State v. Turner, Docket: Ken-16-402.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2017
• Docket Number: Docket: Ken-16-402.
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Ryan TURNER
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

169 A.3d 931

STATE of Maine

v.Ryan TURNER

Docket: Ken-16-402.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: April 13, 2017

Decided: August 22, 2017

Revised: December 7, 2017

Scott F. Hess, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Scott F. Hess, LLC, Augusta, for appellant Ryan Turner

Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, Francis Griffin, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), and Mary–Ann Letourneau, Stud. Atty., Prosecutorial District IV, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶ 1] Ryan Turner drove his car up over a sidewalk median in Waterville and drew the attention of a Winslow police officer who had just stopped another driver, coming across the bridge into Waterville, for a traffic infraction that had occurred in Winslow. After Turner careened onward, he pulled into a parking lot and stopped his car. The Winslow officer stopped what he was doing, followed Turner, and approached Turner in the parking lot. Following that contact, Turner was charged by an arriving Waterville officer with operating under the influence (Class D), 29–A M.R.S. § 2411(1–A)(C)(1) (2016). After a jury found Turner guilty, the court (Kennebec County, Benson, J. ) entered a judgment of conviction. Turner appeals from the conviction, arguing that the motion court (Marden, J. ) erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the Winslow officer's extraterritorial stop of his vehicle because the officer exceeded the authority granted to him by 30–A M.R.S. § 2671 (2016) and Winslow, Me., Code § 2–44 (2010). We affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The following facts were found by the motion court and are supported by competent evidence in the suppression record. See State v. Kierstead , 2015 ME 45, ¶ 14, 114 A.3d 984.

[¶ 3] On March 19, 2015, at approximately 10:00 p.m., a Winslow law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop in Winslow, but the car drove into Waterville before stopping. While engaged in that traffic stop in Waterville, the officer heard a loud noise and observed a silver four-door sedan drive over the curb and proceed in an erratic manner while turning from Spring Street onto Front Street. The officer terminated the traffic stop and attempted to locate the silver sedan on Front Street. He noticed a vehicle of identical appearance parked in an adjacent bank parking lot. The officer pulled his cruiser in behind the vehicle, leaving sufficient room for the vehicle to pull around the cruiser, and turned on the cruiser's blue lights. He noticed that the motor was not running and that there was damage to the vehicle and fluid on the ground consistent with what one would observe after a vehicle had been driven over a curb. The officer also made observations of the driver, whose appearance indicated impairment. The officer asked for the driver's license and registration and identified the driver as Turner. The officer took no further action and immediately notified Waterville police.¹ The record reflects that a Waterville officer arrived approximately two minutes later.

[¶ 4] Turner was charged by complaint with criminal operating under the influence and failing to submit to a chemical test (Class D), 29–A M.R.S. § 2411(1–A)(C)(1). He entered a not guilty plea and moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the Winslow officer's stop of the vehicle, arguing that he was unreasonably seized by the Winslow police officer because the officer was acting outside the municipality where he had been appointed, in violation of Maine's "fresh pursuit" statute, 30–A M.R.S. § 2671, and the Winslow Code.

[¶ 5] On April 26, 2016, the court held a suppression hearing where the Winslow officer was the only testifying witness. After the hearing, the court entered an order denying the motion to suppress. Turner filed two motions for further findings of fact and conclusions of law and a motion to reconsider. The court ultimately concluded that the officer's observations of the erratic operation and possible property damage constituted specific and articulable facts for the officer to reasonably believe that a misdemeanor had been committed in his presence or that the driver was impaired and needed assistance. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 41A(d). The court further concluded that Turner was not seized until the Winslow officer asked for Turner's license and registration, at which time the encounter became an investigatory detention. The court declined to give weight to Turner's argument that the Winslow officer did not have jurisdictional authority to seize him in Waterville. Citing to State v. Rideout , 2000 ME 194, 761 A.2d 288, and State v. Jolin , 639 A.2d 1062 (Me. 1994), the court concluded, "The officer had probable cause to arrest [Turner] and his action was reasonable in light of an immediate need to prevent [Turner] from harming himself or others. An extraterritorial arrest is not per se unreasonable giving rise to the application of the exclusionary rule." The court declined to make further findings regarding the Winslow officer's contact with the Waterville Police Department.

