State v. Turner

Decision Date19 March 2010
Docket NumberNo. M2008-00482-SC-R11-CO.,M2008-00482-SC-R11-CO.
Citation305 SW 3d 508
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. Thomas L. TURNER, II.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Kerry Knox, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Thomas L. Turner, II.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Mark A. Fulks, Senior Counsel; William C. Whitesell, Jr., District Attorney General; and J. Paul Newman, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

GARY R. WADE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., CORNELIA A. CLARK, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

During the course of an investigation for a robbery and homicide, officers provided Miranda warnings to the defendant, who sought clarification regarding his right to the presence of counsel. Ultimately, the defendant executed a waiver and made a statement to police. Indicted later for first degree murder and other offenses, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his entire statement, arguing that the investigating officers had failed to honor an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. The trial court granted the motion, the State received permission to take an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. We accepted the application for review to determine whether the defendant was equivocal in his request for counsel and, if so, whether the police properly limited further questions to the clarification of his right to counsel until the right was either clearly invoked or waived. Because the defendant did not clearly assert his right and the police officers limited the scope of their questions until the defendant chose to execute the waiver of rights form, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

On the night of February 8, 2007, Tiana Klimpel was shot and killed outside of her apartment building in Smyrna. At approximately 9:00 a.m. on the following day, Thomas L. Turner, II (the "Defendant") and his co-defendant, Kelando Starnes, were arrested by Smyrna police. Within three hours, Detective Kevin Hodges and Lieutenant Todd Spearman began questioning the Defendant in a small room at the police department. The video recording of the interview, which is a part of the record, establishes that the police officers were seated on one side of a small table while the Defendant was seated on the other side with his back to the closed entrance door.1 Detective Hodges and Lieutenant Spearman wore identical wind shirts with "Smyrna Police" printed on the front. Detective Hodges asked the Defendant if he wanted anything to drink, and when he stepped out of the room to get a soft drink for the Defendant, the following exchange occurred between the Defendant and Lieutenant Spearman:

THE DEFENDANT: Are you my lawyer?
SPEARMAN: No, sir, I'm a police officer.
THE DEFENDANT: I . . . can get a lawyer, right?
SPEARMAN: That's your option.

Detective Hodges returned to the room within two minutes and read the Defendant his Miranda rights.2 Afterward, the following discussion took place:

HODGES: You understand all those?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
HODGES: Okay. Are you willing to sit down with us and talk about what happened last night?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I . . . can talk to you.
HODGES: Okay.

About fifteen seconds later, after Lieutenant Spearman had asked the Defendant about his educational level, another exchange occurred:

HODGES: Alright, so you agree with all that, and you're willing to talk to us?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I could talk—
HODGES: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: But . . . anything I say can be held against me, right?
HODGES: Yes, sir, that's one of your rights.
THE DEFENDANT: Um, how quick will my lawyer get here?
HODGES: Well, that's . . . up to you. If you wish to speak with an attorney then we're not going to ask you any questions, okay?
THE DEFENDANT: If, uhh—
SPEARMAN: Now that's your option.
HODGES: Yeah, that's your option.
SPEARMAN: That's something that. . . you know, once you do request that we won't speak anymore, so—
THE DEFENDANT: I'm talking about. . . will my lawyer be here today?
SPEARMAN AND HODGES: Have you called one?
THE DEFENDANT: I ain't even got a phone call yet.
HODGES: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, to be honest, this is my first time, I mean, I'm on probation already. I never did anything. I've never been in trouble a day of my life. . . .
. . . .
HODGES: Well, I mean, these are . . . your rights. You're the one that has to say whether you want to talk to an attorney or not.
THE DEFENDANT: Let's hear them. What kind of questions do you have?
HODGES: Okay. Well . . . you're agreeing that you do want to speak with us now without someone present, without a lawyer present, right?
THE DEFENDANT: Correct.
HODGES: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, then—I can stop at any time—
SPEARMAN: At any time you want.
THE DEFENDANT:—and get my lawyer.
SPEARMAN: Yes, at any time that you want to.
HODGES: Yes, you sure can.
THE DEFENDANT: Because really I don't know the system, you know, so I—
SPEARMAN: Let me—I'll make it a little bit more simple for you. We wish to ask you questions, okay? We wish to ask you questions about some stuff that happened. According to this, you have a right to a lawyer present, okay? That's your option. You know, do you want a lawyer present right now? Just yes or no.
THE DEFENDANT: I could—if I could afford one.
HODGES: It's not up to whether you afford one or not—
THE DEFENDANT: Oh, I can get one rather or not?
HODGES: Yes, sir.
THE DEFENDANT: And he can come today?
SPEARMAN: If you got one that you can call.
THE DEFENDANT: Can I—my phone, my phone is right there in that little envelope—can you go get it for me?3
HODGES: Well, I tell you what—we've got a phone that you can use if you want.
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, the number's in my cell phone, the lawyer.
HODGES: Okay, so you already have an attorney then?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
SPEARMAN: Who's your attorney?

