State v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 05 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 415A88,415A88
• Citation: 329 N.C. 709,407 S.E.2d 805
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. William E. TUCKER.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 805

407 S.E.2d 805

329 N.C. 709

STATE of North Carolina v. William E. TUCKER.

No. 415A88.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 5, 1991.

Appeal of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(a) from a conviction of murder in the first degree and a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Lamm, J., at the 16 May 1988 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Catawba County. Motion to bypass Court of Appeals as to defendant's armed robbery conviction and sentence allowed 19 December 1988. Heard in the Supreme Court 9 October 1989.

Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen. by Debra C. Graves, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Mark D. Montgomery, Asst. Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

EXUM, Chief Justice.

Defendant was indicted on 6 August 1984 for the first-degree murder of Melissa Rowe and on 2 December of the following year for robbery with a dangerous weapon perpetrated at the same time as the murder. After defendant's conviction by a jury of both crimes, a capital sentencing proceeding was conducted. The jury recommended and the trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the murder case. The trial court sentenced defendant to a consecutive term of forty years' imprisonment for the armed robbery. Our review of the record of defendant's trial reveals that it was conducted without reversible error.

I.

Evidence presented by the State tended to show that the following events took place in Catawba County on Easter weekend 1984:

Shortly before midnight on 21 April 1984, Catawba County Sheriff's officers found the body of Melissa Rowe in the bedroom of a mobile home. An autopsy later revealed that the victim had suffered multiple lacerations from a knife. The pathologist identified one laceration across the throat as the probable cause of her death.

On Friday evening, 20 April 1984, Randy Setzer, Barry Shuemaker, and defendant, among others, consumed cocaine throughout the night. At approximately 7:30 a.m. Saturday, Carolyn Raper drove defendant and Setzer to the trailer where the victim resided. Initially, Setzer entered alone to buy cocaine, but when the victim began having convulsions, Setzer called Raper and defendant to come in. Eventually Rowe revived sufficiently to bring a large bag of cocaine from the bedroom and to parcel out a small portion, which she gave to Setzer. Raper drove Setzer and defendant to a motel room occupied by Tony Isenhowr. ^*

Shuemaker introduced Isenhowr to defendant Saturday evening in the motel parking lot. The three went to Rowe's mobile home, where Isenhowr entered with defendant. Defendant bought a gram of cocaine from Rowe. The three drove to a rest area, where they injected the cocaine. Isenhowr heard defendant say that "he may have to hurt her." Isenhowr protested but was reassured by the others, and the three went back to Rowe's mobile home.

When they arrived--around 10:30 p.m.--Isenhowr again accompanied defendant into the mobile home. Shuemaker remained in the car with the engine running. Rowe came to the door and told Shuemaker to come in too, for she was on the phone. When she hung up, she invited the three to "free base" cocaine with her. Presently, after talking prices and quantities, defendant, picking up a butcher knife, followed Rowe into the bedroom. After twenty or thirty seconds a commotion broke out, and the victim hollered, "No, don't, no, don't." Shuemaker went out the front door. Isenhowr followed, but was hit at the door by a bag of cocaine thrown by defendant, who told him to take it to the car. Bending down to pick up the bag, Isenhowr saw defendant "swinging at Miss Rowe and hitting her" with a knife. She was bleeding from wounds in her face and saying "no, don't, stop it, don't do this, just take it, they'll kill you." Isenhowr went to the car, where he and Shuemaker waited for ten or fifteen minutes. Defendant came out, holding up his bloody hands and arms. At defendant's direction, Isenhowr let defendant into the car trunk. He then drove to a mobile home belonging to Terry Barry, with whom defendant had been staying, and got a change of clothes. Remarking on the blood on defendant as he emerged from the trunk, Isenhowr asked what had happened. Defendant answered: "The bitch wouldn't shut up so I cut her fucking throat, I shut her up." Defendant washed off in a lake and changed clothes. Isenhowr, Shuemaker, Barry, and defendant drove to a pull-off, burned the bloody clothes, and then drove to Isenhowr's motel room, where they injected more cocaine and divided the cocaine they had taken from Rowe.