[¶ 6] Following the denial of the motion to suppress, the court (Benson, J. ) held a one-day jury trial on August 22, 2016. The jury found Turner guilty, and the court sentenced him to the mandatory ninety-six hours' imprisonment required by his refusal to submit to a chemical test, a 150–day license suspension, and a $600 fine. See 29–A M.R.S. § 2411(5)(A) (2016). Turner timely appealed. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2016) ; M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 7] Turner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he was unreasonably seized when the Winslow officer, outside that officer's territorial jurisdiction, stopped him in violation of Maine's fresh pursuit statute and the local ordinance. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review the findings of fact for clear error and the conclusions of law de novo. State v. Gerry , 2016 ME 163, ¶ 11, 150 A.3d 810. Because Turner does not challenge the court's factual findings, we review only the legal determination that the officer's seizure of Turner was constitutional and reasonable. See Kierstead , 2015 ME 45, ¶ 14, 114 A.3d 984. "We will uphold the denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court's decision." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

A. Fourth Amendment Seizure

[¶ 8] The State contests the court's finding that the Winslow officer subjected Turner to an investigatory detention. It argues that, without investigatory detention, Turner's Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated.² Although Turner asserts that the State cannot contest this finding because it did not cross-appeal, when the defendant appeals, the State is not required to cross-appeal and "may argue that error in the proceedings at trial in fact supports the judgment."

15 M.R.S. § 2115–A(3). Ultimately, we defer to the motion court's factual findings and final conclusion that the Winslow officer effected a brief, investigatory detention of Turner for which Turner was entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.³

[¶ 9] Therefore, we must determine whether the officer's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure. See State v. Gulick , 2000 ME 170, ¶¶ 12–13, 759 A.2d 1085. As always, this is a mixed question of fact and law. See Gerry , 2016 ME 163, ¶ 11, 150 A.3d 810. We begin with the operative facts. The court found that the officer parked his cruiser behind Turner's car, activated the cruiser's emergency lights, and asked Turner for his license and registration. The Winslow officer was in Waterville as a result of a legitimate pursuit of a motorist who traveled into Waterville in the course of a traffic stop that originated in Winslow. The Winslow officer directly observed Turner's erratic and potentially dangerous operation of the car, and the Winslow officer's contact with Turner occurred immediately following that erratic operation and after Turner had himself stopped his car in the parking lot. Finally, the record reflects that the Winslow officer contacted the Waterville dispatch center and that the Waterville officer arrived within minutes of that contact.

[¶ 10] On these facts, the Winslow officer certainly had sufficient articulable suspicion of either the commission of a crime or the existence of a health and safety crisis to support the stop of Turner's vehicle, had the officer been operating within his geographic authority. Thus, the legal question presented is whether the extraterritorial nature of the stop rendered it "unreasonable" for purposes of a Fourth Amendment analysis, requiring suppression of the evidence obtained during the Winslow officer's stop of Turner.

B. Violation of the Fresh Pursuit Statute

[¶ 11] The geographic scope of the Winslow officer's authority is defined by statute. Maine's fresh pursuit statute provides, in pertinent part, "No police officer has any authority in criminal or traffic infraction matters beyond the limits of the municipality in which the officer is appointed, except," as relevant here, to "[a]rrest a person who travels beyond the limits of the municipality in which the officer is appointed when in fresh pursuit of that person." 30–A M.R.S. § 2671(2)(E).

[¶ 12] An exception to the limitations set out in section 2671(2)(E) exists when the officer observes the commission of a crime outside of his or her municipality. A municipality may authorize its police officers who have completed the basic training course required for continued full-time employment to make warrantless extraterritorial arrests of "[a]ny person who has committed or is committing in the officer's presence any Class D or Class E crime." 30–A M.R.S. § 2671(2–A) ; 17–A M.R.S. § 15(1)(B) (2016) ; see also 25 M.R.S. § 2804–C (2016). Pursuant to section 2671(2–A), the Town of Winslow has authorized its full-time police officers to make...