State v. Twiggs
| Decision Date | 22 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. A-4417-14T1. |
| Citation | 445 N.J.Super. 23,135 A.3d 981 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Gary TWIGGS, Defendant–Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for appellant ( Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
Cooper Levenson, P.A., attorneys for respondent (Steven E. Rosenfeld, Atlantic City, on the brief).
Before Judges REISNER, LEONE and WHIPPLE.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WHIPPLE
, J.A.D.
The State appeals from an April 27, 2015 order dismissing an indictment charging defendant with conspiracy to commit robbery. The trial court dismissed the indictment because the State initiated its prosecution beyond the time permitted by the criminal statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2C:1–6
. Contrary to the State's argument, we hold that the statutory tolling provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:1–6, for situations in which “the actor” is identified by means of DNA evidence, refers to the individual whose DNA is analyzed. It does not apply to a third party identified by that individual. Consequently, we affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record. On June 16, 2009, defendant met S.T.1 in a Wildwood Crest parking lot to purchase 150 tablets of prescription painkillers. As defendant and S.T. talked in the parking lot, a man wearing a mask approached, pointed a handgun at S.T. and defendant, and ordered them into defendant's vehicle. After defendant and S.T. entered the vehicle, the masked man demanded their money, cell phones, and the drugs that S.T. was about to sell to defendant. After the man left with the money, cell phones, and drugs, S.T. attempted to chase him on foot but was unable to apprehend the masked gunman.
S.T. reported the robbery of his money and cell phone to the Wildwood Crest Police Department (the Department), which initiated an investigation. Several officers went to the scene of the crime and found a mask and gloves, which S.T. identified as belonging to the gunman. The officers submitted the gloves and mask to the New Jersey State Police DNA Laboratory (the DNA Lab), which extracted and analyzed DNA samples from hair found on the articles found at the scene. No DNA matches were available in the DNA Lab's database at that time, however. The DNA Lab entered the DNA profile into the Combined DNA Information System (CODIS).
Meanwhile, S.T. and defendant submitted to multiple interviews at the Department. During these interviews, S.T. admitted to police that he and defendant had met for the purpose of conducting a drug sale. Defendant denied S.T.'s account of the incident, leading police to suspect that he was involved in the robbery. S.T. also told police that he personally believed defendant was involved in planning the robbery. After sending the mask and gloves to the DNA lab for inspection in July 2010, the Department did not receive any further evidence until 2014.
On July 2, 2014, the Department received information from the DNA Lab that it had matched DNA from the crime-scene with DNA taken from Dillon Tracy after he was arrested for a different offense in 2014. Tracy's DNA profile matched the profile of the hair on the mask found in 2009, which the DNA Lab had entered into CODIS. Upon receiving this information, the Department obtained a warrant to take a DNA sample from Tracy. Defendant's DNA was not found or matched with a CODIS sample at any point during this investigation.
When officers met with Tracy on July 19, 2014, he initially refused to discuss the 2009 robbery. However, on September 16, 2014, Tracy told police that he was the masked gunman who robbed defendant and S.T. Tracy also told police that defendant arranged the robbery so they could both share in the drugs that Tracy planned to steal. Tracy told police he stole defendant's money and cell phone to make defendant appear to be a victim, and that he threw his gun away after the robbery was completed. Defendant was arrested on September 17, 2014 and charged with conspiracy.
On December 2, 2014, the grand jury indicted defendant and Tracy. The indictment charged both defendant and Tracy with second-degree conspiracy under N.J.S.A. 2C:5–2
a to commit first-degree robbery in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 a. The indictment also charged Tracy with first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1 a; unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5 b; and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4 a. Tracy subsequently pled guilty to each of these charges. On January 22, 2015, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the basis that the State's claim was barred by the general criminal statute of limitations. The trial court heard argument on the motion on April 14, 2015 and granted defendant's motion to dismiss because the State initiated its prosecution outside of the time permitted by the statute of limitations. The trial judge found that the prosecution was initiated more than five years after the June 16, 2009 incident because the grand jury proceeding did not start until December 2, 2014. The State appealed.
The State raises a single issue on appeal:
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WAS NOT TOLLED WAS INCORRECT AND THIS COURT SHOULD REINSTATE DEFENDANT'S INDICTMENT.
We review the trial court's dismissal of the indictment de novo. A trial court's “interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.” State v. Pomianek, 221 N.J. 66, 80, 110 A. 3d 841 (2015)
(quoting Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A. 2d 1230 (1995) ).
In cases where a plain reading of the statute “leads to a clear and unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end, without resort to extrinsic sources.” D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A. 2d 217 (citation omitted). If, however, the plain language of the statute is ambiguous, we may turn to extrinsic evidence to determine the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Ibid. Turning to such extrinsic evidence is also necessary if a plain reading of a statute renders an absurd result at odds with the Legislature's intent. Ibid. (citing DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492, 874 A. 2d 1039
); State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586, 95 A. 3d 721 (2014) (citation omitted). Such extrinsic evidence includes “legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.” DiProspero, supra, 183 N.J. at 492–93, 874 A. 2d 1039 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75, 861 A. 2d 123 (2004) ). Such evidence aids us in elucidating the Legislature's intent. We may not “rewrite a statute or add language that the Legislature omitted.” State v. Munafo, 222 N.J. 480, 488, 120 A. 3d 170 (2015) (citations omitted).
Finally, in criminal cases where the statutory language is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence is unhelpful in determining the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute, we apply the rule of lenity. We note that all penal statutes are to be strictly construed. D.A., supra, 191 N.J. at 164, 923 A. 2d 217
(citing State v. Valentin, 105 N.J. 14, 17, 519 A. 2d 322 (1987) ). In so doing, where ambiguity in statutory language persists after reference to the statute's language and extrinsic evidence, we resolve the ambiguity “in favor of anyone subjected to [that] criminal statute.” Ibid. (citations omitted).
The State asserts that this exception applies here, because defendant's prosecution was the result of obtaining DNA evidence. The State argues that the exception tolled the commencement of the statute of limitations period. The State argues that the exception overrides the five-year limitations period. W...
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State v. Twiggs
...to survive the motion to dismiss the indictment, so we also affirm the Appellate Division on that count.I.A.We derive the facts in State v. Twiggs from pretrial motion practice.On June 16, 2009, a detective from the Wildwood Crest Police Department responded to a robbery call. At the scene,......
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State v. Thompson
...for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division, the trial court issued supplemental findings. It distinguished State v. Twiggs, 445 N.J. Super. 23, 31, 135 A.3d 981 (App. Div. 2016), from the present case and noted that it was guided by the Code's commentary to N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6(c), which inte......
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