State v. Trujillo

• Decision Date: 26 February 2009
• Docket Number: No. 30,318.,30,318.
• Citation: 2009 NMSC 012,206 P.3d 125
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Daniel Ben TRUJILLO, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

206 P.3d 125

2009 NMSC 012

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Daniel Ben TRUJILLO, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 30,318.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

February 26, 2009.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 2009.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, JK Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Marc A. Gordon, Assistant Public Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

Jones, Snead, Wertheim & Wentworth, P.A., Jerry Todd Wertheim, Trace L. Rabern, Santa Fe, NM, Barbara E. Bergman, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

SERNA, Justice.

{1} We are faced with the unenviable task of interpreting the statutory labyrinth created by the intersection of the New Mexico Mental Illness and Competency Code ("NMMIC"), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-9-1 to -1.5 (1988), NMSA 1978, Section 31-9-1.6 (1997, as amended through 1999), and the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code ("MHDDC"), NMSA 1978, §§ 43-1-1 to -25 (1976). First, we are asked whether the definition of mental retardation in Section 31-9-1.6 tracks that of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-IV-TR 41 (2000) ("DSM"). We hold that the New Mexico definition of mental retardation in Section 31-9-1.6 is not equivalent to that of the DSM in that it does not contain an age of onset requirement.

{2} Second, we consider whether defendants with mental retardation who are dangerous, incompetent, and without a substantial probability of gaining competence may be criminally committed per the NMMIC or whether Section 31-9-1.6 precludes such commitment. We hold that Section 31-9-1.6 mandates that defendants with mental retardation who are dangerous, incompetent, and without a substantial probability of gaining competence may not be criminally committed, though they may be civilly committed at the discretion of the district court and the district attorney. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

{3} Defendant, Daniel Ben Trujillo, stands accused of attempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated battery, and tampering with evidence. The State alleges that he broke into the home of his employer and tried to kill him with a steel bar because of allegations that the employer had raped Defendant's girlfriend. Defendant has an extreme mental condition resulting from self-inflicted carbon monoxide poisoning that occurred over twenty years ago when Defendant was twenty-six years old. As a result of this suicide attempt, Defendant's IQ is estimated to be in the high fifties to low sixties. This score puts him in the first percentile, meaning that ninety-nine per cent of the population has a higher IQ than he does.

{4} Upon a pretrial defense motion to determine competency, the district court stayed Defendant's trial and ordered him to undergo a psychological evaluation. Defendant was examined by Dr. Eric Mason Westfried, a clinical psychologist, who determined that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Both parties stipulated to Dr. Westfried's evaluation and the district court entered a finding that Defendant was incompetent to stand trial.

{5} The defense subsequently filed a notice of mental retardation, whereupon a hearing was held and the district court ordered Defendant committed for a determination of competency based on mental retardation. A second clinical psychologist, Dr. Renee H. Wilkins, again found that Defendant was incompetent and unlikely to be treated to competency. This expert further found that Defendant was dangerous. However, Dr. Wilkins reported that Defendant did not meet the medical or psychiatric definition of mental retardation for the sole reason that his difficulties did not commence prior to his attaining the age of eighteen, as required by the DSM. See DSM at 41. Rather, Dr. Wilkins diagnosed Defendant with dementia, a dysfunction that has a medical definition comparable to mental retardation but without the age of onset requirement.

{6} Despite Dr. Wilkins' failure to diagnose Defendant with mental retardation, the district court found that Defendant had mental retardation per the definition in Section 31-9-1.6(E). The district court issued factual findings to the effect that Defendant is dangerous, incompetent, and without a substantial probability of gaining competence pursuant to Section 31-9-1.6(B). The court determined that, because Defendant was not charged with one of the enumerated crimes in Section 31-9-1.6(C), he was not subject to civil commitment by the Department of Health ("DOH") under the MHDDC. See § 31-9-1.6(C) ("[T]he [DOH] shall commence [civil commitment] if the defendant was charged with murder in the first degree, first degree criminal sexual penetration, criminal sexual contact of a minor or arson."); § 43-1-1 to -25. Instead, the district court concluded, because he was not accused of any of the felonies enumerated in Section 31-9-1.6(C), Defendant could only be criminally committed under the NMMIC. See § 31-9-1 to -1.5; § 31-9-1.6(C).

