretation of the word "he" as used in the police report. During the hearing, the following exchange took place between Detective Stidum and defense counsel:

Q: During the course of that interview did [defendant] ever tell you that he was present at the time of a shooting of a Kaven Sipes, on Gibson[?]

A: Yes, he did.

Q: He indicated to you he was, in fact, present?

A: Yes, he did--

Q: When did he tell you that?

A: --no, he didn't tell me that.

[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, may the record reflect there was an approximately forty-five second interval there while the detective reviewed the pertinent part of that police report?

The Court: So reflect.

Detective Stidum, after reviewing the police report, then testified defendant had been referring to Williams' presence at the dice game. During the State's cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Detective Stidum further about the police report's ambiguity:

Q: Detective, you reviewed Page 8 of that paragraph [sic] that [defense counsel] just read to you. You took some time to review it. You read it through maybe once, twice, three, four times?

A: Yes.

Q: And were you confused as to what you had written, oh, a year or two years ago, as a matter of fact, I think it was, with reference to the identity of who was present?

A: Yeah. This is somewhat confusing.

Q: So you thought until you recalled what you personally had experienced, when you read that paragraph at...

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  • State v. Brooks
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