An SBI Special Agent removed the interior and exterior doorknobs of Rowe's mobile home and sent them to the lab for processing. He had observed what tests later proved to be a smear of the victim's blood on the knob. He chose not to lift the prints he perceived on one of the knobs in the event they had been made in blood.

Latent prints corresponding to those of defendant were found on a soda pop can and bottle found in Rowe's mobile home and on a glass from the bedroom where her body was found. Two latent prints on the interior doorknob were Isenhowr's; nothing corresponding to defendant's prints was on either the interior or exterior doorknob.

II.

Defendant first argues that the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion for an expert in fingerprint, hair, and blood analysis and for a nontestimonial identification order to obtain the hair of Shuemaker. This argument is closely related to defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refusing to issue sanctions against the State for discovery violations.

Within a week of the victim's death, hair samples from the crime scene and the interior and exterior doorknobs were submitted to the State Bureau of Investigation for analysis. Beyond identifying the blood on the doorknob and other stained items as being consistent with that of the victim, the report deferred further analysis, particularly of the hair samples, for a time when known samples from one or more suspects would be available. The record does not reflect when this report was released to the office of the district attorney; but a follow-up report, dated 16 May 1988, finding no match between the crime scene hair samples and samples from Isenhowr, was not delivered to the SBI supervisor until 18 May 1988. Defendant was given both reports the same day.

Defendant had first moved on 15 October 1987 for an order allowing him to inspect the physical evidence in the State's custody and to review test analyses. The trial court deferred ruling on the motion until the State had had an opportunity to examine the file and to decide whether to permit open file discovery.

In response to a 15 February 1988 motion to dismiss alleging the State's failure to provide discovery, the State sent defendant a letter the next day granting him open file discovery.

On 23 February 1988 the trial court noted that the prior order had not compelled discovery, but had deferred ruling on the matter. The court then denied defendant's motion to dismiss, entering a full order of discovery in response to defendant's 15 October 1987 motion. The order directed the district attorney

[to] permit the defendant through counsel to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant or copies thereof within the possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due diligence may be known to the pro[s]ecutor and ... to divulge knowledge, [in] written or recorded form the substance of any oral statement relevant to the subject matter of the case made by the defendant regardless of to whom the statement was made within the possession, custody, control of the state the existence of which is known to the prosecutor or become[s] known to him prior to or during the course of trial ...; the prosecutor further and is herein ordered to permit the defendant, through his attorneys, to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, mechanical or electronic recordings, buildings and places or any other crime scene tangible objects which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state and which are material to the preparation of his defense or intended for use by the state as evidence at the trial or were obtained from or belonged to defendant.

The order required the State to allow defendant similarly to examine the evidence of physical or mental tests or experiments performed in connection with the case, and to be in compliance with its provisions within ten days. The court told defendant that he could have no more than the statute required regarding the statements of the State's witnesses--a copy when the witness testified. To the State's expression of concern that certain lab tests were not yet complete and their results might not be known within ten days, the court responded: "If you've got it, you've got ... to give it to him." The court subsequently admonished defendant, "This is a two-way street. This doesn't require you to sit back and have him come to you. I have ordered precisely what the statute allows. Gives you an opportunity to see and copy. They're under no obligation to provide you with a thing."

Defendant next moved on 7 April 1988 for an expert to review hair, blood, and fingerprint evidence and to dismiss or continue the action. These motions and a 9 April motion for a nontestimonial identification order for Shuemaker's hair were denied 16 May 1988. The court refused to order funds for an expert, "finding that the defendant has not cited any particularized need." In addition, the court intimated that defendant, who had known about the nature of the evidence at least since December 1987, had been dilatory in not presenting the motion for an expert to the court before 7 April.

Much later in the trial, defendant again twice objected to the introduction of...