The Defendant explained that his cell phone contained the phone number of a lawyer from a pre-paid legal service, which he had previously obtained in anticipation of court proceedings in an unrelated matter. The officers and the Defendant then engaged in further conversation:

HODGES: Okay. Basically . . . what you're telling me is that you really don't want to talk to us right now and you would rather speak to an attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: I mean, I could talk, `cause I could tell you—
HODGES: Well, I don't want to force you to do anything that you don't want to do, okay? I'm not here to do that.
THE DEFENDANT: I just wanted to hear what you had to say.
HODGES: Well, I mean, it's one of those two way streets. Either you want to talk to me and we'll sit down and talk, or you don't.
SPEARMAN: Or you want an attorney. It's that simple.
HODGES: It's . . . that simple.
THE DEFENDANT: All right, I'll talk to you.
HODGES: Okay. All right then, what I need you to do, okay, and you can read these if you wish—
THE DEFENDANT: And I can stop at any time, right?
HODGES: Yes, sir.
THE DEFENDANT: And get my lawyer?
HODGES: Yes, sir.

Afterward, Detective Hodges explained the purpose and content of the Miranda waiver form. The Defendant read the form silently and, after initialing it, submitted to the interrogation.4 The Defendant subsequently made a number of incriminating statements that led to his eventual indictment for his role in the murder and robbery of Klimpel.

At 1:26 p.m., after being questioned for nearly an hour-and-a-half, the Defendant slammed his hand down on the table and stated unequivocally that he wanted to speak to an attorney:

THE DEFENDANT: I'll tell you what. Get me a lawyer, and—and I'm through. Get me a lawyer, and I'll tell the lawyer exactly everything that went down. I had nothing to do with it. I can't afford one, I need a lawyer. Cause this is getting out of hand, I'm telling you man.
HODGES: I understand.
THE DEFENDANT: Real talk, man.
HODGES: Cool.
THE DEFENDANT: I—it wasn't me.
HODGES: Okay. All right, then. All right. That's cool.
THE DEFENDANT: I want to go home today.
HODGES: Hey, hey, hey. You've already —you've already asked for an attorney, okay? So do me a favor, and don't say anything else, all right?

At that point, Detective Hodges, who by then was alone in the room with the Defendant, ended the interview.

On May 8, 2007, some three months after the arrest, both the Defendant and a codefendant were indicted on charges of conspiracy to commit robbery, especially aggravated robbery, first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, possession of ecstasy with intent to deliver or sell, and possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver or sell. Afterward, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress his entire statement to the police, contending that because "he had little sleep, had been under the influence of drugs, and had been in custody for some time," the statements were the result of coercion. Later, he amended the motion on "the basis that he had unequivocally, unconditionally requested counsel prior to" the interrogation and, therefore, his statements were inadmissible as evidence.

Both Detective Hodges and Lieutenant Spearman appeared as witnesses at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The Defendant did not testify. Detective Hodges testified that, in his opinion, the Defendant, after considering his options, knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel before making a statement to police. He stated that the Defendant "appeared fine" during the interview and understood "that if he had any questions about any of his rights that we would explain those to him and . . . he could stop answering at any time." While Detective Hodges acknowledged that the Defendant had initially claimed that "he had an attorney," the Defendant immediately explained, "Actually I've got prepaid legal service." Detective Hodges also recalled that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT