State v. Thurman L. Steed
| Decision Date | 13 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | 83-CA-73,84-LW-0389 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee v. THURMAN L. STEED Defendant-Appellant CASE |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
WILLIAM F. SCHENCK, Prosecuting Attorney, BY: GREGORY G. LOCKHART Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Third Floor, Greene County Courthouse, Xenia, Ohio 45385 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee.
GARY E WRIGHT, 26 North Wright Avenue, Fairborn, Ohio 45324 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
On August 18, 1983, a jury in the Common Pleas Court of Greene County found appellant guilty of rape of a minor under age thirteen by means of force or threat of force, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1) and (3). On August 19, 1983, the trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment.
Appellant timely appealed from that judgment, herein asserting four assignments of error. As his first assignment, appellant contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress admissions he made following his arrest because: 1) the statements were involuntary; 2) he was not re-informed of his Miranda rights prior to the second portion of the tape recorded interview; and 3) appellant did not make a knowing, voluntary (and intelligent) waiver of his Miranda rights.
At the pre-trial hearing on August 10, 1983, appellant, inter alia sought to suppress admissions he made to Detective Webb of the Xenia Police Department and Mr. Lockhart of the Greene County Prosecutor's Office on March 9, 1983, the day after his arrest. The interview took place in a small room at the Xenia Police Department about an hour after appellant's release from Greene Memorial Hospital for treatment of injuries he sustained in attempting to escape from the scene of the rape.
Initially, Det. Webb advised appellant of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436. Det. Webb read appellant his Miranda rights from a pre-interview form and took about eight minutes to review them with appellant. After each sentence setting forth those rights, appellant indicated he understood the concept therein and initialed them. The transcript reveals appellant signed the form at the end, indicating he was advised of his rights and that he understood their meaning. Examination of the form reveals that appellant agreed "... (w)ith full knowledge of these rights, I waive these rights and agree to give a voluntary statement." Then, in the course of a tape-recorded interview which lasted about twenty-four minutes, appellant answered questions, but consistently denied commission of the offense.
At the apparent conclusion of appellant's remarks, Det. Webb stopped the tape, although he continued talking with appellant. Also at that time, Mr. Lockhart explained the difference in penalties for "rape of a minor under age thirteen by means of force or threat of force" and "rape of a minor under age thirteen." Additionally, Mr. Lockhart urged appellant that telling the truth would be easier for all concerned, especially the five-year old victim. After twelve minutes of this unrecorded discussion, the tape recorder was again turned on. Appellant did not request an attorney, nor ask that the questioning cease. No additional Miranda warnings were given appellant at that time.
Shortly thereafter, in response to specific questions, appellant began admitting he engaged in sexual relations with the five-year old victim. He maintained, however, that he did so at her request. Throughout this second portion of the interview, appellant did not request an attorney nor express a desire to stop the questioning.
Initially, under the first assignment, appellant contends his confession lacked voluntariness. Although courts have sometimes combined their analysis, the question of whether an accused's statement was voluntary is distinct from the question of whether his waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary. See State v. Chase (1978), 55 Ohio St. 2d 237 at 246, citing State v. Kassow (1971), 28 Ohio St. 2d 141, vac. on other grds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972). Although receipt of the Miranda warnings is a factor to be considered in determining the voluntary nature of a confession, proof of formal compliance with Miranda requirements does not end the inquiry. State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St. 2d 135, at 141, Fn. 3; see State v. Kassow, supra, at 145.
Indeed, the correct standard for assessing a confession's voluntariness is the totality of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Cowans (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 96, at 101-102; State v. Chase, supra, at 248. In State v. Barker, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court stated;
"In deciding whether a defendant's confession is involuntarily induced, the court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement."
at 140-41; Citing State v. Edwards (1976), 49 Ohio St. 2d 31, 40-41, vacated in part, 438 U.S. 911 (1978).
