JOINER, Judge.
The State of Alabama appeals the circuit court's decision to grant the motion filed by Earl Gaines Thomas, Jr., to dismiss the three complaints charging him with driving under the influence of alcohol, reckless driving, and running a red light. We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural HistoryThomas was convicted in the Baldwin County District Court of driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”), see § 32–5A–191, Ala.Code 1975, of reckless driving, see § 32–5A–190, Ala.Code 1975, and of running a red light, see § 32–5A–32(3) a., Ala.Code 1975. Thomas appealed his convictions to the Baldwin Circuit Court and requested a jury trial.
On September 4, 2014, Thomas filed a “motion to dismiss,” in which Thomas contended that the Alabama Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint (“UTTC”) that charged him in each of his cases—DUI, reckless driving, and running a red light—“failed to ‘designate a public offense’ or cite any statute or ‘offense’ that [Thomas had] violated.” (C. 32.) Thus, Thomas argued, the UTTCs “failed to properly charge [him] with violating any law.” (C. 32.) To support his position, Thomas cited several cases, including Corum v. City of Huntsville, 491 So.2d 1091, 1092 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), which, he said, holds “that [an] officer's failure to cite [a] statutory code provision [in a UTTC] is fatal.” (C. 34.)
On September 8, 2014, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Thomas's motion. At the hearing, Thomas again argued that the three UTTCs were fatally defective because, he said, they failed to cite any Code section charging him with an offense. To support his position, he cited this Court's decisions in Ex parte State ex rel. Johnson, 636 So.2d 1266 (Ala.Crim.App.1994), and Corum, supra. The State, on the other hand, argued that
“in each of these three offenses, the DUI, the reckless driving, and the third charge—
“....
“—running a red light, the charging document designates the charge by name. The [Alabama] Code does not require that the charging officer cite a code section. It is sufficient when the charging document designates the charge by name, as it did in these cases.”
(R. 9.) The circuit court then questioned the State about the application of Corum to this case and concluded as follows:
“My recollection from reading [Corum ], it's almost directly on point from the standpoint of there was no code section cited.”
(R. 10.) The State disagreed with the circuit court's interpretation of Corum, explaining that Corum is distinguishable from this case and that “what we're talking about here in due process is reasonable notice. And reasonable notice of the offense is a description of the offense.” (R. 11.) Thereafter, Thomas again argued that “the charging instrument[s] charge[ ] no crime” and that “we're dealing with something beyond just reasonable notice. We're dealing with the subject matter jurisdiction of the [circuit] court to hear the case.” (R. 12.)
On September 8, 2013, the circuit court granted Thomas's motion to dismiss. Pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim. P., the State appealed the circuit court's ruling.
The facts in this case are not in dispute, and the question before this Court on appeal—whether the circuit court erred when it granted Thomas's motion to dismiss—is purely a legal one. “ ‘ “ ‘[O]n appeal, the ruling on a question of law carries no presumption of correctness, and this Court's review is de novo. ’ Ex parte Graham, 702 So.2d 1215, 1221 (Ala.1997).” Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala.1999).' ” Scott v. State, 917 So.2d 159, 169–70 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (quoting Girard v. State, 883 So.2d 717, 719 (Ala.2003) ).
On appeal, the State contends that the circuit court erred when it granted Thomas's motion to dismiss because, the State says, “[t]he UTTC's sufficiently charged Thomas with committing the offenses of DUI, reckless driving, and running a red light.” (State's brief, p. 8.) We agree.
As a threshold issue, we note that Thomas argued in the circuit court that the alleged defects in the UTTCs deprived the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to try the charged offenses. This argument is incorrect.
