State v. Turner

• Decision Date: 27 August 2018
• Docket Number: S18A0957.
• Citation: 818 S.E.2d 589,304 Ga. 356
• Parties: The STATE v. TURNER.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

304 Ga. 356

818 S.E.2d 589

The STATE

v.TURNER.

S18A0957.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided August 27, 2018

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Emily Kathleen Richardson, Deputy Chief A.D.A., Dekalb County District Attorney's Office, 556 N. McDonough Street, Suite 700, Decatur, Georgia 30030, Ryan Reese Leonard, District Attorney, Bonnie Kaye Smith, A.D.A., Anna Vaughan-Upshaw, Sean Alexander Garrett, Senior A.D.A., Douglas County District Attorney's Office, 8700 Hospital Drive, Douglas County Courthouse, Douglasville, Georgia 30134, for Appellant.

Dolly M. Fairclough, Law Offices of D. M. Fairclough, 2330 Scenic Highway, Ste. 311, Snellville, Georgia 30078, for Appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellee Arielle Turner was indicted by a Douglas County grand jury for the December 2015 death of her infant child. Appellee filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, seeking to prohibit the State from adducing items that were seized from her house during what she says was an unlawful search. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that the search was unlawful and granted the motion. The State now appeals; finding no error, we affirm.

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court and accept the trial court's findings of disputed fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744 (1), 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015) ; see also Caffee v. State, 303 Ga. 557, 557, 814 S.E.2d 386 (2018) ("An appellate court also generally must limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those expressly found by the trial court.") (citation and punctuation omitted). Viewed in this way, the evidence at the suppression hearing shows that on December 3, 2015, Appellee and her mother Terry Turner called 911 to report that Appellee's 10-week old baby was unresponsive. EMTs arrived at the residence (which Appellee shared with her mother) and began treating the infant.

Eventually, Appellee left the house with the EMTs to take the child to the hospital; Terry remained at home. Shortly thereafter, Douglasville Police Officer Joseph Wells arrived at the house and, while standing on the front porch, comforted a very upset Terry. Officer Wells testified that, during their conversation, Terry requested that they go inside and sit, noting that her legs were hurting and that it was cold outside. Officer Wells agreed, followed Terry inside the home, and sat down at the kitchen table. He did not search the house or seize any items. Victoria Bender, a detective with the Douglasville Police Department, also responded to the residence. She entered the home through an already open front door and sat with Terry and Officer Wells at the kitchen table. Detective Bender did not search the house or seize any items during this time.

Meanwhile, the child was taken to Douglas Wellstar Hospital where she eventually died. Investigators did not observe any marks or bruising on the child's body, saw no signs of foul play or evidence that a crime had been committed, and believed her death to be accidental.

Back at the Turner residence, Detective Bender was notified of the child's death, and she relayed this information to Terry. Terry testified that, after being notified of the child's death, officers instructed her that the home was a crime scene which no one was allowed to leave or enter. Shortly thereafter, more officers arrived, including a crime scene investigator¹ who, at some point, began photographing the residence. Detective Bender started questioning Terry about the events leading up to the infant's death and asked Terry to "take her around and tell [her] what went on last night." Terry testified that she did not consent to the officers entering or searching her home, and she explained that she did not stop the officers because Detective Bender "just told me that's what they was [sic] supposed to do."

Appellee was returned to her house by Todd Garner, a Sergeant with the Douglasville Police Department. When they arrived, law enforcement officers were still inside the residence with Terry. Around the same time, Mark Alcarez, the Chief Coroner for Douglas County, also arrived at the residence. Alcarez entered the home and immediately began "looking at things which the SUIDI² form suggests."³ Meanwhile, Appellee answered questions from Detective Bender regarding what had occurred prior to the child's death. While Appellee spoke with officers, she pointed out specific items that were part of the baby's sleep environment and diet, including a car seat, blankets, pacifiers, a bottle, and a diaper bag containing, among other things, medicine and formula.⁴ Sergeant Garner also took a short video with his cell phone while inside the home. Law enforcement seized the items identified by Appellee and stored them at the sheriff's office until the items were released to the medical examiner.

At the hearing on Appellee's motion to suppress, all of the testifying officers confirmed that they did not obtain a search warrant, that they did not have probable cause to search the house, that they did not ask for permission to search the home, and that they did not believe a crime had occurred when the search of the home took place. Instead, the officers and Alcarez explained that their investigation was done pursuant to Georgia's Death Investigation Act. See generally OCGA § 45-16-20 (2015) et seq.⁵ In total, law enforcement remained in Appellee's home for approximately three hours questioning witnesses, searching, photographing and videotaping the home, and seizing evidence.

In granting Appellee's motion to suppress, the trial court found the following: law enforcement conducted a warrantless search of Appellee's home; no exigent circumstances existed at the time of the search; while Officer Wells' initial entry into the residence was the result of Terry's voluntary consent, that consent was limited and did not grant other officers consent to search the home; Appellee and Terry did not consent to the search of their home but merely acquiesced to the presence and authority of law enforcement; and the video and photographs of Appellee's re-enactment were tainted by the unreasonable search.

On appeal, the State argues that the trial court's grant of Appellee's motion to suppress is clearly erroneous because both Appellee and her mother consented to the search of the home. The State also argues that, because the search was led by the county coroner pursuant to Georgia's Death Investigation Act, the evidence collected pursuant to that investigation is not subject to the exclusionary rule. We address each argument in turn.

1. The State argues that the search was lawful because Appellee and Terry expressly⁶ and voluntarily permitted officers and the coroner into their home and consented to the search. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial court, we cannot agree.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. Amend. IV. "Ordinarily, a search [by law enforcement] is deemed to be reasonable when conducted pursuant to a judicial warrant, which the Fourth Amendment requires to be supported by probable cause." Caffee, 303 Ga. at 560, 814 S.E.2d 386 (citing U.S. Const. Amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath and affirmation[.]"); and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) ). "Searches conducted without a warrant are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within a well-established exception to the warrant requirement," including "searches conducted pursuant to consent, the existence of exigent circumstances, and searches incident to a lawful arrest." (Citations omitted.) Caffee, 303 Ga. at 560, 814 S.E.2d 386. Indeed, a valid consent to a search "eliminates the need for either probable cause or a search warrant." Brooks v. State, 285 Ga. 424, 425, 677 S.E.2d 68 (2009) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) ).

"In order to justify a warrantless search on the grounds of consent, the State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given under the totality of the circumstances." Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 625, 491 S.E.2d 791 (1997). "[M]ere acquiescence in an officer's authority will not demonstrate the accused's voluntary consensual compliance with the request made of him." State v. Tye, 276 Ga. 559, 562, 580 S.E.2d 528 (2003). When reviewing questions of voluntariness, the trial court's determination is a question of fact and, "[u]nless clearly erroneous, the trial court's ruling on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted on appeal." Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 345, 687 S.E.2d 438 (2009).

Turning to the trial court's order, the court found that, "neither [Appellee] nor her mother gave consent for the officers to search, photograph, videotape or remove items from the house" and, instead, merely acquiesced to the presence and authority of law enforcement. The State asserts that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous because the record established that law enforcement and the coroner were given a valid consent to search the home by both Appellee and her mother. However, the trial court's determination that neither Appellee nor her mother voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of evidence from their home is supported by the record.

a. Terry's Consent

The State argues that, because the trial court found that Terry voluntarily consented to Officer Wells' initial entry into her...