State v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1920
• Docket Number: No. 21826.,21826.
• Citation: 146 Minn. 247,178 N.W. 603
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. TRI-STATE TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. et al.

146 Minn. 247

178 N.W. 603

STATE

v.TRI-STATE TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. et al.

No. 21826.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 2, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; James C. Michael, Judge.

Complaint by the State of Minnesota against the Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Company, in which the City of St. Paul, in its own behalf and in behalf of its citizens, was allowed to appear and participate in the hearing by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. From a rate order, made by the commission, the City of St. Paul appealed to the district court of Ramsey county, and from its order of dismissal, the City of St. Paul appeals. Order affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

The right of appeal is purely statutory, and may be given or withheld by the Legislature at its discretion. If given, it may be upon such conditions as the Legislature deems proper.

Under section 22, c. 152, Gen. Laws 1915 (Gen. St. Supp. 1917, § 4623-22), giving the right of appeal from an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to a party to the proceeding in which the order is made and to the Attorney General, the term ‘party’ is used in the same sense as ‘party to an action.’

The Railroad and Warehouse Commission, by inviting a city in which a telephone company maintained an exchange to attend a hearing in a proceeding begun by the commission to determine the reasonableness of telephone rates, did not make such city a party to the proceeding, by permitting it to file objections to the rates in effect and to participate in the proceedings had before the commission. O. H. O'Neill, of St. Paul, for appellant.

C. B. Randall and F. C. Stevens, both of St. Paul, for respondent.

C. L. Hilton, Atty. Gen., for the State.

LEES, C.

While the telephone properties of the country were under federal control, and in accordance with orders of the Postmaster General, the Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Company placed in effect certain rates for telephone service in this state and was maintaining them when such control ceased. Such rates were in excess of those theretofore approved by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission.

In view of these facts the commission, on its own motion, made an order requiring the company to show cause why its rates should not be modified. It directed that service be made upon the company by mailing a copy of the order to it at its office, and that copies be also mailed to every city and village where it maintained an exchange. On the return day of the order, the city of St. Paul appeared, and in its own behalf and in behalf of its citizens objected to the continued maintenance of the so-called federal rates in St. Paul, and demanded that the old rates be reinstated. It took part in the proceedings at the hearing, and its counsel cross-examined the witnesses called by the company. At the conclusion of the hearing an order was entered approving of the federal rates as temporary rates, subject to change by the commission as operating conditions might warrant. The order recites that the proceeding in which it was made was supplemental to a general investigation then being conducted by the commission to determine reasonable rates for telephone service throughout the state, and that it deals only with the advisability of continuing the rates then in effect pending such investigation.

The city appealed from the order to the district court of Ramsey county. Upon the motion of the company, the court dismissed the appeal, on the ground that the city could not take it, because it was not a party to the proceeding before the commission. The city appeals from the order of dismissal.

By chapter 152, G. L. 1915 (Gen. St. Supp. 1917, §§ 4623-1 to 4623-25), telephone companies were placed under the jurisdiction of the commission. The act provided that their rates should be subject to regulation by the commission, and that the statutes relating to its control of railroad and express companies should also apply to telephone companies, except as otherwise provided in he act. Whenever their rates were found to be unreasonable, the commission, on its own motion or upon complaint made to it, was authorized to prescribe reasonable rates to take the place of those found unreasonable. By section 22 (section 4623-22) it was provided that any party to the proceeding before the commission, or the Attorney General, might appeal from the order made by the commission. The city contends that it was a party to the proceeding and had a right to appeal. It is conceded that it might have filed a complaint with the commission, charging the telephone company with exacting unreasonable rates for service. Section 4185, G. S. 1913. It is also conceded that it did not come into the present proceeding until after it was begun by the commission on its own motion. But it is contended that the commission might have entered a formal order, joining the city as a party and permitting it to file a complaint as an intervener, and that practically this was what was done.

At the threshold of the case we are met with a question not discussed in the briefs or argument. It is this: Does an appeal lie from an order of the commission which does not purport to be final? The order in question is temporary, and is to stand only during the pendency of the investigation conducted by the commission to determine what are reasonable rates. Generally speaking orders of that nature are not appealable, unless the statute so provides, and statutes authorizing appeals from orders which are not final are strictly construed. Dun. Dig. § 285. Where certiorari is resorted to, intermediate orders can only be reviewed by suing out the writ after the final determination of the proceeding. Dun. Dig. §...