State v. Townsend
| Decision Date | 27 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 43553 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Thomas TOWNSEND, Defendant–Appellant. |
160 Idaho 885
380 P.3d 698
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
Thomas TOWNSEND, Defendant–Appellant.
Docket No. 43553
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Filed: July 27, 2016
Review Denied September 7, 2016
Alan Trimming, Ada County Public Defender; Elizabeth Estess, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, Judge
Thomas Townsend appeals from the district court's decision, on intermediate appeal, affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress blood draw evidence. Townsend specifically argues exigent circumstances did not exist to justify his warrantless blood draw. For the reasons explained below, we reverse the district court.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2013, at approximately 1:30 a.m., an officer pulled over a pickup truck after observing the truck drive the wrong way down a street. As he approached the truck, the officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming from the truck cab. He noticed that the driver, Townsend, had glassy, red eyes and his speech was slurred. The officer also smelled alcohol on Townsend's breath. Townsend indicated he had just left a bar.
The officer requested that dispatch send another officer to the scene for a DUI investigation. The second officer arrived approximately ten minutes later. Townsend was then instructed to exit the vehicle. Upon Townsend admitting he had consumed seven beers at the bar, he submitted to three standardized field sobriety tests. Townsend failed each of the tests, and he was arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence. Townsend was placed in the backseat of the patrol vehicle and was played the Administrative License Suspension audio, which notifies suspects of the potential penalties for refusing to submit to evidentiary testing.
After waiting fifteen minutes, the officer requested that Townsend submit to a breath test and explained how to do the test. Townsend blew into the breathalyzer but the breath sample was insufficient. The officer again explained how to conduct the breath test, and indicated that he would need a blood sample from Townsend if Townsend did not comply with the breath test. Townsend failed to exhale air on his second attempt and refused to comply with the breath test, stating that the officer would have to draw his blood. Townsend was then transported to jail, where a paramedic drew blood samples from Townsend at 3 a.m.
The State charged Townsend with driving under the influence and failure to purchase a driver's license. Townsend filed a motion to suppress the blood draw evidence, arguing exigent circumstances did not exist to justify his warrantless blood draw. In response, and in addition to the State's brief in objection to the motion, the State filed an affidavit from an officer. The affidavit stated that the time to obtain a warrant for a DUI case in March 2013 would be no less than one hour and thirty minutes. The affidavit also noted that telephonic and expedited warrants were not available in Ada County in March 2013.
The magistrate denied Townsend's motion to suppress, determining that: (1) implied consent was given as a matter of Idaho law;1 and (2) the anticipated delays in the warrant application process created an exigent circumstance sufficient to justify the warrantless blood draw. Townsend entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress.
The district court, on intermediate appeal, affirmed the magistrate's denial. In concluding that an exigency existed to justify Townsend's
warrantless blood draw, the district court noted the absence of immediate access to warrants in March 2013. The district court additionally considered Idaho's bar to prosecution when a suspected drunk driver has a blood alcohol content below the statutory legal limit—which, due to the natural dissipation of blood alcohol content, may occur when the suspect delays the blood alcohol test long enough. Townsend appeals from the district court's decision.
II.
ANALYSIS
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity, our standard of review is the same as expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn , 148 Idaho 413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id . Thus, we do not review the decision of the magistrate. State v. Trusdall , 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id .
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson , 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996).
A. Exigent Circumstances
Townsend argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate's denial of his motion to suppress blood draw evidence. Specifically, Townsend contends exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the warrantless blood draw, and thus the blood draw was unconstitutional.
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of persons or property.2 Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver , 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995) ; State v. Smith , 152 Idaho 115, 118, 266 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011). Requiring a person to submit to a blood draw for evidentiary testing is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833–34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917–18 (1966). Therefore, warrantless forced blood draws are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Missouri v. McNeely , ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 703–04 (2013) ; State v. Wulff , 157 Idaho 416, 419, 337 P.3d 575, 578 (2014). The State may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Weaver , 127 Idaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198 ; Smith , 152 Idaho at 118, 266 P.3d at 1223.
One of the well-recognized warrant requirement exceptions involves exigency. A warrant is not required if " ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona , 437 U.S. 385, 393–94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300–01 (1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States , 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 193, 93 L.Ed. 153, 158–59 (1948) ). Whether an exigency exists is based on the totality of circumstances, which is analyzed case by case. McNeely , ––– U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 1556, 185 L.Ed.2d at 702 ; Wulff , 157 Idaho at 420, 337 P.3d at 579. A warrantless search under the exigent circumstance exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the exigency that justifies the intrusion.
State v. Buterbaugh , 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 2002). The exigent circumstance exception does not apply where there is time to secure a warrant. State v. Robinson , 144 Idaho 496, 501, 163 P.3d 1208, 1213 (Ct. App. 2007). Indeed, "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so." McNeely , ––– U.S. at ––––, 133 S.Ct. at 1561, 185 L.Ed.2d at 707–08.
For instance, an officer is justified in performing a warrantless blood draw when he "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence." Schmerber , 384 U.S. at 770–71, 86 S.Ct. at 1835–36, 16 L.Ed.2d at 919–20 (internal citation and quotations omitted). The destruction of evidence in that case was the natural dissipation of the defendant's blood alcohol content because the defendant was suspected of drunk driving. Id. The Court implied...
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