State v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 11 June 1930
• Docket Number: No. 30191.,30191.
• Parties: STATE v. THOMPSON.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

29 S.W.2d 67

STATE v. THOMPSON.

No. 30191.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 11, 1930.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Daviess County; Ira D. Beals, Judge.

R. V. Thompson was convicted of the crime of assenting to the reception of a deposit in a bank, knowing the bank to be insolvent, and he appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

John H. Taylor, of Chillicothe, O. O. Mettle and Nat G. Cruzen, both of Gallatin, for appellant.

Stratton Shartel, Atty. Gen. (Otis Patterson, of Springfield, of counsel), for the State.

BLAIR, P. J.

In the circuit court of Daviess county, defendant was convicted of the crime of assenting to the reception of a deposit in the Farmers' Exchange Bank of Gallatin, Mo., a state banking institution, knowing said bank to be insolvent, as defined by section 3365, R. S. 1919. The jury assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for five years. Thereafter sentence was pronounced on the verdict and an appeal was granted to this court.

The deposit mentioned in the indictment was made on March 4, 1926, by C. L. Nodges for his insane ward, and was in the form of a check for $350, drawn by one Linville on the First National Bank of Gallatin. The deposit was received by Virgil Chrane, assistant cashier, during the usual banking hours, and in the ordinary course of the bank's business. Appellant was cashier of the bank and was present thereat when the deposit was received, although it was not shown, and he denied that he had personal knowledge of the reception of the deposit.

It appears that appellant and the other directors of the bank, at the very time of the reception of the deposit charged, were in attendance in a back room of the bank upon a conference with a representative of the commissioner of finance of the state. As a result of said conference and on the same day of and only an hour or two after the reception of the Hodges deposit, the bank was turned over to a deputy of the commissioner of finance by resolution of its board of directors.

Notwithstanding appellant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the jury, we deem it unnecessary to detail the testimony at length. Certainly the action of appellant and the other directors on March 4, 1926, in placing the bank in the hands of the commissioner of finance because the bank had too much borrowed money and too many frozen assets to enable it to reduce its bills payable, and because the cash and sight exchange were far below the 15 per cent. reserve, culminating in the declaration that "it is and would be unwise for us to try and continue to operate said banking institution under such strained circumstances and financial embarrassment," at least made a prima facie showing that the bank was then unable to pay its obligations in the usual course of its business and was therefore insolvent.

There is much other evidence in the record tending to show that the "strained circumstances and financial embarrassment," confessed in the resolution of the board of directors, did not constitute a mere temporary condition, but was a condition growing progressively worse from day to day. The books of the bank, kept under appellant's observation and control, did not truthfully disclose its indebtedness for money borrowed from other banks. Its paper had been rediscounted with appellant's knowledge and participation, and without knowledge or formal action of the board of directors, and the record thereof had been entered in a book kept separate and apart from the other books of the bank. There was substantial proof that, at the time the deposit was received, the signers of many of the notes held by the bank for money loaned by it were either entirely insolvent or so heavily indebted that their assets were small in proportion to their debts, thus making such notes entirely worthless or worth only a fraction of their face value. In short, we do not regard as seriously made appellant's contention that the showing of insolvency was not sufficient to make out a case for the jury in that respect.

Appellant denied that he had anything to do with the reception of deposits, but the jury was not bound by such denial. He was the cashier and director and the active operating officer of the bank in general charge of its financial affairs. While not personally present when the deposit was received, he knew that the bank was open for business, and that his assistant was at his window ready and authorized to transact business, including the reception of any deposits which might be offered. We regard the evidence as sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant assented to the reception by assistant cashier Chrane of the Hodges deposit.

Notwithstanding the sufficiency of the evidence, the verdict returned by the jury must be deemed insufficient to authorize the judgment entered thereon. It was as follows:

"We, the jury, find the defendant R. V. Thompson, guilty of assenting to the reception of a deposit in the Farmers Exchange Bank, of Gallatin, Missouri, knowing said Bank to be insolvent, and assess his punishment at 5 years in the Penitentiary."

This was not a general verdict of guilty, as charged in the indictment. It was a special verdict, and therefore it was required to contain a finding upon every essential element of the crime charged. State v. Bishop, 231 Mo. 411, loc. cit. 415, 133 S. W. 33, 34; State v. Griffin, 278 Mo. 436, loc. cit. 439, 212 S. W. 877, 878; State v. Hinton, 299 Mo. 507, loc....