State v. Thornton

• Decision Date: 19 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2012–5–C.A.,2012–5–C.A.
• Citation: 68 A.3d 533
• Parties: STATE v. Christopher S. THORNTON.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

68 A.3d 533

STATE

v.Christopher S. THORNTON.

No. 2012–5–C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 19, 2013.

Lauren S. Zurier, Department of Attorney General, Providence, for State.

Christopher S. Thornton, Pro Se.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

In 1997, after representing himself at trial, Christopher S. Thornton was convicted of kidnapping, domestic felony assaults, intimidation of a witness, and violation of a no-contact order. This Court affirmed his convictions in State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1045 (R.I.2002), which sets forth the facts and procedural history of his prosecution. After Thornton filed for postconviction relief, the Superior Court denied his application. We affirmed that denial in Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312, 317 (R.I.2008). ¹ In this appeal, which follows from the Superior Court's denial of several motions, properly treated as a subsequent application for postconviction relief, Thornton again attempts to convince us that his convictions should be overturned.

This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on April 2, 2013, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After carefully considering the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

On August 3, 2009, Thornton filed several pro se motions in the Superior Court, including a motion to dismiss or vacate count 3 of the indictment; a motion to vacate the consecutive sentence imposed; and a motion for discovery and inspection of victim-impact statements from 1996 and 1997. Thornton also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, motions to assign the matters for a hearing and status conference, a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and a motion to appoint counsel. About three months later, on October 30, 2009, Thornton filed further motions and supporting materials: a motion to correct an illegal sentence; a motion to reopen for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss or vacate.

The motions filed in August and October 2009 set forth two grounds for relief. First, Thornton contended that his conviction on both count 3 (assault with a dangerous weapon) and count 5 (felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury) violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Second, he argued that the prosecutor had violated Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to produce certain victim-impact statements in response to his discovery requests.

Counsel was appointed to represent Thornton on October 30, 2009. On March 23, 2010, counsel moved to withdraw. A lengthy Shatney memorandum accompaniedthis motion.² Regarding Thornton's double jeopardy argument, counsel noted that it was both barred by the doctrine of res judicata and meritless under State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497, 503, 322 A.2d 626, 629 (1974) (reciting the “same offense” test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). Thornton's Rule 16 argument fared no better under counsel's analysis. Counsel observed that this argument was premised on State v. Stravato, 935 A.2d 948 (R.I.2007), which was decided ten years after Thornton was convicted. Counsel wrote that the rule announced in Stravato should not be applied retroactively and therefore should not serve as a basis on which relief could be granted.

In a letter to the Superior Court justice who would soon conduct a hearing on Thornton's claims for relief, Thornton objected to the positions taken by his counsel in the Shatney memorandum. On April 8, 2010, the parties appeared before that hearing justice. At the outset, the hearing justice and Thornton's counsel agreed that the motions which Thornton had filed in August and October 2009 would be treated as an application for postconviction relief. Thornton's counsel then briefly reiterated the arguments in his Shatney memorandum. The hearing justice then permitted Thornton to respond.

Thornton took issue with his counsel's conclusion that the prosecution's failure to produce certain victim-impact statements could not serve as grounds for postconviction relief. He stated, “I am not asking you [the hearing justice] to decide if Stravato applies. I am asking you to decide the [longstanding] case law of the rule of Brady v. Maryland to determine if a Rule 16 violation occurred.” ³ Thornton contended that Stravato “[did] not create a new rule,” but rather “reinforce[d]” the state's obligation to comply with Rule 16.

Thornton also submitted an affidavit from the attorney who had served as his standby counsel at trial. That attorney confirmed that the state had not produced the victim-impact statements at issue in response to Thornton's initial discovery request. Additionally, he averred that the state had objected to a subsequent discovery request filed by Thornton and, at a hearing before the trial justice, had stated that it had produced everything required by Brady and Rule 16. The state's answer to Thornton's discovery request and Thornton's subsequent request for discovery were attached to the affidavit.

The hearing justice first determined that Thornton's double jeopardy argument “ha[d] no merit whatsoever,” and, accordingly, he denied relief on this ground.⁴ He then heard from the state's attorney, who confirmed that the state had not given the victim-impact statements to Thornton. The state's attorney denied that this nondisclosure was deliberate and denied that Thornton had been prejudiced as a result. Another attorney for the state provided details about the victim-impact statements at issue. The first, from Debra Means, was received by the Department of Attorney General on November 13, 1996. The second, from Diane Sullivan, was received on November 20, 1996. Means, the primary victim, was Thornton's ex-girlfriend. He was convicted of kidnapping and assaulting her, as well as violating a no-contact order imposed for her protection. Sullivan was not physically injured; she was the victim with respect to the count of witness intimidation.

The hearing justice adjourned the hearing, reserved ruling on the motion, and ordered the state to provide Thornton (through counsel) and the court with copies of those statements, which it did.⁵ Thornton's counsel then filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw. This supplemental Shatney memorandum concluded that Thornton had “suffered no demonstrable procedural prejudice” as a result of the state's inadvertent nondisclosure of the victim-impact statements and that those statements did not meet Brady's standard of materiality. The state also filed a memorandum in which it urged the court to reject Thornton's arguments.

Another hearing on this matter was held on September 27, 2010. The hearing justice asked Thornton to explain how he could have used the information contained in the victim-impact statements if those statements had been disclosed to him before trial. Thornton initially responded that he “would have been able to confer with [standby] counsel to determine [how to utilize the statements] * * *.” He speculated that the statements could have led to medical records that might have contained impeachment evidence. He elaborated as follows: “ * * * I believe that [Means] may have * * * disclosed in her counseling session[s] some things that may not have been said at trial. * * * [F]or instance, she could [have said] that she was not extremely affected under the circumstances * * *.” When Thornton stated that Sullivan “made accusations in the victim[-]impact statement that [he felt he] could have challenged,” the hearing justice asked him to be more specific. Thornton responded, “[t]he entire content of it. * * * I could have used * * * the whole entire content [of Means's and Sullivan's statements] to determine how I wanted to approach the witness[es] through cross-examination.”

The hearing justice continued the matter once again to ensure that the state had, in fact, given Thornton each and every victim-impact statement in its possession. On October 21, 2010, the hearing justice filed a written decision, denying Thornton's claim for relief. At the outset, the hearing justice stated that “Thornton ha[d] abandoned any claims under Stravato.” He concluded that Thornton was not entitled to a new trial based on Brady “because the information in the victim[-]impact statements was either immaterial or already provided in discovery.” He found that the statements provided “neither exculpatory nor impeachment evidence.” He also observed that the statements had been filed with the court and were thus “readily available to both Thornton * * * and his standby counsel.” Accordingly, the hearing justice concluded that Thornton was not entitled to a new trial under Rule 33 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.⁶

In an order entered on October 27, 2010, Thornton's postconviction counsel was granted permission to withdraw. Thornton filed a pro se notice of appeal of the Superior Court's decision on November 8, 2010. By order dated November 9, 2012, this Court remanded the case for entry of final judgment, which occurred on November 30, 2012.⁷

IIIssue on Appeal

The issue presented for our decision is straightforward—did the hearing justice err in finding that Thornton was not entitled to postconviction relief based on the prosecution's failure to disclose certain victim-impact statements? ⁸ Thornton maintains that he is entitled to a new trial based on the state's violation of Rule 16 and Brady. The state contends that Thornton's claim is not only barred by ...