State v. Thompkin
| Decision Date | 14 September 2006 |
| Docket Number | SC S51405.,CA A116637.,CC 0105-33237. |
| Citation | 341 Or. 368,143 P.3d 530 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Erikia Marie THOMPKIN, Petitioner on Review. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief on the merits for petitioner on review. With him on the brief was Peter Ozanne, Executive Director, Office of Public Defense Services. Rebecca Duncan, Chief Deputy Public Defender, filed the petition for review. With her on the petition were Peter Ozanne, Executive Director, and Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender Office of Public Defense Services.
Janet A. Metcalf, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
Before CARSON, Chief Justice,** and GILLETTE, DURHAM, RIGGS, DE
In this criminal case, we decide whether police officers unlawfully "seized" an automobile passenger under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.1
During a lawful traffic stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger, the officers requested and retained defendant's identification to conduct a records check. At the time, the officers did not have either a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on defendant's part or a concern about an immediate threat to officer safety. While one officer ran the records check, a second officer questioned defendant about drugs. That conversation prompted defendant to surrender a pipe used for smoking crack cocaine. A subsequent search of defendant's person produced a small rock of crack cocaine. The state charged defendant with possession of cocaine. The trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion to suppress the state's evidence on grounds that defendant voluntarily surrendered the evidence and that she was not unlawfully detained. The trial court convicted defendant of the charged offense, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment from the bench. State v. Thompkin, 192 Or.App. 364, 87 P.3d 709 (2004). We allowed defendant's petition for review, and now, for the reasons that follow, conclude that the officers' interaction with defendant constituted an unlawful seizure under Article I, section 9. We further conclude that the state failed to prove that the discovery of the evidence at issue was sufficiently independent of that preceding violation of defendant's rights; therefore, the evidence must be suppressed. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court.
We take the following facts from the trial court's findings and from the record. At approximately 3:15 a.m. on May 11, 2001, Portland police officers Hill and Reagan were patrolling in a marked police vehicle in Northeast Portland; Hill was driving. While on patrol, Hill observed the driver of a vehicle, in which defendant was the front-seat passenger, fail to signal a turn. Hill initiated a traffic stop and approached the vehicle after it had stopped in front of defendant's apartment.
Hill approached the driver's side of the vehicle, while Reagan approached defendant on the passenger's side. Hill spoke to the driver regarding the reason for the traffic stop and asked for identification from both the driver and defendant, which they provided. Hill then returned to the police vehicle to run a records check on the information from each piece of identification, a process that took less than five minutes. During that time, Reagan remained on the passenger side of the vehicle and asked defendant about her activities with the driver that evening. Reagan also asked defendant if she had any drugs or weapons on her person. In response to that question, defendant removed a crack pipe from her pocket and handed it to Reagan.
After Hill returned from running the records checks on the driver and defendant, he gave the driver a verbal warning regarding his failure to signal the turn. Reagan then informed Hill of the crack pipe that he had obtained from defendant. Based on that information, Hill requested that defendant step out of the vehicle and asked her if she would submit to a search. Defendant got out of the vehicle and complied with Hill's request to search her person.
Prior to conducting the search, Hill asked defendant to interlock her fingers behind her head. Defendant complied but kept her left thumb folded into her palm, which prompted Hill to make a second request that she interlock her fingers. Noticing that something was interfering with defendant's ability to interlock her fingers properly, Hill lifted up defendant's thumb on her left hand. At that point, defendant dropped or threw what appeared to be a small rock to the ground where it shattered. Hill observed the substance and believed it to be consistent with crack cocaine. Hill then took defendant into custody and advised her of her Miranda rights. A subsequent lab report confirmed that the substance was cocaine and that the pipe contained cocaine residue. The state charged defendant with possession of cocaine under former ORS 475.992 (2001).
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the pipe and the cocaine on grounds that the officers had seized that evidence without statutory authorization and in violation of her state and federal constitutional rights. Defendant argued that her surrender of the pipe had not been voluntary but, rather, had been mere acquiescence to police authority. Alternatively, defendant argued that, even if the action of handing over the pipe could be construed as voluntary, the retaining of her identification to run a records check without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity constituted an unlawful seizure. Defendant contended that Reagan had exploited that illegality to obtain the evidence and, therefore, the evidence should be suppressed.