{7} Because of the "substantial ground for difference of opinion" regarding the correct interpretation of Section 31-9-1.6, the district court granted Defendant leave to file an application for interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals. See Rule 12-203 NMRA (outlining the procedure for interlocutory appeals). In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. See State v. Trujillo, 2007-NMCA-056, ¶ 3, 141 N.M. 668, 160 P.3d 577. It upheld the district court's determination that Defendant has mental retardation. See id. However, in a split opinion, it reversed the district court's order allowing Defendant to be criminally committed under the NMMIC. See id. ¶ 24. The majority held that, while before the enactment of Section 31-9-1.6, the NMMIC applied to all incompetent defendants, Section 31-9-1.6 operated as a special carve-out for those defendants who are incompetent due to mental retardation. See id. ¶ 25. Thus, it held, in enacting Section 31-9-1.6, the Legislature created a distinct procedure for defendants who have been found incompetent due to mental retardation and precluded criminal commitment for such defendants under the NMMIC. See id. ¶¶ 25, 26. However, the Court of Appeals also held that the district court could still detain Defendant by referring the matter to the district attorney for civil commitment proceedings under the MHDDC. Id. ¶ 32; see § 43-1-1(E).

{8} The Court of Appeals' dissent concluded that, rather than supplanting the NMMIC for mentally retarded defendants, Section 31-9-1.6 only supplements those sections. Trujillo, 2007-NMCA-056, ¶ 40, 141 N.M. 668, 160 P.3d 577 (Wechsler, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the Legislature did not explicitly amend the NMMIC so that it no longer applied to defendants with mental retardation. Id. ¶ 41. Further, the dissent reasoned that Section 31-9-1.6 is not itself a comprehensive scheme for dealing with incompetent mentally retarded defendants; it does not include the procedural guarantees included in the NMMIC such as a method for transfer to the district court, a hearing to ensure sufficient evidence of guilt, or periodic review of a defendant's case. Id. ¶¶ 42-43; see §§ 31-9-1 to -1.3. Finally, the dissent also thought it problematic that Section 31-9-1.6 would be interpreted to withdraw all defendants incompetent due to mental retardation from the NMMIC regime while only explicitly providing a resolution for a sub-category of those individuals: namely, those who are dangerous, incompetent, without a substantial probability of gaining competence, and accused of one of the listed felonies. Id.; see § 31-9-1.6(C).

{9} We granted certiorari on two issues: whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Defendant has mental retardation under New Mexico law and whether it erred in holding that he may not be criminally committed under the NMMIC. Both of these questions involve statutory interpretation, which is a matter of law and is reviewed de novo. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. We address each issue in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Has Mental Retardation Under New Mexico Law

{10} Mental retardation is defined by Section 31-9-1.6(E) as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior." Thus, there are two prongs to the New Mexico statutory definition of mental retardation: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning and (2) deficits in adaptive behavior. This language closely tracks the definition of mental retardation found in the DSM but the DSM adds a third prong. See DSM at 41. Under the DSM, one's symptoms must have begun before age eighteen in order to be classified as mental retardation. Id. The State urges us to read in the age of onset requirement so that the definition in Section 31-9-1.6 would mirror the DSM definition. Under this formulation, Defendant, whose disorder did not begin until his mid-twenties, would not be classified as having mental retardation.

{11} In interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. In discerning legislative intent, we look first to the language used and the plain meaning of that language. Id. Under the plain meaning rule, when a statute contains clear and unambiguous language, we will heed that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. We will not read into a statute any words that are not there, particularly when the statute is complete and makes sense as written. Burroughs v. Bd. of County...