State v. Thomas

• Decision Date: 21 November 1906
• Citation: 109 N.W. 900,135 Iowa 717
• Parties: STATE v. THOMAS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

135 Iowa 717

109 N.W. 900

STATE

v.THOMAS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 21, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Polk County; A. H. McVey, Judge.

Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, committed by the administration of poison to one Mabel Scofield, resulting in her death, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life, and from this sentence he appeals. Affirmed.McHenry, Mulvaney & Jones, for appellant.

Charles W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., Lawrence De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jesse A. Miller, Co. Atty., for the State.

McCLAIN, C. J.

On the 22d day of October, 1899, the body of Mabel Scofield was found in the Des Moines river, and in December, 1904, the grand jury of Polk county indicted defendant for the murder of Mabel Scofield by the administration of poison. The evidence tended to show that Mabel Scofield and Maggie Hammond had come to Des Moines six or seven weeks before Mabel Scofield's death, and had gone to live with the parents of the defendant, to whom Maggie Hammond was related, and that the two girls were employed in a dressmaking establishment. On the morning of October 21, 1899, which was Saturday, Mabel Scofield had accompanied her mother, with whom she had just previously returned from a short trip to Waterloo, to the train, on which her mother was to return to her home. After her mother's departure from the Union Station on the train, Mabel Scofield started up West Fifth street at the east end of the station. Where she subsequently went, and what occurred to her between this time and 3 o'clock of the afternoon of the next day, when her body was found in the river, is the subject of controversy among the witnesses whose testimony is set out in this record. It does not appear that she went to her place of work, which was on West Sixth street, and which she could have reached in a very direct way by going up Sixth street from the west end of the station; nor that she was at her place of work during the day. Witnesses for the prosecution testify that she was seen returning to the Thomas home on Woodland avenue near West Tenth street, and that she was seen at the Thomas home within a short time after she left the Union Station. There is no evidence that she was seen about the Thomas home after that, and the theory of the prosecution is that she died not later than half past 10 o'clock from the effect of chloral hydrate or chloroform, or the two poisons combined, administered to her by defendant after her return to the Thomas home that morning. On the other hand, two witnesses for defendant testify to having seen her late in the afternoon of that day on the streets, and the theory of the defense is that she committed suicide by drowning in the river near where her body was found, some time between Saturday afternoon and 3 o'clock on Sunday afternoon. There is also some evidence for defendant tending to show that he was not at his parent's home on Saturday morning during the hours when the crime was committed as charged. Such details of the evidence as it is necessary to refer to in passing upon the errors assigned will be stated in the course of the opinion.

1. The indictment charging murder in the first degree is in two counts, in the first of which it is alleged that defendant caused the death of Mabel Scofield by administering and causing to be taken by her “a deadly amount of a certain deadly poison known as the hydrate of chloral, and certain poisons to the grand jurors unknown”; and the second count charged the commission of the crime by making an assault upon and killing Mabel Scofield “by some means, drugs, poisons, instruments, and weapons,” to the grand jury unknown. At the conclusion of the evidence the court withdrew the second count from the consideration of the jury, and submitted the case solely upon the first count, and in this it is claimed there was error, inasmuch as some of the evidence indicated that the death was caused by the administration of chloroform, and that this evidence was not withdrawn from the consideration of the jury, so that the jury were allowed, in passing upon the charge under the first count of the indictment, to consider evidence which it is claimed was admissible only under the second count. But this contention is entirely without merit. Chloroform is not referred to in either count. Evidence that the death was caused by chloroform would be admissible only under the allegation charging the administration of some poison to the grand jurors unknown. The first count charges the administration of “hydrate of chloral, and certain poisons to the grand jurors unknown,” while the second count charges that death was caused “by some means, drugs, poisons, instruments, and weapons, to the grand jurors unknown.” Clearly, therefore, proof of death by the administration of chloroform was as pertinent under the one count as under the other, and there could have been no prejudicial error in submitting only the first count to the consideration of the jury, although, at the time when the evidence tending to show death by the administration of chloroform was introduced, the prosecution was depending upon both counts for a conviction. Considering the first count alone, there was no variance between the allegations and the proof in this respect.