When asked what prompted defendant to hand over the crack pipe, Reagan testified: "Well, I asked her if she had a crack pipe— or I asked her if she had any drugs or weapons on her, and she handed me a crack pipe from her right pocket." Reagan also testified that he commonly inquires about drugs and weapons and that, at the time that he inquired of defendant, he had no reason to believe that defendant actually possessed such items.2
The trial court concluded that the officers had not detained defendant unlawfully by taking her identification because no evidence in the record demonstrated that she otherwise would have left the scene while Hill was evaluating the driver's identification. The trial court found:
Additionally, the trial court found that defendant voluntarily had surrendered the crack pipe and had not done so in response to any threat or promise on Reagan's part. As a result, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of the crack pipe and cocaine.
Following a trial on stipulated facts, the trial court found defendant guilty of the charged offense, and defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued that Reagan's conduct was not authorized by ORS 810.410,3 which governs officer conduct during a stop for a traffic violation. Relying on Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,4 defendant also argued that she unlawfully had been seized without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when Hill took and retained her identification, thereby rendering her response to Reagan's questioning involuntary and tainting the evidence as the fruit of an illegal seizure. As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction from the bench.
On review, defendant argues that, absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or an immediate threat to officer safety, ORS 810.410 and Article I, section 9, do not permit police officers to request and retain a passenger's identification for the purpose of running a records check while conducting a lawful traffic stop of the driver of a vehicle. Consequently, defendant contends, evidence obtained during her unlawful detention must be suppressed because no intervening event broke the connection between the illegality and the discovery of the evidence. Defendant makes similar arguments under the Fourth Amendment.
The state responds that Hill's request for defendant's identification did not amount to a seizure because Hill did not demand compliance or otherwise suggest that defendant was not free to refuse his request. The state characterizes Hill's request for identification as "nothing more than a permissible attempt to obtain defendant's cooperation and assistance." Further, the state continues, running a records check on defendant's identification information did not constitute a seizure because Hill's brief retention of the identification for that purpose did not amount to a significant restriction on defendant's liberty.
We begin our analysis by addressing defendant's argument under ORS 810.410, which authorizes certain police conduct during the course of a valid traffic stop. See State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or. 27, 31, 854 P.2d 399 (1993) (); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Soto-Navarro
...have been ‘stopped’ (at least physically) but, without more, have not been ‘seized’ as a constitutional matter." State v. Thompkin , 341 Or. 368, 377, 143 P.3d 530 (2006).Only a year before Arreola-Botello , our Supreme Court rejected an argument that its own statements about Oregon's passe......
-
State v. Morfin–Estrada
...is conducting an investigation that could result in the person's citation or arrest at that time and place. State v. Thompkin, 341 Or. 368, 378–79, 143 P.3d 530 (2006); State v. Radtke, 242 Or.App. 234, 239–41, 255 P.3d 543 (2011). Accordingly, both we and the Supreme Court have held that, ......
-
State v. Suppah
...; Dominguez–Martinez, 321 Or. at 214, 895 P.2d 306.Subsequent cases involving traffic stops have followed Hall. In State v. Thompkin, 341 Or. 368, 371, 143 P.3d 530 (2006), an officer asked the defendant, who was a passenger in a car that had been lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, f......
-
State v. Ashbaugh
...check, because reasonable person would not feel free to leave when person is subject of pending warrant check); State v. Thompkin, 341 Or. 368, 378-79, 143 P.3d 530 (2006) (same).17 In the handful of cases in which the defendant's subjective beliefs even are mentioned in connection with a p......
-
Your Papers, Please: Police Authority to Request Identification from a Passenger During a Traffic Stop in Alaska
...valid absent reasonable suspicion), abrogated by McCain v. Commonwealth, 545 S.E.2d 541, 546 (va. 2001). [88]See, e.g., State v. Thompkin, 143 P.3d 530, 534-36 (Ore. 2006) (holding that the "defendant was unlawfully seized under Article I, section 9" of the Oregon Constitution); State v. Jo......