State v. Trombley

• Decision Date: 02 July 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-128.,01-128.
• Citation: 807 A.2d 400
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Matthew S. TROMBLEY.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

807 A.2d 400

STATE of Vermont v. Matthew S. TROMBLEY.

No. 01-128.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

July 2, 2002.

Present: AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ.

ENTRY ORDER

Defendant Matthew Trombley appeals his aggravated assault conviction, claiming several errors in the court's jury instructions. Defendant contends that (1) the court improperly instructed the jury to consider whether defendant acted either "purposely" or "knowingly" when defendant was charged with only "purposely" inflicting serious bodily harm, (2) the court failed to instruct the jury that it should consider evidence of defendant's fear and emotions in deciding whether defendant acted purposely, and (3) the court's instructions on self-defense were so misleading that the jury rejected defendant's claim of self-defense. We affirm.

The incident occurred the evening of February 18, 2000, when George Demarais and Matthew Trombley, the defendant, were involved in a fight. Various details of the fight are in dispute.

The two men were at a bar in St. Albans. Both had been drinking. Demarais testified that he had been sitting at the bar with some friends when defendant, whom he did not know, approached him from behind, put him in a headlock, pushed him forward, and punched him several times in the face. Bystanders pulled defendant off Demarais, and shortly thereafter, Demarais left the bar. Defendant testified that he had approached Demarias at the bar because Demarais had been staring at him and he wanted to find out why. He contends a brief struggle then ensued. According to defendant, after Demarais left the bar, defendant noticed that his hand had been cut and he decided to go after Demarais to "talk to him" about what Demarais had done.

The testimony differs as to what happened outside of the bar on Main Street once defendant and Demarais had left the bar. According to Demarais, who was walking away from the bar, defendant grabbed him from behind and punched him at least twelve times before Demarais fell to the ground and started to lose consciousness. Demarais testified that in an effort to defend himself he pulled out a small knife and blindly slashed at defendant over his shoulder. After delivering a few more punches, defendant stopped punching Demarais. According to defendant, he saw Demarais walking down the street, hollered at him to stop, ran towards him, and tackled him. They fell to the ground. After some struggle, defendant felt a pain in his side and became scared and angry. He testified he repeatedly punched Demarais in an effort to get Demarais to stop stabbing him.

Both individuals suffered injuries. Demarais suffered a bruised face. His eyes were swollen shut and he experienced a partial loss of vision. One tooth had been knocked out, and another was hanging by a thread. Defendant suffered multiple stab wounds to his face, the back of his scalp, his neck, hand and chest. The stab wounds were all superficial.

Defendant was charged with aggravated assault under 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1). The charge read: "[defendant] was then and there a person who purposely caused serious bodily injury to another, to wit: George Demarais, by knocking some teeth out by repeatedly punching Mr. Demarais in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1)." The jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault. Defendant appeals the jury verdict of guilty, claiming that the court's instructions to the jury were erroneous. Defendant properly preserved his objections to all of the pertinent jury instructions.

"In reviewing jury instructions, the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole were misleading or inadequate to aid the jury's deliberations." State v. Shabazz, 169 Vt. 448, 450, 739 A.2d 666, 667 (1999). "If the charge as a whole breathes the true spirit and doctrine of the law, and there is no fair ground to say that the jury has been misled by it, it ought to stand." Harris v. Carbonneau, 165 Vt. 433, 438, 685 A.2d 296, 300 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We will assign error only where the instructions undermine our confidence in the verdict. Shabazz, 169 Vt. at 450, 739 A.2d at 667.

Defendant first argues that the jury charge was improper because it instructed the jury to consider whether defendant acted either "purposely" or "knowingly" when defendant was charged with only "purposely" inflicting serious bodily harm. The trial court judge instructed the jury as follows: "To commit the offense purposely means that [defendant] acted with the conscious purpose of causing serious bodily injury or that he acted under circumstances where he was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious bodily injury." Defendant argues that because the information charged defendant with only "purposely" causing serious bodily injury, the additional charge regarding whether he acted knowingly allowed the jury to improperly consider and weigh evidence going to whether the defendant acted under circumstances where he was practically certain his conduct would cause serious bodily injury. Defendant argues that a proper jury instruction would have told the jury that to convict defendant it had to find that it was defendant's conscious objective to inflict serious bodily injury on Demarais; if defendant only acted under circumstances where he was practically certain his conduct would result in serious bodily injury to Demarais, the jury could not convict him.

Criminal liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors: "an evil-meaning mind" and "an evil-doing hand." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). We recognize that one of criminal law's most basic principles is that "a person is not criminally liable for causing a bad result if he or she did not have some culpable mental state with respect to that result." State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 573, 580, 470 A.2d 676, 681 (1983). In the instant case, we must examine the mental element, or mens rea, required for conviction under § 1024(a)(1). If the jury instructions failed to charge the proper mental state required for a conviction under aggravated assault, we would find error.

At common law, crimes generally were classified as requiring either "general intent" or "specific intent." This distinction, however, has been the source of much confusion, and in the 1970's a reform movement of sorts began to replace this traditional dichotomy with an alternative analysis of mens rea. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code exemplifies this new approach. The Code delineates four kinds of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)-(d) (1985).¹ In doing so, it abandoned the "specific intent"—"general intent" terminology prevalent in traditional criminal law. W. LaFave, Criminal Law § 3.5(e) (2000).²

In Act No. 222 of the 1971 Adjourned Session, the Vermont General Assembly enacted 13 V.S.A. § 1024(a)(1), which states that a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. This language is borrowed from the Model Penal Code. State v. D'Amico, 136 Vt. 153, 155, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1978) (citing Model Penal Code §§ 211.0-211.2 (1962)). We have noted that although the rationale of the Code is not binding on this Court, it is indicative of what the General Assembly intended in adopting the legislation modeled on the Code. Id. at 155, 385 A.2d at 1084.³

Defendant argues that since the Legislature adopted the Model Penal Code language, which makes a distinction between "purposely" and "knowingly," and because he was charged with only "purposely" causing serious bodily injury, it was erroneous to instruct the jury on the mens rea of "knowingly." We agree.

The modern approach under the Code defines separately the mental states of "purpose" and "knowledge," because there are several areas of the law where it may be critical to distinguish between one's objective and one's knowledge. W. LaFave, supra, § 3.5(b). For example, when a defendant is charged with treason, the government must demonstrate that the defendant acted with a purpose or objective to aid the enemy. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). In addition, a heightened mental state in the inchoate offenses of attempt and conspiracy "separates criminality itself from otherwise innocuous behavior." Id. (citing Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comments, p. 125 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)). Finally, "the statutory and common law of homicide often distinguishes, either in setting the `degree' of the crime or in imposing punishment, between a person who knows that another person will be killed as a result of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another's life." Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405,100 S.Ct. 624. We too conclude that it is important to distinguish between a person who knows another may be seriously injured because of his conduct and a person who acts with the specific purpose of seriously injuring another.

Because the defendant was charged with only "purposely" causing serious bodily injury, the trial court's instruction on the mens rea of "knowingly" was erroneous. We find, however, that beyond a reasonable doubt that error was harmless. See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553, 674 A.2d 1258, 1264 (1996) (Constitutional and nonconstitutional errors may be found harmless only if the appellate court can state "a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").

Defendant posits that his conscious objective was not to inflict serious bodily injury, but rather to defend himself against Demarais's knife attack and that the jury instruction on knowingly prevented the jury from considering only this conscious objective. Defendant's argument is premised on...