State v. Trulock
| Decision Date | 27 October 1913 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. MOOSE, Atty. Gen., v. TRULOCK et al. RAMSEY et al. v. FARMER et al. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Antonio B. Grace, Judge.
Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; J. E. Martineau, Chancellor.
Quo warranto by the State, on relation of W. L. Moose, Attorney General, against W. N. Trulock and others, and action by E. A. Ramsey and others against John Farmer and others. From a judgment dismissing the petition in the quo warranto proceeding, the relator appeals. From a judgment for defendants in the action, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.
J. W. & J. W. House, Jr., of Little Rock, W. L. Moose, Atty. Gen., and A. R. Cooper, of Pine Bluff, for appellants. Rose, Hemingway, Cantrell & Loughborough and James P. Clarke, all of Little Rock, C. W. McKay of Magnolia, Gordon Frierson, of Jonesboro, Thomas & Lee, of Clarendon, Danaher & Danaher, of Pine Bluff, and Ira D. Oglesby and Ira D. Oglesby, Jr., both of Ft. Smith, for appellees. William H. Arnold and Gustave G. Pope, both of Texarkana, amici curiæ.
In each of these cases an attack is made on the validity of an improvement district, one in the city of Pine Bluff and the other in the city of Argenta, Ark., organized pursuant to the general statutes of this state. The point of attack in each case is that the General Assembly of 1913 enacted a statute purporting to amend the General Statutes on the subject of organization of improvement districts in cities and towns, but which omitted any provision for the appointment of commissioners, and that the effect of that omission was to render the whole of the law on that subject inoperative.
The original statute relating to the appointment of commissioners by the city council reads as follows: "If within three months after the publication of any such ordinance a majority in value of the owners of real property within such district adjoining the locality to be affected, shall present to the council a petition praying that such improvement be made, which petition shall designate the nature of the improvements to be undertaken, and that the cost thereof be assessed and charged upon the real property situated within such district or districts, the city council shall at once appoint three persons, owners of real property therein, who shall compose a board of improvement for the district." Kirby's Digest, § 5667.
The amendatory statute was approved and went into effect March 3, 1913, and the title thereof is "An act to amend the statutes in reference to improvement districts in cities and towns." The first section reads as follows: Laws 1913, p. 528.
Other sections of the amendatory statute make further changes in the law by adding new provisions and changing others.
An analysis of section 5667, as it stood before the amendatory statute was passed, reveals three separate points covered by it, namely: (1) A specification of the time within which the petition may be filed; (2) the requirement as to contents of the petition; and (3) the authority for the appointment by the city council of the board of commissioners and the specification of their qualifications.
The section, as amended by the last statute, omits any reference to the appointment of commissioners, and the contention is that this operated as a repeal of the old section, without providing any method for making such appointment. Learned counsel for the appellants rely upon the well-settled rule of construction announced by so many of the courts and text-writers that "when a statute amends a former statute `so as to read as follows,' it operates as a repeal, by implication of inconsistent provisions in the former law and of provisions therein omitted in the amended law." In re Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 32 N. E. 1091, 18 L. R. A. 713. The authorities in support of that rule are so numerous that it is unnecessary to cite them. The rule is clearly recognized by decisions of this court. Mondschein v. State, 55 Ark. 389, 18 S. W. 383; Rennau v. State, 72 Ark. 445, 81 S. W. 605; Henderson v. Dearing, 89 Ark. 600, 117 S. W. 1066; Edland v. State, 91 Ark. 243, 120 S. W. 994. But that rule of interpretation is not an absolute or an inflexible one, and is not always arbitrarily applied. It must be considered with other rules equally well settled, and must yield place to others which may, under the language of a statute, be more appropriately and accurately employed. The cardinal rule of interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning of the lawmakers as expressed in the language which they have used. Not what the lawmakers themselves meant, but what the language they used means. And all rules of interpretation must yield to this as the paramount one.
"The intent of a statute being the law," said Mr. Sutherland, "it necessarily follows that the object of all interpretation is to find out that intent." 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 364. In reaching the goal we adopt any of the rules of construction which are found appropriate.
An examination of the amendatory statute discloses an irreconcilable conflict between the language thereof, when literally interpreted, and other parts of the same statute, as well as other parts of the old act which there appears no intention to amend or repeal. The language of the amendatory statute is that the section named above "be amended to read as follows," but, as before stated, it omits any reference to the appointment of commissioners, and if a literal meaning be given to the words used, the result is that the whole law on the subject of improvement districts is abrogated. This the lawmakers did not intend. The new act clearly contemplates the continued existence of a complete statutory scheme for organizing and carrying out the purposes of improvement districts, for we find in later sections of the amendatory statute references to the commissioners and their duties, and also find many untouched provisions of the old statute which contain references to the duties of the commissioners. For instance, there is a section which specifies when the commissioners shall take the oath of office, and what the oath shall contain; another section contains a provision for filling vacancies, and another provides what shall constitute a quorum of the board for the transaction of business. Numerous other sections specify duties to be performed in carrying out the purposes of the organization of the district.
Now, the title of the act shows that the...
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