State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 25 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. 32673.,32673.
• Citation: 144 Idaho 496,163 P.3d 1208
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Linda Beth ROBINSON, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

163 P.3d 1208

144 Idaho 496

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Linda Beth ROBINSON, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 32673.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 25, 2007.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

Robert R. Chastain, Boise, for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, Judge.

The state appeals from the district court's order on intermediate appeal affirming the magistrate's order granting Linda Beth Robinson's motion for suppression of evidence.¹ We reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The magistrate set forth the following facts of the case in his memorandum opinion and order granting Robinson's motion to suppress:

Shortly after midnight on December 18th, 2004, police were contacted by a man and woman, traveling together, who reported they were following a woman who appeared to be intoxicated. Officer Larry Moore of the Boise Police Department spoke with the couple, who described the driving pattern of the suspect vehicle to include: stopping in the traffic lane with a turn signal flashing for no apparent reason, running a stop sign, weaving in her lane of travel and across the bike lane, and almost striking parked cars. The couple also reported to Moore they had followed the vehicle to a residence, and identified for Moore both the vehicle and the residence.

Prior to Moore approaching the residence, Officer Harms and Sgt. Hagler both Boise Police officers, knocked on the door of the residence, and were greeted by one Jonathan Orenstein, Defendant's cohabitant at the residence. Sgt. Hagler asked to speak with the operator of the suspect vehicle, and Defendant came to the door. During this initial conversation, apparently in response to Hagler's request, Defendant provided her driver's license.

When Moore approached the residence to speak with the Defendant, the door was open, and Defendant was seated on the arm of a loveseat, approximately three to four feet inside the residence. During Moore's brief conversation with the Defendant, she acknowledged having driven the car from "Mandalay Bay", where she had consumed "cocktails", which she later identified as beer. Both Hagler and Moore noted a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the Defendant, and both noted slurred speech. The audio [recording] of the conversation also indicates that Defendant's speech had the characteristics one would normally associate with someone who was under the influence of alcohol.

Moore requested to come into the house to perform field sobriety tests, and Defendant refused to allow him entry. Moore also asked Defendant to come outside, which she likewise refused to do. It appears from the audio of the incident that Moore had begun to announce his intention to place Defendant under arrest, when Defendant stood up, and began to shut the door. At that time, Sgt. Hagler told Defendant she was under arrest, and both officers came through the threshold of the doorway to take custody of the Defendant.

While there was conflicting testimony regarding whether Moore had his foot on the threshold of the door while in conversation with Defendant, there is no question that he used his foot to keep her from closing the door when she attempted to terminate the conversation and retreat into her home.

The magistrate determined that the police had probable cause to arrest Robinson and, considering that her blood alcohol concentration would quickly dissipate if time were taken to obtain a warrant, also determined that exigent circumstances existed. However, because the charge involved a misdemeanor and because the magistrate determined that the officers' actions exceeded those allowed by the exigency, the magistrate granted Robinson's motion to suppress. The district court affirmed on intermediate appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On review of a decision of the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, we examine the record of the trial court independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 939, 866 P.2d 193, 196 (Ct.App.1993). The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App.1999).

III. ANALYSIS

The "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."² United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752, 764 (1972).

[The Fourth Amendment] unequivocally establishes the proposition that at the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 653 (1980). Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 586, 100 S.Ct. at 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d at 651. "[T]he police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, 743 (1984); see, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d 650, 657 (2006) (listing exceptions to warrant requirement).

Robinson contends that application of the exclusionary rule is justified because the police lacked probable cause to arrest her at the moment she responded and came to the door. Probable cause is "the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty." State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). Probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard; a practical, nontechnical probability, but not necessarily a belief more likely true than false, that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 513-14 (1983). "In analyzing whether probable cause existed, this Court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate." State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct.App.2005) (emphasis added). In other words, probable cause is necessary at the moment officers enter a home.

Prior to the officers' entry, Robinson identified herself as the driver of the suspect vehicle and admitted driving the vehicle after drinking cocktails. The officers noted her slurred speech and the strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from her direction. This information corroborated citizen witnesses who earlier reported seeing Robinson exhibit erratic and illegal driving behavior shortly before the officers contacted her at home. Based on these facts, we agree with the magistrate's conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest Robinson.

The magistrate in the instant case further determined that probable cause for a felony and exigent circumstances was required prior to a lawful warrantless home entry. See State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 824, 103 P.3d 430, 437 (2004). The state contends that the magistrate erred because a crime need not be a felony to trigger the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement and because the officers' actions did not exceed the scope of the evidence preservation exigency.

"[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home or his person unless `the exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Brigham City, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at 657 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978)). A warrantless search under this exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the exigency that justifies the intrusion. State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 810 (Ct.App.2002). The traditional exigencies that may justify a warrantless entry by law enforcement officers are pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent risk of destruction of evidence, prevention of a suspect from escaping, or danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling. State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 912, 136 P.3d 379, 383 (Ct.App.2006). The reach of the doctrine is explained in the analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 90 P.3d 306 (2004), which considered the decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving different classifications of offenses.

The trial court, in Fees, granted the defendant's motion to suppress, ruling that the warrantless entry into Fee's residence to preserve evidence was unreasonable because it was to preserve evidence of a nonviolent felony. The trial court relied on State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 869 P.2d 224 (1993), which looked to Welsh wherein the United States Supreme Court held that it was unreasonable under the ...