State v. Vagle
| Decision Date | 22 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | A18-0878 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brendon Scott Vagle, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jonathan P. Schmidt, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Kate M. Baxter-Kauf, Arielle S. Wagner, Lockridge Grindal Nauen, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this direct appeal from a stay of adjudication, appellant argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress drugs found during the execution of a search warrant at his apartment. He argues that the underlying search-warrant application was based, in part, on an unconstitutional dog sniff and that without the information regarding the dog sniff, the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Because the dog sniff did not violate appellant's rights under the United States or Minnesota Constitutions and there was probable cause for the search warrant, we affirm.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Brendon Scott Vagle with first-degree sale of a controlled substance and third-degree possession of a controlled substance after police executed a search warrant at his apartment and found 21.11 grams of methamphetamine, a small amount of marijuana, one suspected lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) strip, scales, and $550 in cash. Vagle moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. The relevant facts, which are undisputed on appeal, are as follows.
A confidential informant told law-enforcement officers that Vagle was selling methamphetamine out of his apartment at #3N 4545 Valley View Road, Edina.1 DeputyArturo Lopez obtained a photograph of Vagle and showed it to the informant, and the informant confirmed that Vagle was the male who had been selling the methamphetamine at apartment #3N. Deputy Lopez confirmed, through the Minnesota Department of Vehicle Services website and contact with a United States postal inspector, that Vagle lived at #3N 4545 Valley View Road. Deputy Lopez went to 4545 Valley View Road and viewed the rear-entrance directory; the line for #3N displayed "B. Vagle." In addition, Deputy Lopez learned that a vehicle with license plate number 383-PRT was registered to Vagle and observed that vehicle in the underground parking garage at 4545 Valley View Road.
Deputy Lopez reviewed Vagle's criminal history and learned that he had been cited for traffic violations and possession of drug paraphernalia. Deputy Lopez also learned the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had received a tip from a DEA confidential informant that "a person by the name Brendon Scott Vagle" was selling methamphetamine out of apartment #3N 4545 Valley View Road, Edina.
On or about January 11, Deputy Lopez spoke with the manager of the apartment building at 4545 Valley View Road. The manager informed Deputy Lopez that Vagle used to live in apartment #3P and later moved to apartment #3N, after a domestic dispute with his roommate. The manager also informed Deputy Lopez that law enforcement had conducted a dog sniff at apartment #3P when Vagle lived there. The manager grantedpermission for the police to enter the building to conduct a dog sniff and provided Deputy Lopez with an access code to enter the apartment building.2
On or about January 18, Deputy Lopez and canine Officer Sean Young conducted a dog sniff in the common hallway in front of Vagle's apartment door, and the narcotics-detection dog alerted to the presence of methamphetamine at Vagle's apartment.3 The officers also swabbed the door handle on Vagle's apartment door for purposes of an Ionscan analysis.4 That analysis indicated the presence of methamphetamine. Following the dog sniff, Deputy Lopez obtained a warrant to search Vagle's apartment, relying on the information above, which was set forth in an affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant. The officers executed the search warrant the day after they obtained it and found drugs, scales, and cash in Vagle's apartment.
The district court ruled that the warrant was supported by probable cause and denied Vagle's motion to suppress. Later, the district court denied Vagle's request for reconsideration.
Vagle stipulated to the prosecution's case to obtain review of the district court's pretrial ruling. The district court found Vagle guilty of third-degree possession of a controlled substance and granted a stay of adjudication. Vagle appeals, challenging the district court's pretrial ruling.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Generally, a search is lawful only if it is executed pursuant to a valid search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate after a finding of probable cause. See Minn. Stat. § 626.08 (2018); State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1999). No warrant shall issue absent a showing of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10.
When determining whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, this court does not engage in de novo review. State v. McGrath, 706 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Minn. App. 2005), review denied (Minn. Feb. 22, 2006). Instead, "great deference must be given to the issuing [magistrate's] determination of probable cause." State v. Valento, 405 N.W.2d 914, 918 (Minn. App. 1987). An appellate court limits its review to whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Minn. 2014). In doing so, the appellate courtconsiders the "totality of the circumstances." State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985).
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)). "[T]he resolution of doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded warrants." Id. (quotation omitted).
Vagle's primary argument on appeal is that the dog sniff conducted by Deputy Lopez and Officer Young was unconstitutional and that "[w]ithout the unconstitutional dog sniff, the search warrant in this case was not properly issued." See State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 212 (Minn. 2005) ().
The Minnesota Supreme Court's most recent decision regarding the constitutional validity of a dog sniff in a common hallway of an apartment building is State v. Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018). A majority of the Minnesota Supreme Court held, "Because the police did not intrude upon the curtilage of respondent's apartment or his reasonable expectation of privacy when they conducted a narcotics-dog sniff in the hallway immediately adjacent to respondent's apartment door, a search did not occur under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 514. The majority further held, "Because police were lawfully present in the hallway outsiderespondent's apartment and had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the narcotics-dog sniff of the hallway immediately adjacent to respondent's apartment door did not violate Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution." Id.
Vagle contends that the Minnesota Supreme Court should have followed Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), and held that the dog sniff at his apartment door was a search under the Fourth Amendment requiring a warrant supported by probable cause. In Jardines, the United States Supreme Court considered "whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 569 U.S. at 3, 133 S. Ct. at 1413. The Supreme Court held that the dog sniff was a search governed by the Fourth Amendment, reasoning, in part, that the front porch was curtilage and therefore a constitutionally protected area. Id. at 7, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The Minnesota Supreme Court majority in Edstrom distinguished Jardines, reasoning, Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 520.
"The court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent." State v. Curtis, 921 N.W.2d 342, 342 (Minn. 2018). We therefore follow the majority opinion in Edstrom and hold that the dog sniff in this case was not a search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As to the validity of the dog sniff under the Minnesota Constitution, we consider whether the police were lawfully present in the hallway outsideVagle's apartment and whether they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Edstrom, 916 N.W.2d at 514.
Vagle does not dispute that the officers were legally present in his apartment building when they conducted the dog sniff. But Vagle contends that the dog sniff...
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