State v. Tyler G.

Decision Date07 October 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–0937.,14–0937.
Citation778 S.E.2d 601,236 W.Va. 152
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. TYLER G., Defendant Below, Petitioner.

Christopher Alan Scheetz, Follansbee, WV, for Petitioner.

Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Shannon Frederick Kiser, Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.

Opinion

DAVIS, Justice:

Petitioner, Tyler G.,1appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Hancock County that sentenced him to prison, after a jury convicted him of three sexual offenses against an infant. In this appeal, Petitioner has assigned error to the following: (1) failure to suppress statements made to police, (2) insufficiency of evidence of guilt, (3) improper use of information from juvenile record, (4) mentioning of polygraph during trial, (5) prejudicial effect of cumulative errors, and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. After a careful review of the briefs submitted by the parties, the record submitted for appeal, the oral arguments presented to this Court, and the applicable case law, we affirm.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The record in this case indicates that the Petitioner began dating A.M. in May of 2012. A.M. was approximately twenty years old at the time and was living with her parents in Hancock County. A.M. also had an infant daughter less than two years old, L.S., the victim in this case. Shortly after A.M. began her relationship with the Petitioner, she contracted the sexually transmitted diseaseknown as HPV (human papillomavirus). A.M. believed that she contracted the disease from the Petitioner because he was the only person with whom she was intimate at that time. Consequently, A.M. ended her relationship with Petitioner.

A.M. resumed her relationship with the Petitioner after about a month of separation. After the relationship resumed, it appears that A.M. would frequently stay at the Petitioner's home,2and Petitioner would on occasion stay with A.M. at her parents' home. On December 10, 2012, A.M.'s father was admitted to a hospital for back surgery.3A.M. invited Petitioner to spend the night at her parents' home so that she would not be alone with her baby, L.S. The Petitioner agreed to come over and spend the night with A.M. When they went to bed L.S. was placed between A.M. and Petitioner.4The next morning, December 11, the Petitioner got up and left the house. The Petitioner left a note saying he had to go to a GED class.5A.M. spoke with the Petitioner later that day by phone. During the phone conversation the Petitioner stated “that he accidentally bumped [L.S.] A.M. did not know what was meant by the remark.

On December 25, 2012, A.M. took L.S. to a local hospital because of an ear infection and an apparent diaper rash in her anal area that would not clear up. While at the hospital, A.M. was told that the diaper rash appeared to be hemorrhoids, but that she should take L.S. to a pediatrician. A.M. took L.S. to a pediatrician. The pediatrician informed A.M. that the bumps around L.S.'s anal area appeared to be genital wartsand that she should take the child to a gynecologist. A.M. took the child to a gynecologist. The gynecologist determined that L.S. did not have a diaper rash. Instead, L.S. was diagnosed with severe HPV. A.M. was told that surgery was necessary to remove the warts. A.M. eventually took L.S. to Weirton Medical Center on February 8, 2013, to have the genital wartsremoved.

While A.M. was at the hospital with L.S., hospital officials made a child abuse report to the Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”) and the local police. Several police officers and a DHHR investigator came to the hospital and met with A.M. and the doctor who removed the genital wartsfrom L.S. The police and the DHHR investigator were informed that the Petitioner and A.M.'s father were the only two males that were around L.S. They also were informed by the doctor that the genital wartswere around the baby's anal area and were actually inside her anal cavity. This information prompted a formal child abuse and criminal investigation.

The police left the hospital and went to the Petitioner's home to interview him. The Petitioner agreed to accompany the police to the local police station for the interview. During the interview, the Petitioner stated that when he stayed the night at A.M.'s home on December 10, 2012, he “accidentally touched” L.S., and that he was “ashamed, embarrassed, upset that he did it.” After the police concluded their questioning of the Petitioner, he left the police station and went home.

On the morning of February 11, 2013, the Petitioner's mother dropped him off at the police station. It appears that the Petitioner had been asked to come to the police station to take a polygraph examination. The polygraph examination was administered, to the Petitioner by a state police officer. After the polygraph was administered, the Petitioner was informed that some of his answers showed inconsistencies. Consequently, the Petitioner was asked to provide a post-polygraph interview. The Petitioner agreed to provide the interview. During the initial part of the interview, the Petitioner denied having sexual contact with L.S. However, during subsequent questioning by other police officers, the Petitioner stated it was possible that he could have had sexual contact with L.S., but he could not remember. The Petitioner went on to describe the following:

There was an event that he woke up during the night and his erect penis was exposed from his underwear and he was laying against the child, which was between him and the child's mother at the time in the bed. And her clothes, at least the bottom half, was off of her and he was laying up against the child's butt.