2. With reference to the evidence tending to show an alibi, the court instructed the jury that: “The defendant is not required to prove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt, but, to entitle him to an acquittal, it is sufficient if the evidence upon that point raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's presence at the time and place of the commission of the crime charged. The burden is upon the defendant to prove this defense for himself by a preponderance of evidence; that is, by the greater and superior evidence.” It is claimed that this instruction is erroneous because it does not properly present the rule adopted by this court, and which is in some respects peculiar to this state, that, while the defense of alibi must be made out for defendant by a preponderance of the evidence relating thereto, nevertheless the defendant is entitled to acquittal, if all the evidence, including that relating to alibi, leaves in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt of the crime charged. State v. Hogan, 115 Iowa, 455, 88 N. W. 1074;State v. McGarry, 111 Iowa, 709, 83 N. W. 718;State v. Hathaway, 100 Iowa, 225, 69 N. W. 449;State v. Maher, 75 Iowa, 77, 37 N. W. 2. The only question, as we think, is whether, in the instruction quoted, the jury was directed to take into account the evidence relating to alibi in determining whether they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt on all the evidence as to defendant's guilt, and we are satisfied that the instruction plainly conveys this idea. The jury was told to acquit if the evidence as to alibi “raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's presence at the time and place of the commission of the crime charged.” Certainly it must have been understood from this instruction that, in determing whether there was a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, the evidence as to alibi should be considered regardless of whether defendant established the defense of alibi by a preponderance of the evidence. The instruction is quite similar in this respect to one which was held not prejudicial to the defendant in State v. Worthen, 124 Iowa, 408, 100 N. W. 330. It is said, in the Worthen Case, that the instruction given was more favorable to the defendant than it should have been, and perhaps the same thing is true in this case; but, at any rate, there was clearly no error prejudicial to defendant.

3. With reference to the degree of the crime committed, the jury was instructed as follows: “But if you find that the defendant, Charles Thomas, unlawfully, with bad intention, caused poison to be taken by Mabel Scofield which caused the death of the said Mabel Scofield, you should find the defendant, Charles Thomas, guilty of murder in the first degree; but, if you fail to so find, your verdict should be not guilty.” An objection made to this charge is that a homicide committed by the unlawful administration of poison with bad intention is not necessarily murder, but that it may be manslaughter, depending upon the nature of the intent with which the poison was administered. The question is not as to the degree of murder, for it is provided, in Code, § 4728, that: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison * * * is murder in the first degree.” But the question is whether the crime might not be manslaughter. The abstract inquiry to which our attention is thus directed is this: May there be a homicide committed by the unlawful administration of poison under such circumstances as to render the perpetrator thereof guilty of a crime which does not constitute the crime of murder? Or, in other words, does the fact of the unlawful and wrongful administration of poison, causing death, in itself show that malice aforethought which characterizes murder as distinct from manslaughter? There can be but one answer to this question under the decisions of this court, and it is not necessary to go further in discussing the question for the present case. In State v. Robinson, 126 Iowa, 70, 101 N. W. 634, it was held that an indictment for murder by means of a felonious administration of poison need not specifically allege an intent to kill. In State v. Wells, 61 Iowa, 629, 17 N. W. 90, 47 Am. Rep. 822, it was held that it was sufficient to charge that the poison was unlawfully administered, and not given with a good intention, and the court says: “The administration of the poison unlawfully, with a bad motive or intent, under the statute constitutes murder, if death ensues. * * * It is immaterial whether or not there is a specific intent to kill. It is fundamental that every one is presumed to intend the necessary consequences of an act deliberately done by him.”...