State v. Tye, S03A0395.
Decision Date | 05 May 2003 |
Docket Number | No. S03A0395.,S03A0395. |
Citation | 276 Ga. 559,580 S.E.2d 528 |
Parties | The STATE v. TYE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Paul L. Howard, Jr., Dist. Atty., Marc A. Mallon, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for appellant.
Elizabeth L. Markowitz, Fulton County Public Defender, Atlanta, for appellee.
Stephanie Black was stabbed to death in her home. Police canvassed the neighborhood, attempting to locate witnesses. Appellant, Clarence Tye, lived next door to the victim, and was standing on his porch when an investigator approached to question him. The two were joined by a police photographer. At some point, Tye admitted that he had an intimate relationship with the victim. His shoes and the lower portion of his pants were stained with what he explained to be blood from an injury to his finger sustained while restraining a leashed dog. When asked to surrender the shoes, Tye agreed. Testing showed that the stains were blood from both Tye and Ms. Black. He was arrested and charged with murder.
No written order denying the motion was signed or filed. Almost two years later, however, the trial court entered a written order granting the motion. The order did not expressly address the plain view doctrine, and was based instead upon the trial court's conclusion that the State failed to prove that Tye voluntarily consented to the surrender of his shoes. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, and that Court correctly transferred the case to us in accordance with State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524(1), 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984).
Dean v. State, 250 Ga. 77, 80(2)(a), 295 S.E.2d 306 (1982).
The trial court cited State v. Norrington, 203 Ga.App. 574, 417 S.E.2d 203 (1992) as the authority for its ruling. The State urges that reliance on that case is misplaced, because it provides that a failure to warn, standing alone, mandates the grant of a motion to suppress. If Norrington did establish such a per se test for suppression, it would be erroneous. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (II), 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002).
However, the State mischaracterizes the Norrington decision, which Martinez v. State, 239 Ga.App. 662, 663, 522 S.E.2d 53 (1999). A review of the record shows that, consistent with Norrington, the trial court applied the totality of the circumstances test and gave no single factor more weight than any other. According to the order granting the motion to suppress, the State failed to meet its evidentiary burden based upon Tye's mental incapacity, his apparent perception that he was compelled to accede to the investigator's request, the number of police on the scene and the lack of an express warning that he did not have to surrender his shoes. Accordingly, we must first decide whether the totality of these enumerated circumstances authorized the trial court's finding that Tye did not voluntarily consent to the surrender of his shoes.
2. Tye has a low I.Q. Compare Raulerson v. State, supra at 626(2)(a), 491 S.E.2d 791. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248(II)(D), 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). It is a circumstance which bears on the accused's susceptibility to suggestion and intimidation. See State v. Osborne, 174 Ga. App. 521, 330 S.E.2d 447 (1985) (voluntariness of statement). Here, Tye's predisposition to comply with the requests of authority figures is implicit in his testimony that he surrendered the shoes because a police officer asked him to do so.
Moreover, "mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion...." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165(II), 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (voluntariness of statement). The interview with Tye did not take place in a formal custodial setting, and there is no evidence that the investigator or photographer was overtly intimidating. However, the coercion need not be express. (Emphasis supplied.) Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra at 221(I), 93 S.Ct. 2041. The interview occurred next door to the scene of a murder which was under active investigation and, at the time of questioning, Tye apparently was aware that there were numerous other policemen in the immediate vicinity. Although the presence of a large number of officers is not per se coercive, it is a factor to consider as part of the totality of the circumstances. 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.2(b), p. 644 (3d ed.1996). It can be especially relevant where, as here, the accused suffers from a mental deficiency, since 3 LaFave, supra at § 8.2(e), p. 667.
An appellate court Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54(1), 440 S.E.2d 646 (1994). Based upon Tye's testimony, his mental condition, the conditions under which he was interviewed and the absence of any express warning of the right to refuse to comply, the trial court was authorized to find that surrender of the shoes was the product of his belief that he had no choice but to accede to the investigator's request. See State v. Westmoreland, 204 Ga.App. 312, 314(2), 418 S.E.2d 822 (1992). Because the trial court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous, this Court must accept them. Tate v. State, supra at 54(1), 440 S.E.2d 646. Those findings support the legal conclusion that the State did not meet its burden of proof, since a showing of mere acquiescence in an officer's authority will not demonstrate the accused's voluntary consensual compliance with the request made of him. State v. Westmoreland, supra at 313(2), 418 S.E.2d 822.
3. Although the plain view doctrine was not specifically addressed in the trial court's order, the State urges we can consider that exception to the warrant requirement as an alternative ground for reversing the grant of the motion to suppress.
Pfeiffer v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829(2), 573 S.E.2d 389 (2002) (summary judgment). Notwithstanding the written order's lack of an...
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