State v. Valera

• Decision Date: 24 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 15773,15773
• Citation: 848 P.2d 376,74 Haw. 424
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Guzon VALERA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 376

848 P.2d 376

74 Haw. 424

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Guzon VALERA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15773.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

March 24, 1993.

Reconsideration Denied April 12, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The prosecution may not use a defendant's statements obtained through custodial interrogation in a criminal prosecution against that defendant unless the prosecution can demonstrate that procedural safeguards were used to inform the defendant of his Miranda rights.

2. The Miranda warnings are an absolute constitutional prerequisite to admitting a defendant's statement, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, into evidence at trial.

3. This court has held that the Miranda warnings have an independent source in the Hawaii Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination.

4. Society has a valid policy of convicting and punishing persons convicted of criminal offenses; however, by prohibiting the use of a defendant's constitutionally infirm statements against him, even for impeachment purposes, we in effect recognize that every accused has the right to be informed of his freedom to choose whether to incriminate himself.

5. A defendant's privilege against self-incrimination must be maintained, even though it necessitates that a certain number of criminals must go free in order to preserve the rights of all persons accused of crimes.

6. The sentencing phase is considered a critical stage of the criminal process.

7. A sentencing judge generally has broad discretion in imposing a sentence which should be tailored to the particular circumstances of a defendant's case.

8. There is a legitimate need to provide a sentencing judge with complete information about the defendant.

9. The scope of a sentencing judge's inquiry into a defendant's background is very broad and limitations on the kind and/or source of information the court may consider are not lightly imposed.

10. A sentencing judge's discretion is not without limits. A sentencing judge is still required to impose a fair, proper, and just sentence based upon the crime of which the defendant was convicted.

11. While a defendant is not entitled to the full panoply of due process protections at sentencing, a defendant is entitled at the very least to the minimal procedural protections afforded by the due process clause.

12. The use of statements at sentencing previously obtained in violation of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination violates the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and right to due process, as guaranteed by the Hawaii Constitution.

13. The authority of a sentencing judge to select and determine the severity of a penalty is normally undisturbed on review in the absence of an apparent abuse of discretion or unless applicable statutory or constitutional commands have not been observed.

14. Pursuant to Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52(a), we must ignore errors that do not affect substantial rights.

15. A sentencing judge cannot enhance a defendant's sentence based on an aggravating factor not established by the evidence.

16. A judge may not punish a defendant for an uncharged crime in the belief that it too deserves punishment.

17. HRPP Rule 32(a) requires an adjudication of guilt before a sentence may be imposed.

Joyce K. Matsumori-Hoshijo, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Donald S. Davidson, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., Hilo, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LUM, C.J., MOON, KLEIN and LEVINSON, JJ., and HAYASHI, ^* Retired Justice, assigned by reason of vacancy.

LUM, Chief Justice.

Defendant-appellant Juan Guzon Valera (Valera) was found guilty by a jury of two counts of manslaughter, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-702 (1985) and the offenses of permit to acquire, in violation of HRS § 134-3 (1985) and license to carry a firearm, in violation of HRS § 134-9 (1985). On appeal, Valera does not contest his convictions; rather, he argues that the sentencing judge improperly considered and relied upon his suppressed statements when determining his sentence. We conclude it was error for the sentencing judge to have relied on statements obtained in violation of Valera's constitutional right against self-incrimination when determining Valera's sentence. We therefore vacate Valera's sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

On the night of March 24, 1990, Valera shot and killed his wife, Arcelie Valera and her alleged lover, Carlito Fernandez. Valera was arrested that night by Hawaii County Police Officer Kamakawiwoole (Kamakawiwoole). Valera, however, received inadequate Miranda warnings. ¹

While in a holding cell awaiting processing, Valera stated that he had shot his wife and her lover. Kamakawiwoole asked Valera, "What happened?" In response, Valera recounted the sequence of events leading up to the killings. ² Valera was also asked where he had obtained the gun and replied that he had gotten the gun from a person in Kawaihae.

