State v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 19 December 2018
• Docket Number: A17-0373
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Edwin Thomas CURTIS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

921 N.W.2d 342

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Edwin Thomas CURTIS, Appellant.

A17-0373

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: December 19, 2018

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this case is whether the State or the defendant bears the burden of proving in a criminal case that the defendant is competent. The district court determined that appellant Edwin Thomas Curtis was mentally competent to proceed to trial. Following a stipulated-facts trial, the court convicted Curtis of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Curtis challenged the district court’s competency determination, arguing that the court failed to place the burden of proof on the State as required by State v. Ganpat , 732 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 2007). Declining to follow Ganpat , the court of appeals held that competency should be determined based on the greater weight of the evidence without regard to burden of proof. Because the court of appeals and the district court erred in failing to adhere to Ganpat and we cannot be certain the district court would have made the same competency determination had it applied the correct burden of proof, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

The State charged Curtis with criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree under Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(d) (2018). This statute prohibits sexual contact with a person whom "the actor knows or has reason to know ... is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless." The State alleged that on March 2, 2015, Curtis touched an incapacitated person’s breasts and genitals through her clothing. Counsel for Curtis suggested to the district court that Curtis was not mentally competent. In response, the court ordered an evaluation of Curtis consistent with Rules 20.01 and 20.02 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.¹

Dr. Craig Stevens conducted the evaluation. Dr. Stevens had examined Curtis before and was aware that Curtis had been committed for mental health treatment in 2008, 2012, and 2013. Dr. Stevens acknowledged that Curtis suffered from a significant mental illness. But because Dr. Stevens believed that Curtis was malingering, Dr. Stevens concluded that it was not possible to determine Curtis’s capacity to stand trial. Dr. Stevens opined that, because Curtis had not demonstrated his incompetence, Curtis was competent.

After receiving Dr. Stevens’s report, the district court held a hearing. Dr. Stevens summarized his Rule 20.01 finding at the hearing: "Basically, I—I was unable—because of [Curtis’s] poor performance, and which appeared to be purposeful, I really had no information about his competency, and I believe the assumption is unless a person exhibits incompetency, that the Court would view him as competent."

Following the hearing, the district court determined that Curtis was competent to stand trial. The court incorporated into its findings of fact Dr. Stevens’s opinion that "the Court should find the Defendant to be competent as there is no evidence, based on his examination, the Defendant is incompetent." The court also referenced Dr. Stevens’s conclusion that Curtis was exaggerating his symptoms. The district court’s order did not cite any specific evidence that indicated Curtis had the capacity to participate in his defense, consult with counsel, or understand the proceedings. Nevertheless, citing the standard set forth by Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f),² the court concluded "[t]hat the greater weight of the evidence indicates the Defendant is competent."

After the district court’s competency determination, defense counsel arranged for an additional Rule 20.01 evaluation of Curtis by Dr. Gerald Henkel-Johnson. In a report dated November 11, 2015, Dr. Henkel-Johnson concluded that Curtis "presents with quite a mixed symptom picture." In the category of skills to assist defense, Curtis’s scores on one test Dr. Henkel-Johnson administered fell below the average score for developmentally disabled defendants deemed incompetent. And on another test Dr. Henkel-Johnson administered, Curtis’s scores fell in the category of clinically significant impairment in the areas of understanding, reasoning, and appreciation. Although Dr. Henkel-Johnson opined that Curtis’s "deficits in concentration and communication skills to assist his attorney or otherwise adequately participate in his defense are concerning[,]" he concluded that Curtis was competent. Dr. Henkel-Johnson recommended that Curtis’s counsel ask him closed-ended, rather than open-ended, questions.

