State v. Trotman
Decision Date | 26 February 2002 |
Docket Number | (AC 21242) |
Citation | 68 Conn. App. 437,791 A.2d 700 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. LORI TROTMAN |
Lavery, C. J., and Foti and Dupont, JS. Joaquina Borges King, for the appellant (defendant).
Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Corinne Klatt, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, John A. Connelly, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, Lori Trotman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32 and committing her to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a period of four years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) concluded, on the basis of the evidence, that her urine sample tested positive for the presence of an opiate, (2) found that she violated the terms of the plea agreement1 and (3) revoked her probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On December 9, 1997, the court sentenced the defendant to an eighteen month suspended sentence and two years of probation following a conviction for possession of narcotics. On September 8, 1999, during the two year probationary period, the defendant was charged with possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a) and violation of probation in violation of § 53a-32.
On February 1, 2000, the defendant entered a plea of guilty under the Alford doctrine2 to the possession of narcotics charge. The defendant also admitted to violating her probation imposed by the December 9, 1997 sentence. The state, as part of the plea agreement, nolled a number of additional charges filed against the defendant and allowed the matter to be continued for four months to allow the defendant to enroll in a drug treatment program.
While she was in the program, the defendant was required to submit to random urine samples for drug testing. Monthly reports were to be submitted to the court through the program. If the defendant successfully completed the program, she would have received a suspended sentence of four years with three years of probation. The defendant's failure to remain in the program, a new arrest or a urine test indicating drug use would result in a sentence of four years without the right to argue for a lesser sentence.
Three months into her rehabilitation, the defendant's urine sample tested positive for an opiate. The defendant was brought before the court for a hearing in which the court found that the defendant had in fact violated her plea agreement and reinstated, according to that agreement, her four year prison sentence. At that hearing, the court denied the defendant's previously filed motion objecting to the court's "revocation of the plea agreement." This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the court improperly found that, on the basis of the evidence, her urine sample tested positive for the presence of an opiate. The defendant claims that the court's finding was improper because there was evidence that the "drug test may have yielded a false positive...." Specifically, the defendant claims that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support a finding that the urine sample tested positive for the presence of an opiate. We disagree. Because the defendant's claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, which is based on the court's factual findings, the proper standard of review is whether, on the basis of the evidence, the court's finding of a positive drug test was clearly erroneous. See Aubin v. Miller, 64 Conn. App. 781, 796, 781 A.2d 396 (2001). In other words, a court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficiency "when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Azia v. DiLascia, 64 Conn. App. 540, 558, 780 A.2d 992, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 914, 782 A.2d 1241 (2001). Moreover, we repeatedly have held that (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Nelson, 67 Conn. App. 168, 179, 786 A.2d 1171 (2001).
In this case, the state presented evidence of the results of the testing performed on the random urine sample taken from the defendant. Those results tested positive for the presence of an opiate. The defendant was brought before the court where she denied using any drugs during the rehabilitation period. In support of her defense, the defendant presented the court with a letter from her program counselor claiming that, because the defendant had no prior record of using opiates, she personally felt that the drug test was "questionable." The defendant also argued that "poppy seeds" caused the positive test result or that there was a mix-up in the samples.
As the sole arbiter of the testimony, the court did not believe the defendant's assertions that she had not used drugs during the rehabilitation period. Further, the court was not persuaded that the viability, reliability or accuracy of the test results should be called into question. We conclude, therefore, that the court's finding that the urine sample tested positive for the presence of an opiate was not clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. Additionally, we cannot say that we are "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Azia v. DiLascia, supra, 64 Conn. App. 558. The court's conclusion had sufficient evidentiary support because it was drawn from a finding of fact that cannot, after a review of the record, be found to be clearly erroneous.
The defendant next claims that the court improperly found that she violated the terms of the plea agreement. The defendant argues that she remains compliant with the plea agreement because it requires only that she successfully complete the drug rehabilitation program and that she have no new arrests. We are not persuaded.
Before we address whether the court was correct in finding that the defendant breached her plea agreement, we first look to the terms of that agreement. We identify those terms by way of the court's explanation of the plea agreement to the defendant.
Before accepting the defendant's plea, the court canvassed the defendant and explained all of the terms in the plea agreement in accordance with Practice Book § 39-19. The court, in addressing the defendant, stated:
(Emphasis added.) The court asked the defendant if she understood what the court had explained, and she responded affirmatively.
The trial court repeated: (Emphasis added.) The defendant acknowledged several times that she fully understood the terms of the plea agreement and the risks involved. The court, thereafter, accepted the plea agreement.
Having identified the terms of the plea agreement, we note at the outset our standard of review and the legal principles applicable to the defendant's claim. The defendant does not claim that an interpretation or construction of the agreement is necessary or that she did not understand the plea agreement or claim that she did not freely and knowingly enter into it. She essentially challenges the court's factual finding that she violated one of the essential terms thereof. As such, we review the court's fmding under the clearly erroneous standard.
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