Valera was initially charged with murder in the first degree for the killings, acquiring a firearm without a permit, and carrying a firearm without a license. ³ On May 1, 1990, the State moved to determine the voluntariness of several statements Valera made to various people and to the police on the night of the killings. The statements include Valera's March 24, 1990 declaration that he had just shot his wife and her lover. Valera moved to suppress all of his statements, claiming that they were obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel as guaranteed by article I, sections 10 and 14 of the Hawaii Constitution, respectively.

The circuit court granted Valera's motion to suppress the statements he had made in response to Kamakawiwoole's question, "What happened?" and his statements regarding where he had obtained the gun used in the killings. The circuit court specifically determined that these statements were the product of custodial interrogation in which Valera had been given inadequate Miranda warnings and that Valera had not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights to silence and to counsel under article I, sections 10 and 14 of the Hawaii Constitution. ⁴

The circuit court ruled Valera's suppressed statements could not be introduced at trial, in any manner, by the State. We affirmed the circuit court's ruling in State v. Valera, 72 Haw. 614, 810 P.2d 667 (1991).

Valera was found guilty, after a jury trial, of two counts of manslaughter (Counts I and II) and of the other offenses as charged. The State subsequently filed three motions regarding sentencing: (1) a Motion for Extended Term Sentencing, pursuant to HRS § 706-661 (1985); (2) a Motion for Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, pursuant to HRS § 706-660.1 (Supp.1991); and (3) a Motion to Impose Consecutive Sentencing, pursuant to HRS § 706-668.5 (Supp.1992).

At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to a reference made to Valera's suppressed statements in the presentence investigation report and requested that the reference be stricken.

The sentencing judge, by implication, overruled defense counsel's objection and implicitly denied the defense's motion to strike, stating:

As far as this matter goes, there are [sic] certain evidence, which the jury could not hear but which is in the minds of all those who sat through the trial including defense counsel and prosecutor, I cannot dismiss from my mind. I think it is clear from Mr. Valera's statement is they [sic] went to Mauna Kea Beach Hotel, followed his wife from the Beach Hotel all the way to Honokaa. Although it's not explicit in the statement, I think it's implicit that he had this illegally obtained .357 Magnum in his car.

When he saw his wife meet with Mr. Fernandez, he then approached the vehicle with his vehicle, parked behind his vehicle, went out with his weapon, and shot Mrs. Valera as she fled the car. Then he chased Mr. Fernandez down to Honokaa club, quite a distance of about three football lengths, I believe it was, the testimony, and finished him off at the Honokaa Club.

I think if the jury had heard the evidence which had to be barred because of the way the police questioned Mr. Valera, a different result would have occurred. I think in sentencing, the Court can consider that [sic] those items which had to be barred. I think in this case, Mr. Valera acted as an executioner. He stalked his victim [sic] and shot them one after the other.

The sentencing judge also denied the State's motions for extended term and mandatory minimum term sentencing, but granted its motion for consecutive sentence with respect to Valera's manslaughter convictions. Valera was sentenced to serve: (a) two ten-year consecutive terms of imprisonment for Counts I and II; (b) a five-year concurrent term of imprisonment for Count III; and (c) a one-year concurrent term of imprisonment for Count IV. Judgment was entered and this appeal followed.

II.

Valera argues on appeal that the sentencing judge ⁵ violated his constitutional rights to due process and to counsel, and his privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by article I, sections 5, 14 and 10 of the Hawaii Constitution, ⁶ by relying almost exclusively upon his suppressed statements in determining his sentence. ⁷ Valera, therefore, asks this court to extend the Santiago rule prohibiting the use of illegally obtained confessions as evidence at trial to the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.

The State counters that the exclusionary rule should not apply at sentencing proceedings; however, should this court determine that the rule does apply, any error by the sentencing judge in considering Valera's suppressed statements was harmless, because most of the substantive content of Valera's statements was elicited during trial either through testimony or physical evidence. Thus, the State argues, Valera's sentence was supported by the totality of the...