Dr. Henkel-Johnson spoke with Curtis’s counsel after issuing his report, and their discussion prompted Dr. Henkel-Johnson to issue an addendum to his report clarifying his opinion. In the addendum, Dr. Henkel-Johnson acknowledged that his opinion that the defense attorney should communicate with Curtis by providing him with " ‘several alternatives that are listed for him, rather than asking him to generate a statement in response to an open-ended question’ ... may result in compromising Mr. Curtis'[s] ability to assist in his defense, especially his ability to testify in a relevant matter." And Dr. Henkel-Johnson opined that if that were the case, "then [Curtis] indeed is not competent to stand trial."

Based on Dr. Henkel-Johnson’s report and addendum, Curtis requested that the district court reconsider Curtis’s competency to stand trial. The court denied Curtis’s request and determined that Curtis was competent to stand trial. The court’s order again incorporated the opinion of Dr. Stevens, including the doctor’s conclusion that "the Court should find the Defendant to be competent as there is no evidence, based on his examination, the Defendant is incompetent." The court cited Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 5(f) and found "[t]hat the greater weight of the evidence indicates the Defendant is competent."

In June 2016, Dr. Henkel-Johnson testified regarding Curtis’s competency to stand trial in an unrelated case and provided the opinion that Curtis was incompetent. On the basis of that testimony, counsel for Curtis asked the district court in this case to vacate its previous Rule 20.01 competency determination and issue a new order deeming Curtis incompetent to stand trial. In a July 2016 order, the district court found Curtis competent to proceed to trial and denied the motion to vacate its previous competency determination.

Following the district court’s July 2016 order, Curtis waived his right to a jury trial and submitted his case to the court on stipulated facts. The court found Curtis guilty, stayed imposition of the sentence, and placed him on supervised probation. Curtis appealed, arguing the district court erroneously shifted the burden of proving incompetence to the defendant, in violation of both Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 and State v. Ganpat . See 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007) (stating that the State bears the burden of proving the defendant’s competence by a preponderance of the evidence). Declining to follow Ganpat , the court of appeals held that competency should be determined based on the greater weight of the evidence without regard to burden of proof. State v. Curtis , 907 N.W.2d 215, 218–19 (Minn. App. 2018). As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s competency determination. Id . at 219–20. We granted Curtis’s petition for review.

ANALYSIS

On appeal to our court, Curtis argues that the court of appeals erred in failing to adhere to State v. Ganpat , 732 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 2007). Specifically, Curtis argues that in Ganpat , we held that the State bears the burden of proving that the defendant is competent to proceed to trial. And he argues that the court of appeals and the district court erred in failing to assign that burden to the State. Because the State did not carry its burden to prove that he was competent to stand trial, Curtis argues, his conviction must be reversed. We "independently review the record to determine if the district court gave ‘proper weight’ to the evidence produced and if ‘its finding of competency is adequately supported by the record.’ " Id. at 238 (quoting State v. Mills , 562 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Minn. 1997) ). Proper application of our precedent, determination of which party bears the burden of proof, and the interpretation of the competency rule of procedure are questions of law that we review de novo. See Williams v. State , 910 N.W.2d 736, 740 (2018) (noting that questions of law, including the interpretation of rules of procedure and "[d]etermining which party has the burden of proof," are reviewed de novo); State v. Obeta , 796 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 2011) ("The question of whether to overrule precedent is a legal one that is subject to de novo review."); State v. Lewis , 656 N.W.2d 535, 537 (Minn. 2003) ("We review de novo the question whether and to what extent our precedent should be given retroactive effect.").

I.

Curtis first contends that the court of appeals erred when it refused to follow our decision in Ganpat , 732 N.W.2d 232. We agree.

The court of appeals did not follow Ganpat because it concluded that language in Rule 20.01 or in other decisions from our court did not assign the burden of proof to the State. Id . at 218–19. The court of appeals is bound by supreme court precedent, as it has repeatedly acknowledged. See , e.g. , State v. Final Exit Network, Inc. , 889 N.W.2d 296, 303 (Minn. App. 2016) ("We are bound by Minnesota Supreme Court precedent."), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 19, 2016), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 145, 199 L.Ed.2d 36 (2017) ; State v. M.L.A. , 785...