This Court has stated:
“Prosecutions of misdemeanor traffic offenses are commenced upon the filing of a valid UTTC in the district court or, where the offense is adopted as a municipal ordinance, in the municipal court. § 12–12–53, Ala.Code 1975; Rule 19(A) and (D), Ala. R. Jud. Admin.; Rule 2.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. See Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 585, 589 (Ala.1990) ; Sisson v. State, 528 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Ala.1988) ; Gandy v. City of Birmingham, 478 So.2d 11, 12 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) ; see also Young v. City of Hokes Bluff, 611 So.2d 401, 404 n. 1 (Ala.Cr.App.) (Bowen, J., concurring in result), aff'd, 611 So.2d 414 (Ala.1992). In misdemeanor traffic cases, the UTTC is the formal charging instrument, analogous to an indictment and conferring original subject matter jurisdiction on the district or municipal court, and on the circuit court in the case of a de novo appeal. Young, 611 So.2d at 411–13 (Bowen, J., concurring in result); Sanders v. City of Birmingham, 669 So.2d 236, 238 (Ala.Cr.App.1995). See also Rule 2.2(d), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended effective August 1, 1997.”
Stoll v. State, 724 So.2d 90, 91–92 (Ala.Crim.App.1998).
In Stoll, this Court held that the complete absence of a formal charging instrument would deprive a circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to try a case, see 724 So.2d at 92 (“Although the record indicates that the state filed a solicitor's complaint for a trial de novo in the circuit court, the complete absence in this case of a UTTC, the formal charging instrument, cannot be cured by the filing of the solicitor's complaint.”). Similarly, this Court has held that the absence of an indictment deprives a circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to try a case. See Ross v. State, 529 So.2d 1074, 1078 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (“In the absence of an indictment or information upon which this prosecution should have begun, the trial court was without jurisdiction to render judgment. Woodham v. State, 28 Ala.App. 62, 178 So. 464 (1938). Thus, the judgment was and void and of no force and effect. Id. ”).
This Court, however, has recognized that the principle announced in Ross was overruled by the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536 (Ala.2006). See Patton v. State, 964 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (“Were Ex parte Looney [, 797 So.2d 427 (Ala.2001),] or Ross the latest statement of the law regarding jurisdiction, Patton's contention that he has raised a jurisdictional claim that entitles him to relief may have been meritorious. However, neither Ex parte Looney nor Ross are the latest statement of the law.”). In Seymour, the Alabama Supreme Court held that “a circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a felony prosecution, even if that prosecution is based on a defective indictment.” 946 So.2d at 539.
Because a UTTC is “analogous to an indictment” and defects in a charging instrument do not deprive a circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to try a charged offense, defects in a UTTC do not deprive a circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction to try a charged offense.
Recently, in State v. Simmons, 179 So.3d 249, 250 (Ala.2014), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed this Court's decision that “the circuit court could not exercise jurisdiction over Simmons's appeal for a trial de novo because the original charging instrument was not used to prosecute the case” in the circuit court. The Supreme Court explained:
“In Ex parte Seymour, this Court established that a court's subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by ‘whether the trial court [has] the constitutional and statutory authority to try the offense’ with which a defendant has been charged. 946 So.2d at 538. Section 12–11–30(3), Ala.Code 1975, provides:
“ ‘The circuit court shall have appellate jurisdiction of ... criminal ... cases in district court.... Appeals to the circuit court shall be tried de novo, with or without a jury, as provided by law.’
“In this case, Simmons was convicted in the district court of a Class A misdemeanor. He appealed his conviction to the circuit court for a trial de novo. In accordance with § 12–11–30(3), Ala.Code 1975, and Ex parte Seymour, the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Simmons's case.
“The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledges Ex parte Seymour and does not appear to dispute the fact that the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Simmons's case; rather that court asserts that ‘the filing of the proper charging instrument was required for the jurisdiction belonging to the circuit court to attach. ’ 179 So.3d at 246 (emphasis added). In other words, according to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the circuit court's jurisdiction in this particular case was not invoked because the original charging instrument used in the district court was not used in the circuit court to prosecute the case. In support of its assertion, the Court of Criminal Appeals cites State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1072 (Ala.1989).
“State v. Thomas, however, does not support the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision that jurisdiction in the circuit court did not ‘attach’ in Simmons's case....
“The facts and circumstances in this case are clearly distinguishable from those in State v. Thomas. In State v. Thomas, no action had been initiated in the juvenile court with regard to the child for the juvenile court's jurisdiction to attach; therefore, the juvenile court could not exercise its
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