State v. Urena-Muro
| Decision Date | 08 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | A19-1652 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jordan Antonio Urena-Muro, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Washington County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Assistant County Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
Appellant challenges his convictions of first-degree aggravated robbery and second-degree assault, as well as his sentence for the robbery offense, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that the state could impeach him with prior convictions if he were to testify at trial, by failing to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses, and in calculating his criminal-history score. We affirm the convictions, reverse the sentence, and remand for recalculation of appellant's criminal-history score and resentencing.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jordan Antonio Urena-Muro with several offenses stemming from a late night theft at a Walmart store, and ultimately tried two of the offenses to a jury: first-degree aggravated robbery and second-degree assault. Before trial, the state gave notice of its intent to impeach Urena-Muro with the following convictions if he were to testify at trial: fleeing police, terroristic threats, domestic assault, first-degree burglary, and fifth-degree controlled-substance crime. Urena-Muro objected to the impeachment evidence. The district court heard arguments from both parties, analyzed the issue on the record, and concluded that the convictions could be used for impeachment purposes. However, the district court ruled that the terroristic-threats and burglary convictions would be referred to as unspecified felonies to reduce the possibility of prejudice.
The state presented evidence that in December 2018, Urena-Muro stole items, including a suitcase, from a Walmart store. As he was exiting the store, an employeeconfronted him and asked him for a receipt. When Urena-Muro refused to provide one, the employee grabbed hold of the suitcase. Urena-Muro punched the employee's arm, chest, and shoulder. When the employee refused to let go of the suitcase, Urena-Muro slashed at the employee with a box cutter, cutting the cuff of her sweatshirt. Urena-Muro fled the scene in a vehicle, but the police stopped the vehicle and arrested him. The police found stolen items from Walmart in the vehicle, as well as a box cutter. The Walmart theft was recorded on a surveillance video, which was admitted into evidence.
Urena-Muro elected not to testify at trial because he feared the prejudicial effect of his prior criminal record. Urena-Muro did not ask the court to provide a jury instruction regarding lesser-included offenses, and the district court did not provide one.
The jury found Urena-Muro guilty of both offenses. The district court entered judgments of conviction for both offenses, but imposed a sentence only for the robbery offense. This appeal followed.
Urena-Muro contends that the district court erred in ruling that the state could impeach him with five felony convictions if he were to testify at trial. A district court's ruling on a request to impeach with evidence of a prior conviction "will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Ihnot, 575 N.W.2d 581, 584 (Minn. 1998) (quotation omitted).
Under Minn. R. Evid. 609, the credibility of a witness may be impeached with prior convictions. There are two types of convictions that may be admissible for impeachmentunder rule 609. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a); State v. Flemino, 721 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Minn. App. 2006). One type of conviction that may be used for impeachment is a crime of dishonesty. Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2); Flemino, 721 N.W.2d at 328. As the state concedes, none of the convictions at issue here is a recognized crime of dishonesty for impeachment purposes.
The other type of conviction that may be used for impeachment is any felony-level offense, so long as "the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect." Minn. R. Evid. 609(a)(1); Flemino, 721 N.W.2d at 328. In making that determination, the court must consider the impeachment value of the prior crime, the conviction date and the accused's subsequent history, the similarity of the past crime and the charged crime, the importance of the accused's testimony, and the centrality of the credibility issue. State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 534, 537-38 (Minn. 1978).
The supreme court has explained the rationale for permitting impeachment with felony convictions not involving dishonesty as follows:
Impeachment through prior convictions allows the fact-finder to make credibility determinations by seeing the whole person to judge better the truth of his testimony. We have noted that lack of trustworthiness may be evinced by the defendant's abiding and repeated contempt for laws which he is legally and morally bound to obey. Under both our approach to Rule 609(a) and the common law tradition, it is the general lack of respect for the law, rather than the specific nature of the conviction, that informs the fact-finder about a witness's credibility, at least with respect to convictions other than those involving dishonesty or false statements. In other words, any felony conviction is probative of a witness's credibility, and the mere fact that a witness is a convicted felon holds impeachment value.
State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646, 651-52 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).
In ruling on the impeachment issue, the district court considered each of the relevant factors. The court determined that each prior conviction had impeachment value because, had Urena-Muro testified, the central issue would have been his credibility versus the credibility of the Walmart employee. The court noted that all of the convictions were "within the last six years" and occurred "almost annually." The court concluded that the burglary and terroristic-threats crimes were similar to the crimes being tried and therefore would be referred to as unspecified felonies, in an effort to reduce potential prejudice. The court recognized that admission of the convictions could dissuade Urena-Muro from testifying and that the fourth factor therefore weighed against admission. Lastly, the court determined that credibility was a central issue as "there were only two people present."
Urena-Muro argues that the district court did not "meaningfully" consider the convictions and failed to consider them independently. The record belies that argument. The district court heard arguments from both parties and explained its analysis of the relevant factors on the record. The district court discussed the prior convictions individually and as a whole. As a result of its consideration of the convictions individually, the district court ruled that although the state could impeach Urena-Muro with all of the convictions, the state could not refer to the offense type for two of the convictions.
Urena-Muro also points to the aggregate prejudicial effect of the convictions, but caselaw indicates that ongoing criminal activity has probative impeachment value. See State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 707 (Minn. 1979) ().
In summary, "[a] district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Eason v. State, 950 N.W.2d 258, 263 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). We cannot say that either of those circumstances is present here. We therefore hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the state's motion for impeachment under Minn. R. Evid. 609.
Urena-Muro contends that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of simple robbery and fifth-degree assault. Urena-Muro did not request such an instruction. "[W]hen a defendant fails to request a lesser-included offense instruction warranted by the evidence, the defendant impliedly waives his or her right to receive the instruction." State v. Dahlin, 695 N.W.2d 588, 597-98 (Minn. 2005). "Thus, absent plain error affecting a defendant's substantial rights, a trial court does not err when it does not give a warranted lesser-included offense instruction if the defendant has impliedly . . . waived that instruction." Id. at 598.
To obtain relief under the plain-error standard of review, a defendant must show that there was error, that the error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 2006). Error is plain if it is clear or obvious and not hypothetical or debatable. State v. Leutschaft, 759 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009). Generally, plain error is shown if it "contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct." State v. Hersi, 763 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). Error affects a defendant's substantial rights when it deprives him of a fair trial. State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 863 (Minn.2008). If the three prongs of the plain-error test are met, this court then decides whether it should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id.
Courts must give a lesser-included offense instruction when "1) the lesser offense is included in the charged offense; 2) the evidence provides a rational basis for acquitting the defendant of the offense charged; and 3) the...
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