State v. Tracy
Decision Date | 19 June 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 113,763,113,763 |
Citation | 466 P.3d 434 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Richard A. TRACY, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant.
Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.
Richard A. Tracy challenges the district court's decision to classify his 1974 Colorado conviction for second-degree burglary as a person felony when determining his criminal history score prior to sentencing for a later Kansas drug offense. The State argues his appeal is moot because he completed his sentence and has been released from custody. We agree with the State and dismiss the appeal as moot.
Tracy pled guilty in 2013 to one count of methamphetamine possession, a severity level 5 drug felony. For sentencing purposes, the district court found he had a criminal history score of B. This was based in part on both a 1974 Colorado burglary conviction and a 1982 Kansas burglary conviction being classified as person offenses. Tracy did not object to either classification at the time. The court imposed an underlying sentence of 36 months' imprisonment but granted a downward dispositional departure to 12 months' probation. The district court extended, and then eventually revoked, Tracy's probation and ordered him to serve the underlying sentence.
At the hearing at which revocation occurred, the district court noted Tracy had filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, challenging the earlier classifications of his prior Colorado and Kansas burglary convictions. We know very little about that written motion because it is not included in the appellate record. But in denying the motion, the court determined State v. Murdock , 299 Kan. 312, 319, 323 P.3d 846 (2014) (, )overruled by State v. Keel , 302 Kan. 560, 357 P.3d 251 (2015), did not apply retroactively. Presumably, Tracy advanced that argument in the motion. The court also held Tracy waived any challenge to those classifications because he did not object at the original sentencing hearing. It revoked the probation and ordered him to serve the underlying sentence. He appealed.
Tracy's argument appears to have changed in the Court of Appeals. He contended the district court's classification of both convictions necessarily required unconstitutional judicial fact-finding prohibited by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 186 L. Ed. 2d 438 (2013). The panel agreed with him in part.
The panel held Tracy's 1982 Kansas burglary conviction should have been classified as a nonperson felony under State v. Dickey , 301 Kan. 1018, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015) ( Dickey I ). State v. Tracy , No. 113,763, 2016 WL 3960185, at *8 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion) ( ). But it held his Colorado conviction was properly classified. It noted Tracy's claim focused on the Colorado statute's intent element, which he argued was broader than the Kansas statute's similar element. The panel reasoned that Dickey I did not apply to how intent was defined when comparing statutes. Tracy , 2016 WL 3960185, at *11 (). In doing so, it adopted the reasoning of two other Court of Appeals decisions: State v. Moore , 52 Kan. App. 2d 799, 377 P.3d 1162 (2016), rev'd 307 Kan. 599, 412 P.3d 965 (2018), and State v. Buell , 52 Kan. App. 2d 818, 377 P.3d 1174 (2016), rev'd 307 Kan. 604, 412 P.3d 1004 (2018). Tracy , 2016 WL 3960185, at *11.
Both the State and Tracy sought review from this court. We denied review of the State's challenge about the Kansas conviction. But we kept Tracy's request for review in abeyance pending resolution of other appeals with related issues. In the interim, the parties agree Tracy fully served his prison sentence and the applicable period of postrelease supervision. The State argues this renders Tracy's appeal moot.
Tracy objects to the mootness suggestion, arguing: (1) if this court does not correct and vacate the panel's decision, any future sentencing court might feel obligated to follow the panel's decision and again classify the 1974 Colorado burglary conviction as a person felony; (2) without a favorable outcome from this court, under Garcia v. Ball , 303 Kan. 560, 573, 363 P.3d 399 (2015), Tracy could not pursue a legal malpractice claim against his original sentencing attorney for not challenging the allegedly improper classification; and (3) the issue relating to classification is capable of repetition and raises concerns of public importance.
As a practical matter, Tracy argues for the impractical—that we should remand his case back to the district court for resentencing, even though he has entirely served his original sentence. We reject this and dismiss his appeal as moot.
Generally, Kansas appellate courts do not decide moot questions or render advisory opinions. State v. Montgomery , 295 Kan. 837, 840, 286 P.3d 866 (2012). But an appeal will not be dismissed as moot unless it is clearly and convincingly shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that could be entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the parties' rights. 295 Kan. at 840-41, 286 P.3d 866 ; McAlister v. City of Fairway , 289 Kan. 391, 400, 212 P.3d 184 (2009) ; State ex rel. Slusher v. City of Leavenworth , 285 Kan. 438, 454, 172 P.3d 1154 (2007).
Speculated reliance by a future sentencing court on the panel's decision
Tracy claims if we do not correct the Court of Appeals decision, a future district court will feel obligated to follow the panel's ruling and again classify his 1974 Colorado conviction as a person felony—if he is ever convicted again for another crime. This assertion lacks merit.
To begin with, and even assuming Tracy's premise that he has a predilection for recidivism, dismissing this appeal can have no legal effect on how a future sentencing court would classify his prior crimes in a new sentencing proceeding. State law grants a defendant the right to challenge a criminal history worksheet before sentencing. And when that happens, the burden shifts to the State to prove its accuracy by a preponderance of the evidence. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6814(c) ; State v. Schow , 287 Kan. 529, 539-40, 197 P.3d 825 (2008). Despite Tracy's suggestion that he would be precluded from relitigating this issue in a future prosecution, our sentencing guidelines contemplate a new presentence investigation for each new sentence. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6813 ; State v. Collier , 263 Kan. 629, 634, 952 P.2d 1326 (1998) ( collateral estoppel).
Adding to this, a future sentencing court will no doubt be guided by our decisions in Moore and Buell , both of which direct how that hypothetical court's classifying of prior crimes, such as Tracy's Colorado conviction, should be resolved. See Moore , 307 Kan. 599, Syl. ¶ 3, 412 P.3d 965 ( ); Buell , 307 Kan. 604, Syl. ¶ 3, 412 P.3d 1004 (same); State v. Wetrich , 307 Kan. 552, Syl. ¶ 3, 562, 412 P.3d 984 (2018) (same). Tracy's arguments focus on his prior crime's person/nonperson classification, which is typically a question of law. See State v. Obregon , 309 Kan. 1267, 1275, 444 P.3d 331 (2019). And in a future prosecution, the crimes' classification will be determined according to the then-governing law. See 309 Kan. at 1271, 444 P.3d 331 ( ).
Tracy fails to explain how a future sentencing court would have authority to ignore the statutory requirements for preparing and considering a presentence investigation in a manner that would deny him his legal right to challenge "any error in the proposed criminal history worksheet." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6814(c). Similarly, to accept his argument we would have to assume that a future sentencing court would ignore controlling caselaw. See State v. Rodriguez , 305 Kan. 1139, 1144, 390 P.3d 903 (2017) ( ). Tracy's speculative claim simply fails to demonstrate a way in which a judgment on this appeal would impact his rights as he asserts.
Tracy's legal malpractice contention
Tracy argues he needs postsentencing relief now for his allegedly unlawful sentence because he would otherwise be barred "if [he] wants to" pursue a legal malpractice claim against his original sentencing attorney for not objecting to that sentence. See Garcia , 303 Kan. at 573, 363 P.3d 399 ( ). But Tracy provides no detail about what he might assert as a basis for this alleged legal malpractice he might want to file. See Mashaney v. Board of Indigents' Defense Services , 302 Kan. 625, 639, 355 P.3d 667 (2015) ( ).
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