The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance that the accused's confession was voluntarily made. State v. Gresham (1967), 10 Ohio App. 2d 199, at 203; State v. Kassow, supra; Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477; State v. Melchior (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 15, 25.
At the suppression hearing, Det. Webb and Mr. Lockhart testified concerning the circumstances surrounding appellant's confession. Det. Webb characterized the atmosphere as cordial. Det. Webb testified he did not threaten appellant prior to the interview, nor did he promise anything in return for appellant's statement. Det. Webb further testified that throughout the entire interview, appellant was not threatened, intimidated, nor verbally abused. This evidence remained uncontroverted, as appellant himself did not testify at the suppression hearing.
Appellant asserts that his confession was rendered involuntary as a result of his own subnormal intelligence, weak physiological condition, impressionability and desire to satisfy others, as well as the "promise" he alleges was implied in Mr. Lockhart's statement that "it would be easier for all concerned" for him to be truthful. Although such factors arguably might contribute to render an accused's statement involuntary, the trier of fact instead determined, in light of the total facts of this case, that the State had successfully carried its burden in proving the confession voluntary.
Appellant contends the comment that "it would be easier for all concerned" for him to be truthful, constituted an implicit offer of leniency, causing him to admit to his interrogators whatever they wanted to hear. However, Mr. Lockhart testified the intent of his statement was to suggest that appellant's honesty could prevent further stigma to the victim from an unnecessary trial. There was no evidence the comment was interpreted otherwise. If appellant's claim is that his admissions were compelled by hope of reward, the burden is on him to prove his claim, which he failed to do. See State v. Gaines (1974), 40 Ohio App. 224, at 231; State v. Kassow, supra.
Even if this statement implied an offer of leniency, under the "totality of the circumstances" standard, the presence of promises does not, as a matter of law, render a confession involuntary. State v. Edwards, supra at 40, 41; see State v. Collett (1944), 44 O.L.Abs. 225, app. dism'd for want of debat. ques. 144 Ohio St. 639 (1945); see also State v. Campbell (April 6, 1981), Greene App. No. 1179, unreported; 109B-G-63.
Appellant also contends his low intelligence prevented him from speaking voluntarily. Although the evidence established appellant's I.Q. was only sixty-eight, he informed Det. Webb he was twenty years old and had attended twelve years of school. An accused's low intelligence is but one factor to be considered in determining the voluntariness of his statement. Johnson v. Hall (1979), 465 F. Supp. 516, 518.
Similarly, the fact appellant spent the night at the hospital and had been released to police custody only an hour before his questioning was relevant to consider. However, Det. Webb testified appellant appeared to be in good condition and did not appear ill or nauseous at the time of the interview.
Further, appellant cites, by way of comparison, State v. Edgell (1972), 30 Ohio St. 2d 103. There the Supreme Court of Ohio, upon facts inapposite to those found here, held the prosecution failed to carry its burden with respect to voluntariness. Accordingly, Edgell is inapplicable to the instant case.
Upon review of the record, we find the trial court's judgment that appellant's confession was voluntary is supported by substantial credible evidence. State v. DeHaas (1967), 10 Ohio St. 2d 230; see State v. Butler (Sept. 14, 1983), Mont. App. No. 7745, unreported; 114B-1227.
Secondly, appellant asserts the police officials should have re-advised him of his Miranda rights before the second recorded portion of his interview, wherein he inculpated himself. Appellant asserts Det. Webb's premature announcement that "this will conclude the taped interview" may have caused him to believe that subsequent statements could not be used against him.
The uncontroverted evidence established that when it appeared appellant would make further statements, Det. Webb expressly stated he was turning the tape recorder back on. At that time, appellant did not request an attorney, nor did he ask the questioning to stop. As this Court stated in State v Campbell, supra, the guarantee of Miranda warnings "...does not mean that an individual must automatically be advised of his rights after each pause in the interrogation process..." (at 4). Indeed, in the instant case, we view the...
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