The Petitioner was asked if it was “possible that he entered her rectum at any time. He said it was possible, but he didn't really recall for sure.” Finally, the Petitioner was asked “is there any possible way that the penis did enter the anus of the baby?” The Petitioner responded yes to the question. The Petitioner was allowed to go home after the interview.

As a result of the criminal investigation, the police arrested the Petitioner on February 19, 2013. Subsequently, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against the Petitioner in April of 2013. The indictment charged the Petitioner with first-degree sexual assault, sexual abuse by a custodian, and child abuse resulting in serious injury. The case went to trial in May of 2014. The jury returned a verdict convicting the Petitioner of all three counts of the indictment. The circuit court thereafter sentenced the Petitioner to not less than twenty-five years nor more than one hundred years for first-degree sexual assault;6not less than ten years nor more than twenty years for sexual abuse by a custodian;7and not less than two years nor more than ten years for child abuse resulting in serious injury.8This appeal followed.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Petitioner asserts six assignments of error. The issues presented have specific review standards. Therefore, we will dispense with setting out a general standard of review. Specific standards of review will be discussed separately as we address each assignment of error.

III.DISCUSSION

The issues assigned for our review by the Petitioner are as follows: (1) failure to suppress statements made to police, (2) insufficiency of evidence of guilt, (3) improper use of information from juvenile record, (4) mentioning of polygraph during trial, (5) prejudicial effect of cumulative errors, and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. We will consider separately each assignment of error.

A. Failure to Suppress Statements Made to Police

The first issue raised by the Petitioner is that the circuit court committed error in denying his motion to suppress inculpatory statements he made to the police. The State contends that the statements were voluntarily made. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress.

This Court has held that [a] trial court's decision regarding the voluntariness of a confession will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or clearly against the weight of the evidence.” Syl. pt. 3, State v. Vance,162 W.Va. 467, 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978). We elaborated further in Syllabus point 2 of State v. Farley,192 W.Va. 247, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994), as follows:

This Court is constitutionally obligated to give plenary, independent, and de novoreview to the ultimate question of whether a particular confession is voluntary and whether the lower court applied the correct legal standard in making its determination. The holdings of prior West Virginia cases suggesting deference in this area continue, but that deference is limited to factual findings as opposed to legal conclusions.

Finally, we pointed out in syllabus point 1 of State v. Lacy,196 W.Va. 104, 468 S.E.2d 719 (1996)that:

When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court should construe all facts in the light most favorable to the State, as it was the prevailing party below. Because of the highly fact-specific nature of a motion to suppress, particular deference is given to the findings of the circuit court because it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to hear testimony on the issues. Therefore, the circuit court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error.

It is well-settled that the State has the burden of proving that inculpatory statements of the accused were voluntarily given. We set forth this principle in Syllabus point 5 of State v. Starr,158 W.Va. 905, 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975), as follows:

The State must prove, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that confessions or statements of an accused which amount to admissions of part or all of an offense were voluntary before such may be admitted into the evidence of a criminal case.

Accord State v. Blackburn,233 W.Va. 362, 368, 758 S.E.2d 566, 572...

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  • Frank A. v. Ames
    • United States
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    ...alone would be harmless error.’ Syllabus point 5, State v. Smith, 156 W.Va. 385, 193 S.E.2d 550 (1972)."Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Tyler G. , 236 W. Va. 152, 778 S.E.2d 601, 604 (2015). We have cautioned, however, that mere allegations of error cannot form the basis for application of the cumulat......
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    ...v. Dinga, 609 F.3d 904, 908-09 (7th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 501-02 (6th Cir. 1993) ; State v. Tyler G., 236 W.Va. 152, 163, 778 S.E.2d 601, 612 (2015) ; State v. Mitchell, 166 N.H. 288, 294, 94 A.3d 859, 865 (2014) ; Commonwealth v. Elliott, 622 Pa. 236, 292, 80 A.......
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    ...conviction should be set aside, even though any one of such errors standing alone would be harmless error." Syl. pt. 7, State v. Tyler G. , 236 W. Va. 152, 778 S.E.2d 601 (2015) (citation omitted). It was further noted that this doctrine is "applicable only when ‘numerous’ errors have been ......
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